Insights from the Frontlines: Senior Defense Officials Discuss Ukraine in Exclusive DOD Briefing

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Good morning, everyone. We appreciate you joining us for today’s background briefing regarding an update on the UDCG. Just a reminder, today’s call is on background attributed to senior defense officials.

Please be aware that we will be calling on reporters, so utilize the raise hand feature and we’ll endeavor to address as many of your inquiries as possible within the 30 minutes we have. Before we commence, kindly remember to keep your phones muted unless posing a question.

Now, I’ll pass the floor to our first senior defense official, followed by our second, for any introductory remarks?

Senior Defense Official 1: Thank you, Charlie. Wishing everyone a Happy New Year. Today, we have the chance to converse with you right before Secretary Austin hosts the 25th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on Thursday, January 25th at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

It seems like we timed it well. 25 is a fitting number. As you will recall, Ramstein is where it all commenced back in April 2022, when Secretary Austin held the inaugural meeting of this group at Ramstein. Thus, this meeting sends a clear and we believe impactful message of support for Ukraine from this coalition of approximately 50 nations.

As the conflict persists into its third year — and a third winter — this group has demonstrated remarkable dedication, focus, and determination to ensure Ukraine’s success in the face of Russian hostility. Those of you traveling with the secretary will especially witness this at the upcoming meeting.

A few overarching statistics: so far, the United States, allies, and partners have together pledged over $126 billion in security support to Ukraine since the onset of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. For the United States, this encompasses two Patriot batteries, in addition to various air defense systems, hundreds of interceptors, numerous HIMARS systems, and thousands of rounds of associated ammunition, including GMLRS and ATACMS, hundreds of artillery systems, millions of artillery shells, thousands of armored vehicles, over 100,000 anti-tank arms, hundreds of millions of rounds of small arms ammunition, and a substantial number of drones.

Allies and partners, just to provide a glimpse, have delivered extra air defense systems, including more Patriot systems or components from various countries, some of whom choose to remain unnamed. However, I would like to acknowledge and express gratitude to Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Italy for the SAMP/T system as well.

This coalition of allies and partners has established Ukraine’s F-16 capability, with Belgium and Denmark, along with the Netherlands and Norway, committed to supplying 79 jets, and Canada, Denmark, France, Romania, and the UK training Ukrainian pilots.

This coalition has boosted crucial munitions, including Soviet-era ammunition that enabled Ukrainians to utilize both legacy and donated artillery systems to defend their homeland, along with NATO-standard modern artillery systems, featuring a Czech initiative that has coordinated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of rounds of 155 millimeter ammunition from numerous countries with European funding.

Additionally, European nations have provided hundreds of main battle tanks and thousands of armed vehicles, including Leopard tanks, which now form the backbone of Ukraine’s future armored forces — a NATO-standard tank that constitutes the core of Ukraine’s next armored capabilities. I anticipate, similar to prior UDCG meetings, you will hear more significant security assistance announcements this Thursday.

The final point I want to emphasize before handing it over to the second defense official and then to your questions is to spotlight that the secretary will also host a meeting of the Coalition Leadership Group. This group consists of co-leaders for the eight capability coalitions, supporting Ukraine’s defense capacity and developing a credible deterrent force — not only for immediate battlefield needs but for the years to come.

The heads of these coalitions will convene to approve roadmaps that outline Ukraine’s requirements and objectives in areas like air force, armor, artillery, demining, drone, integrated air and missile defense, information technology, and maritime security through 2027. These roadmaps are designed to enable donors to sustainably support Ukraine into the future.

With that, let’s go back to Charlie and welcome your questions. Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Now, we will move to our second defense official.

Senior Defense Official 2: Thank you, Charlie. That was an excellent introduction. For everyone on the call, what you just heard is a solid recap of our journey and progress since April 2022, when Secretary Austin convened the inaugural Ukraine Defense Contact Group. As we prepare to head to Ramstein for the 25th meeting later this evening, I wanted to briefly communicate how the Ukraine Defense Contact Group is genuinely Secretary Austin’s initiative.

Numerous individuals and remarkable patriots, including Official One and their team, have contributed to its realization, and other nations have played a role as well. However, this initiative is fundamentally Secretary Austin’s vision, stemming from his experiences and contributions to the D-ISIS coalition and his profound belief that uniting allies and partners yields a sum much greater than its parts.

The evidence lies in all the figures, the statistics, the actual contributions made as a direct outcome, and our expansion from 30 nations participating in the first meeting to 50 nations assembling for this 25th contact group.

I would also like to underline that while it may seem apparent now, what the UDCG has achieved has transitioned us from sporadic goodwill and the bilateral support countries provided to Ukraine into a structured approach to meeting Ukraine’s urgent battlefield requirements and their longer-term needs through the supplies and donations that countries can furnish. It’s truly a significant accomplishment, and I believe it will be an excellent gathering at Ramstein.

The next point I wish to convey quickly at the outset, and I’m sure we can delve deeper into this with more questions, is the need to clarify a misconception that I believe exists: that the United States ought to have acted more swiftly to back Ukraine’s defense. This perspective overlooks the monumental effort that has gone into addressing Ukraine’s battlefield necessities as they have evolved. What Ukraine required in the initial months of the conflict differs from its ongoing needs, and we have adapted to meet those demands over time. We’ve also been very mindful of Ukraine’s requests, as well as its capacity to absorb, sustain, train, and operate on the capabilities we provide.

Lastly, I believe you have heard Secretary Austin mention, and you will likely hear him reiterate, that we have moved mountains to support Ukraine’s defense.

of its autonomous territory. And in this context, there are numerous unsung champions like the United States Transportation Command, who have labored tirelessly, alongside European Command, EUCOM, and others to perpetually deliver security aid into Ukraine. They are operating around the clock. They are functioning through the holidays. They are active even amidst these festive seasons. I believe this underscores our profound dedication to Ukraine’s defense.

I’ll take a moment there. Thanks, Charlie.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Thank you. We will begin with Patrick Tucker from Defense One.

Q: Good morning. I appreciate your time and the insights shared. In December, Ukrainian Parliament member Oleksandra Ustinova emphasized the significance of foreign assistance for Ukraine’s defense. However, she mentioned that less than half of the pledged aid had so far reached the nation, regarding items that have been authorized and the delays in their delivery.

This encompasses certain essentials they require, particularly now, to preserve any form of territorial — you know, to sustain territory in case of a ceasefire negotiation where new borders are primarily delineated. One request she underscored was for not only long-range artillery, although she did address that, but also for Blackhawk helicopters.

Is there any understanding of how to tackle or how would you describe — the gap between the advertised aid and what has been delivered, how would you define it? And can you inform us about the provision of some additional items that have been ratified and promised but not arrived yet, such as Black Hawk helicopters? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Thank you. It’s crucial to distinguish something. You made two separate points — one about the delivery of committed assistance and the other about Ukrainian applications that are under review and have not yet been approved or funded necessarily. I think Blackhawk helicopters fit into the latter category. Thus, it’s vital to differentiate between these two aspects.

Regarding the figures often mentioned concerning deliveries, we actually possess an information sheet on this, Charlie, which I would recommend you circulate, as we have developed it due to this inquiry circulating since July when announcements were made o—in relation to the NATO summit about assistance. For — I cannot speak for other nations, but for the United States, those figures unfortunately tend to conflate monetary amounts that were proclaimed for both PDA, the presidential drawdown authority, which addresses immediate supplies, and USAI, the longer-term funding — the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which entails procurement and production.

For instance, under USAI, the United States is supplying Ukraine with NASAMS, the air defense missile system, which will start shipping, you know, next year. These were contracted for back in 2022. Hence, a significant portion of the declarations you’ve noticed in the past few, well, throughout the conflict but particularly in the recent six months, have been USAI announcements that will — you know, items can’t be delivered until they exist. They have to be constructed and produced before being supplied to Ukraine.

In fact, you will probably — I think if the plans proceed as intended, you will hear a considerable announcement of another batch of USAI forthcoming. So, we should differentiate between the figures corresponding to PDA, which is available for more immediate delivery, and USAI.

The second aspect pertains to items like ammunition that we’re extracting from stocks — available stock that can be dispatched swiftly. The delivery statistics in that information sheet suggest rates between 80 and 90 percent for these items. They can be shipped rapidly because they are readily available and in working order.

A significant number of the armored vehicles that we have pledged to supply to Ukraine under PDA required refurbishment since they must be upgraded to be fully operational, which can take weeks, sometimes months. However, our aim is to provide Ukraine with usable equipment, not with machinery that they might not know how to repair because, well, this is Western technology, and they might not have the necessary training or spare parts.

Therefore, the overall numbers can be quite misleading. I recognize they are distressing for Ukrainians who see a headline and wonder where all this equipment is. Thank you for the chance to clarify this. I believe we can also follow up with specific numbers for you.

Charlie, back to you.

Q: Thank you. Just a brief follow-up on the Blackhawk helicopters, because you are correct; they are requested but not necessarily promised or delivered. Is there going to be any statement regarding them? The Ukrainians consider it crucial for policing the area they might control under any ceasefire arrangement, and it hasn’t received official approval yet.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: I don’t have any advance announcement concerning Blackhawks. However, what I will mention is that we are attentive to the Ukrainians’ needs, and we have been collaborating with them, along with partners and allies, to identify the required helicopters for those operations. We have been doing this since the very outset of the conflict, and we continue to seek those capabilities for them. But I have no specific updates to share right now.

Q: Okay. Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Alright. Over to Chris Gordon.

Q: Thanks, Charlie, and thank you to the officials for organizing this. I have two interconnected inquiries. First, what are Ukraine’s military prospects looking like for the upcoming months, and what factors will dictate success or failure?

Secondly, what is the current perspective on offering security guarantees to Ukraine without NATO membership, which is not forthcoming anytime soon? Does the US endorse providing security assurances to Ukraine? If so, how would they be structured? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Thank you. I genuinely do not wish to evade the second inquiry. However, the reality is that I represent the Biden administration, and I believe this inquiry is better suited for the forthcoming administration, not for the current one.

At the moment, especially within the Pentagon, our priority lies in equipping Ukraine with the defense resources we can provide within the available timeframe, including establishing contracts that will ensure deliveries through 2025 and into 2026 to enhance that capability, enabling Ukraine to be in the strongest position possible for potential negotiations.

Our assessment is that Putin is unlikely to concede anything he does not have to surrender. When he approaches a negotiation, especially amidst a conflict where his goals remain unmet and costs are escalating, he may become more amenable, listening to Ukrainian demands, especially as Ukraine holds a stronger position on the battlefield. Thus, our focus lies very much on this aspect right now.

Regarding that evaluation, Ukraine continues to withstand an extraordinary array of Russian offensives, air assaults on cities, crucial infrastructures far into Ukrainian territory, air strikes on frontline positions aiming to disrupt Ukrainian defenses, and artillery bombardments, indicative of the Russian modus operandi now augmented, of course, by North Korean forces in Kursk.

And yet, Ukraine continues to protect those boundaries. While they have lost some tactical ground, the losses are minimal.

level, which certainly is a topic of concentration, where the US is concentrating on the various capabilities Ukraine requires to counter Russia’s maneuvers, including certain operations on Russian command and control nodes, supply zones, and other such enabling capacities that Russia possesses to disrupt those capabilities — to hinder those operations aimed at assisting Ukraine fortify those defenses.

Nevertheless, it remains a continuous struggle, and what is essential from our perspective to enable Ukraine to perpetuate its defense is to sustain the flow of security aid. This is the purpose behind the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, allowing the secretary to once again convene with colleagues and partners to delineate what Ukraine needs to persist in that conflict into 2025.

Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We’ll transition to Missy Ryan from the Washington Post.

Q: Can you all hear me?

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Yes.

Q: Great. I’m looking forward to seeing everyone later, and I hope everyone is dressing warmly for the flight tonight. Essentially, I just wanted to follow up regarding the earlier inquiry about PDAs. To ensure we are on the same page as we enter these meetings this week, could you clarify how much of the PDA amount approved by Congress remains?

And I understand that some of it has to actually be — that you have already announced and drawn down, and that needs to be effectively transferred to Ukraine. But how much will be left for the Trump administration to decide on usage? I’m trying to gauge how much PDA authority will be available then when they take office in late January.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Excellent. Missy, we do have that figure. Since it’s a snow day, I’m addressing you from my home office, and I don’t have those numbers at my disposal. We do have them. A figure of around — $3.8 billion sticks in my mind. Would it be possible for me to obtain that specific number for you?

I — yes, I’m bringing a blanket and instructed all my team to ensure they pack a blanket for the delightful trip aboard the C-17. Therefore, I’ll have that information for you in the — in the DV lounge. I apologize for not having it immediately available.

Q: Alright.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: And just – Official 2, do you have it readily available?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 2: We will verify that. Senior Defense Official 1, I had something similar in mind, somewhere between about $400 — $4 to $5 billion in authority remaining. Missy, we will get that information for you, just as Senior Defense Official 1 mentioned.

However, I believe the principal point is the consistent rhythm and intentional effort we’ve undertaken to deliver capabilities in the — munitions and equipment into the PDAs and USAI packages we have released, and then coordinating with TRANSCOM to ensure these items reach Ukraine so they are equipped, and they have operational capacity. This is what this administration is capable of doing, leaving the subsequent administration to make decisions and the trade-offs they deem fit.

Q: Just to clarify, would the Trump administration have any ability to retract PDA disbursements that have already been announced but not yet delivered, and if so, how would we ascertain how much that would represent — in terms of equipment and dollar amount — on January 20th, should they choose to do so?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: So, as the other official pointed out, we are — right now, TRANSCOM is engaged in a surge operation to get the declared capabilities to Ukraine in the approaching days and weeks, as Ukraine requires them for the battlefield. Some of the vehicles I mentioned might require refurbishment and may not be delivered, but the vast majority of what has been announced will indeed be delivered this month.

Again, we’ll determine whether we have specific figures to share. However, we feel it is our duty, having developed those packages and understanding the urgency and significance for Ukraine to have that material on the battlefield, to ensure its delivery. We certainly will not leave that to anyone else. It is not their responsibility; it is ours.

Thus, we have genuinely worked to boost our capacity, even over the holidays, to ensure these packages are delivered, aside from items still undergoing repairs and refurbishment. Much of that equipment is stationed in Europe undergoing refurbishment and repair, and we anticipate its delivery in — you know, the near future. Over.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: Okay. We’ll proceed to Tara from Associated Press.

Q: Hi. Thank you for hosting this. I have one follow-up question and two additional inquiries. Pertaining to the announcement expected on Thursday, the senior defense official indicated that it was USAI. However, it was my understanding from our last significant announcement that all USAI funds had been allocated and expended. So, just to clarify, is that indeed USAI? I also have two other questions.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: I apologize if I misspoke. Yes, should there be an announcement this week, it would indeed involve PDA. Thank you for your understanding.

Q: Thank you. Then returning to one of your earlier points regarding the substantial amount of material sent to Ukraine, it seems — in hindsight, it’s not merely the volume but perhaps the duration it took to deliberate sending some advanced systems.

It appears that during the initial months of the conflict, there was a legitimate — and even extending into the first year, a genuine concern that dispatching certain advanced systems could escalate the situation with Russia. Ultimately, all of these systems were dispatched nonetheless. So, is there a sentiment in retrospect that some of those systems should have been delivered sooner to provide Ukraine a quicker advantage?

Additionally, have any officials involved in the Ukraine account had the chance to engage with any prospective members of Trump’s national security team to update them on Ukraine and advocate for maintaining this level of support? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Great. Thank you. Regarding the second question, there exists a standard transition process, complete with briefing materials and discussions, so that procedure is ongoing. I cannot comment on any precise briefings, but that process is indeed in motion, as it — it should be, because it is our obligation, our duty to the American populace, to ensure a professional and seamless transition to the upcoming administration. I’ll refrain from elaborating further.

Q: Is that — is that particular to Ukraine? Just — sorry. Or is that in general, but are you specifically briefing on Ukraine?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Again, I cannot delve into specific briefings. That would transcend what we can discuss publicly or even as background. Nonetheless, the transition encompasses all matters that the incoming team has inquired about and all topics we deem crucial to brief on. I’ll leave it at that.

In regard to the idea that — and the other official has addressed this, yet I want to be more explicit due to some of the claims I’ve observed. Firstly, what Ukraine required in 2022 was predominantly the capabilities to fend off the Russian assault on Kyiv, and that is precisely what we and other nations intensified. Items such as Javelins, Stingers, and ammunition supplies, not NATO standard ammunition, in fact, as they lacked those artillery pieces, but rather Soviet legacy ammunition.surges, for instance. And that’s how I devoted my initial months, examining the list of what Ukraine required in those early days to resist the Russian invasion — munitions for T-72 tanks, since they lacked, you know, contemporary tanks.

Consequently, that became the primary focus, motivated by the necessities of the Ukrainians in 2022. This also encompassed nations being ready to supply Soviet-era aircraft, as that was the type Filipino pilots were trained to operate in 2022. They weren’t trained to fly aircraft such as F-16s. And if you sort of — I’m certainly not an authority — well, I’ve gained more expertise, but the training duration for an F-16 pilot typically ranges from around two to three years.

Thus, the idea that dispatching Ukraine, let’s say, F-16s in 2022 would have been a more appropriate utilization of the PDA we possessed that year compared to initiating the delivery of 155 ammunition and artillery or HIMARS and GMLRS, which turned out to be absolutely crucial for the Ukrainians to repel the Russians during the summer and autumn of 2022, is a challenging assertion to justify.

I, you know, have never — I’ve never served as an officer myself, but I — you know, I suggest you consult some officers and ponder whether training F-16 pilots for an extended period while F-16s remained stationed on a runway somewhere in Europe was a more advantageous option for the Ukrainians during the summer of 2022 than Soviet-era ammunition competencies coupled with initiating their training and assisting them in operating those NATO standard platforms, which proved exceptionally effective that summer.

By the autumn and winter, however, the utmost requirement for Ukraine was air defense, with interceptors for Soviet legacy systems and/or ones they were already familiar with, alongside initiating the provision of Western standard air defense systems, such as NASAMS, SAMP/Ts, and ultimately Patriots.

Therefore, the counterfactual is complex because it presumes we had $126 billion in March 2022, which we did not. We had a limited number of billions, which was substantial, but we needed to prioritize what Ukrainians required in the battlefield at that time rather than contemplate systems that would necessitate months, if not years, to train them on how to utilize.

Now, we did engage in that as well, which is why, as we approached 2023, the Ukrainians were trained and capable of operating those more advanced systems. However, I believe this aspect of the narrative is often overlooked: we had to operate within the budget we had available at that time. We had to respond to Ukrainian battlefield priorities in the moment. And then we needed to consider the lead times for training and equipping forces with much more advanced and distinct NATO standard equipment.

Let me pause there for now.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We’ll transition to Carla from VOA.

Q: Thank you, Charlie. And thank you both for holding this discussion. I have two inquiries. First off, I am following up on the PDA. According to my Ukrainian service, we tracked $4.3 billion, so it would be incredibly beneficial to receive that figure.

However, we conducted background research on Ukraine in December, and a senior defense official informed reporters that the Biden administration would be unable to utilize all the remaining PDA funds, which was when it totaled $5.6 billion. Then, the following day, Mike Carpenter from the White House told VOA that the administration did have a plan to allocate all the funds for Ukraine.

So, when we receive the PDA announcement on Thursday, should we anticipate it to represent the total amount remaining of the PDA? Will it be substantially less? Will it be over half? Can you share further insights on that?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Regarding Mike’s comment, I would direct you to him. However, we do not anticipate that we will have completely utilized all PDA authority available. There will be a significant package announced.

A considerable package was announced along with that USAI package or within the same timeframe as previously mentioned USAI package. Another one is anticipated. It will offer critical capabilities. However, our data indicates, and we will provide those figures and have more concrete data for you on Thursday, given the announcement we expect. We believe there will be PDA authority left for future contributions to Ukraine. Over.

Q: Great. Just to clarify that, are we discussing that most of it will still be available or, you know, less than half? If you could offer additional specifics on that.

My second question relates to how the US is leading — is co-leading multiple of these eight combat capability groups. As we approach this final UDCG for Austin, what is the strategy concerning the groups that involve the United States? Are they making contingency plans to sustain these without US support?

And, I mean, is this disheartening for Austin as this was his initiative, and now the US might not play a significant role in this? What contingency measures are in place to continue this effort should the Trump administration alter its course?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Excellent. Concerning the PDA, I can’t provide a specific figure, and we will ascertain that in a few days. I think I have an idea of what it is. But I can state that there will be more than a couple of billion dollars remaining in PDA assistance for future utilization after January 20th.

As for the capability coalitions, the United States is co-leading two out of the eight. We are co-leading the Air Force Capability Coalition alongside Denmark and the Netherlands. And concerning the Artillery Capability Coalition, we co-lead with France. This indicates that six of the capability coalitions, including armor, air defense, maritime, IT, drones, and demining, are entirely led by European nations, exercised entirely and adeptly by them.

And the two coalitions, which we are fortunate to co-lead, involve strong partnerships. France possesses exceptional expertise and experience in artillery. Additionally, we have a robust coalition beyond our co-lead with France, consisting of various European nations, many of which manufacture artillery systems and ammunition, being significant contributors in that sector. Of course, Denmark and the Netherlands have taken the lead not only in donating F-16s but also in training Ukrainian pilots.

We are very confident that the multilateral nature, which was integral from the beginning as established by Secretary Austin, both due to the absolute commitment to multilateral initiatives building more than just the sum of its parts, and his understanding and respect for the capabilities of those European nations in numerous defense sectors, enabled us to achieve more collaboratively with those eight capability coalitions than we could have alone.

The future of those coalitions remains a consideration, and that is one reason why the coalition leadership group will convene at the ministerial level to establish a solid foundation for the ongoing work of those coalitions. Again, I cannot comment on what the incoming administration’s stance will be concerning its role, but I feel very assured of the European commitment, capability, and experience, coupled with the unwavering belief in the mission, and I am confident that those capability coalitions will persist in one manner or another.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We’re beginning to — okay.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 2: That was — again, do you mind if I — that was — that was well articulated, what the first senior defense official stated. Carla, if I could just add a few remarks, humbly representing Secretary Austin, his priority is an organized, seamless transition from this administration, where…

he is the secretary of defense, for the upcoming administration. Therefore, that is a significant priority for him. I believe all actions by the department reflect that.

An aspect of this is ensuring Ukraine’s optimal positioning. This is why, during his final days in office, he will make an effort to visit Ramstein for the 25th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting, and he will strongly advocate for the ongoing US national interest in Ukraine being a sovereign and democratic nation.

I want to clarify that, while this marks Secretary Austin’s concluding Ukraine Defense Contact Group session, we are not discontinuing the group. The subsequent administration is entirely welcome and even encouraged to adopt leadership of this robust coalition of 50 nations and continue to advance its initiatives. Thanks to the collaborative efforts and capabilities we have developed, I believe it will persist in some form or another in the future, regardless of how the next team decides to engage with it.

Ultimately, the decision lies with them. Nevertheless, we are striving to position them such that they can assume leadership of the UDCG if they wish. Otherwise, perhaps a European nation might take on that role. Over.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Quickly, we will proceed to John Ismay from the New York Times.

Q: Yes. Hello. I was curious if you could elaborate on the relationship between the UDCG and the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine organization. Specifically, what functions, if any, have been transferred from the contact group to NSATU, and whether any future roles or responsibilities may transition to NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine. Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Excellent. Thank you. At this moment, none of the functions from the Ukraine Defense Contact Group nor the capability coalitions, operating under the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s framework, have moved to NSATU. NSATU, by consensus among allies, assumed the roles and responsibilities of the IDCC, or International Donors Coordination Cell, in July. This entity closely collaborated with the UDCG and functioned primarily as a coordination cell consisting of European and other international (beyond Europe) nations as they aligned their plans and particularly their provision of capabilities to Ukraine.

There exists a strong synergistic connection between the UDCG and the IDCC, with frequent briefings and coordination between the two. Additionally, they engaged with the Security Assistance Group Ukraine, which functions as the US military command unit dedicated to providing training, assistance, and capability delivery to Ukraine. However, it is mainly the multilateral cell that was transitioned.

Moreover, though not entirely independent but rather supplementary, coordination of much of the European training initiatives for Ukraine now operates under NSATU. Furthermore, NSATU has also taken on a newly established mission by NATO to aid Ukraine in its long-term defense planning, focusing on ensuring that Ukraine’s future capabilities align with NATO interoperability standards in support of Ukraine’s aspirations to eventually join NATO.

Thus, rather than simply waiting for NATO to guide Ukraine’s decisions, Ukraine is being encouraged to plan for a future force in a way that inherently meets NATO interoperability criteria, integrating this requirement into their strategy from the outset, rather than retroactively addressing it. Those three areas embody what NSATU encompasses, and certainly, there is overlap with the UDCG’s activities and what the US has done bilaterally.

From our standpoint, as NATO allies, we are contributing to NSATU. Nonetheless, I understand it’s somewhat complex due to the extensive efforts being made to support Ukraine, making it challenging to clearly delineate between them, and I hope that provides some clarity. Over.

Q: It does. Thank you. I was also wondering if there are any plans to further transfer roles or responsibilities from the contact group to NSATU or any other NATO entity or organization that we haven’t yet discussed.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Oh, right, I failed to address that question. Currently, there are no plans in that regard. This is an aspect that, moving forward, UDCG members, including the United States under the next administration, would certainly be open to considering. However, as it stands now, there are no intentions for such transitions.

Q: Thank you very much.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. We will proceed to Natalia from Bloomberg and then conclude with Noah Robertson. Natalia?

Q: Hi. Thank you very much for this opportunity. I wanted to hear your insights on whether you are observing any signs of a slowdown or a change in the types of assistance from allies, especially given the expected change in US strategy regarding Ukraine moving forward. I’m somewhat concerned if there’s a pullback in light of Trump’s potential plans for a ceasefire.

Additionally, I wanted your opinion on Putin’s remarks the other day about advocating for retaliation against the use of ATACMS. How seriously should we take that, considering there’s about to be a governmental transition that could be more favorable to him?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: Regarding a shift in allied and partner contributions, we have observed a change over the past year, similar to the shift in US contributions, predominantly driven by evolving battlefield needs, the changing dynamics of this conflict, and, like us, a pivot towards longer-term procurement and production efforts. Initially, it was possible to increase capabilities from stockpiles reserved for other contingencies, but now we are reaching the limits of what can be supplied without adversely affecting readiness. European nations and other members of the UDCG are encountering similar limitations.

Hence, over the past year, there has been a movement toward purchasing capabilities from international markets for provision to Ukrainians or investing in production capabilities. The EU is facilitating several production investment projects, and we have seen this shift materialize.

Therefore, I believe any alterations you have observed thus far should not be interpreted as hedging against possible changes in US policy, although, again, I don’t see that happening. We do not perceive that. We recognize a shift, but it aligns with the reasons I previously outlined. You should definitely consult with European nations as well, but I reiterate, we view this as a shift rooted in those reasons.

As for Putin’s threats, he frequently makes statements. We don’t dismiss them. It’s prudent to pay attention to what adversaries articulate. Sometimes what Putin declares reflects Russia’s actions, such as the invasion of Ukraine. Many were skeptical when he was hinting at invading Ukraine or suggesting NATO membership for Ukraine was unacceptable—numerous things he asserts do indeed come to pass, while some of his threats do not.

Thus, it’s essential to weigh whether he is merely attempting to coerce the United States and Ukraine’s allies into ceasing their support for Ukraine, or if he is trying to…

to somewhat prepare the negotiation environment, so to speak, allowing him to obtain an outcome on his terms. There are various explanations, which must be assessed.

However, I would — I would not disregard his threats. That would be negligent. Yet, I also believe you must evaluate them against a meticulous examination of Russian conduct, which the US government monitors daily, weighing the evidence against his statements. Over.

Q: Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. Noah, could you please wrap it up?

Q: Yes. Thank you both for conducting this. I have a question regarding the group itself and its structure. Last year, there was a moment when European nations discussed whether, owing to the pause in US support for the supplemental, a transition needed to occur from US leadership to NATO leadership. I won’t label it as buyer’s remorse, but are you sensing any regrets about that decision, given that it remained under US leadership and its future is unclear? I also have a second question.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: No, we have not detected any indication that it would have been a wise decision. I should mention that there weren’t many NATO countries seriously considering that proposal. The majority of NATO nations expressed skepticism toward this idea, and it did not gain momentum, nor did it advance at the NATO summit.

It is always beneficial to explore options. There were arguments indicating how that could have been fruitful and constructive, you know, regardless of perspectives on US leadership, whether in spring 2024 or in the longer term. But overall, there was a consensus that it wasn’t the appropriate action, and I have yet to hear any remorse regarding that decision. In fact, we continue to receive strong support for the UDCG.

On Thursday, you will see an announcement that clearly strengthens the capability coalitions along with their commitment and capacity for long-term defense assistance to Ukraine and support for its defense and deterrence. In answering your question, no, I perceive that the direction over the past year has been solid, and I believe you will hear confirmation of that on Thursday as well.

Senior Defense Official 2, I’m unsure if you have anything to contribute. Or if you think I’m mistaken, please inform me.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 2: Oh, I completely concur with you. I do not believe that was ever a genuine and feasible route for all the reasons you articulated. The contact group, as currently formed, continues to produce tangible results for Ukraine.

I would just reiterate what I mentioned previously, which is that this is the 25th, not the concluding UDCG. There are choices that the next team will make, and we have accomplished much to institutionalize this endeavor in collaboration with the other nations. At the same time, I believe no one has found a useful and fully adequate substitute for US leadership in these efforts. So, all of this exists simultaneously. Over.

Q: I wanted to follow up on that specifically. If the notion of US leadership for the group is essential, as you both outlined rather clearly, is it even feasible to consider a European country assuming leadership? And what implications would it carry to have, regardless of the actions of the next administration since you can’t speak for that, a leader as dedicated as Lloyd Austin in your remarks to this group transitioning to someone who, let’s say, will take less ownership because it’s not his brainchild, as you phrased it?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL 1: One hallmark of outstanding leadership is to initiate and develop something that others will take on. And if that were to be the way forward for the UDCG, I am confident that the structure, culture, processes, and commitment that Secretary Austin has established within the UDCG provides a foundation for success for whoever chooses to carry it forward, be it the incoming administration or a European defense leader.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: All right. That concludes our time today. Thank you to our senior defense officials and everyone for participating. If you have any follow-up inquiries, please feel free to email them to me, or we will see you later today. And —

Q: Is this under embargo?

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: No.

Q: Ok. Thank you.

Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz: And as a reminder, all attribution should be credited to senior defense official. Thanks once more, and we look forward to seeing you on the trip to Ramstein. Signing off.