Unveiling Strength: A Comprehensive Overview of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s National Armaments Directors’ Initiatives

In response to Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III instructed Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) Dr. William LaPlante to consistently bring together National Armaments Directors (NADs) under the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG).

Aimed at hastening the delivery of capabilities to Ukraine by aligning international procurement, production, and sustainment initiatives, this assembly has convened fourteen (14) times thus far since its inaugural gathering on September 28, 2022. The group is scheduled to assemble for the fifteenth time on January 10, 2025. Over 40 countries, along with representatives from NATO and the European Union, are actively engaged. The forum is currently co-chaired by Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for European Integration Sergiy Boyev and USD(A&S) LaPlante.

The forum primarily concentrates on (1) planning based on requirements for production, and (2) actual deliveries contributing to escalating capacity and the obligations made by UDCG participants thus far. Key areas of endeavor include:

• Evaluating global production capabilities, and opportunities to enhance throughput;
• Recognizing production limitations and solutions, including possibilities for co-production, joint ventures, and various other arrangements;
• Facilitating the maintenance of equipment and the replenishment of Ukrainian forces; and
• Expanding avenues for standardization, integration, and interchangeability.

Noteworthy Accomplishments to Date

Through significant collaboration among nations, UDCG NADs have achieved:

• Growth of existing or establishment of new production capabilities for critical munitions globally.
  • The United States has allocated $5.5 billion to boost domestic production capacity of the following munitions or subcomponents (NOTE: figures represent increases from 2022 to current production levels):
    
    • 155mm Projectiles: 14,400 per month to 40,000 per month (178% increase)
    • 155mm Propelling Charge: 14,494 per month to 18,000 per month (24% increase)
    • GMLRS: 833 per month to 1,167 per month (40% increase)
    • Javelin: 175 per month to 200 per month (14% increase)
    • AIM-9X: 116 per month to 137 per month (18% increase)
    • PAC-3 MSE: 21 per month to 48.6 per month (116% increase)
    • HIMARS: 5 per month to 8 per month (60% increase)
    • M777 Tubes: 11 per month to 18 per month (64% increase)

  • Instances of both production expansion and munitions delivery efforts declared by UDCG members encompass, but are not limited to:
    • France and Sweden are set to double their ammunition and explosives loading capacity by 2025, double the capacity of modular charges by 2026, and augment powder production capacity ten-fold by 2026.
    • Facilities in Germany, Spain, Hungary, South Africa, and Australia aim to elevate production to as much as 700,000 artillery shells and up to 10,000 tons of gunpowder annually by 2025; this includes establishing a new gunpowder manufacturing unit in Romania as part of a project developed in collaboration with the European Commission and a new artillery ammunition production site in Germany.
    • Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain intend to co-produce up to 1,000 Patriot GEM-T missiles in Germany.
    • A consortium of 15 nations led by the Czech Republic have committed €1.7 billion to procure 500,000 artillery rounds globally by the conclusion of 2024.
    • Through the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), the European defense sector is anticipated to raise its yearly shell production capacity to 2 million by 2025. 31 initiatives cover five sectors: explosives, powder, shells, missiles, and testing and reconditioning certification.
    • Norway is set to invest over NOK 1 billion to considerably enhance artillery production over a minimum of 15 years.
    • Additional Nordic nations are amplifying ammunition output via the NORDEFCO++ initiative to assist Ukraine while also fortifying long-term capacity for ensuring regional supply security.
    • The United Kingdom plans to allocate £162 million to escalate production of the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) and provide Ukraine with 650 LMMs.

  • From 2023 to 2024, Ukraine has boosted its total domestic manufacturing of mortar and artillery ammunition—ranging from 60mm to 155mm calibers—from 1 million rounds to 2.5 million rounds annually (150% increase).

• Detection of gaps and solutions regarding the production of propellants and explosives.
• Provision of VAMPIRE C-UAS systems and “FrankenSAM” iTEL and BUK systems.
• Contributions of trucks and gun mounts for Mobile Fire Teams (MFT) to aid Ukraine in safeguarding its critical national infrastructures.
• Supply of NASAMS units and munitions, along with subsequent functionality enhancements to broaden interceptor options.
• Provision of AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense.
• Integration of thousands of air-to-ground munitions donations for utilization from Ukraine’s current aircraft as well as donated F-16s.
• Co-development of an Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM), an economical, long-range cruise missile intended for mass production (Denmark, Netherlands, United States).
• Open competition and advanced flight testing for one-way attack capabilities as part of Project ARTEMIS (United States) and Project BREAKSTOP (United Kingdom).
• Facilitation of Jumpstart Foreign Military Sales cases with allies and partners to furnish funding for munitions purchases instead of donations.
• Provision of 90 refurbished T-72 tanks (45 Dutch and 45 U.S.) and over 100,000 T-72 spare parts; a forthcoming collaborative effort will enhance support for spares and overhaul for all major Soviet-era armored combat platforms through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency.
• Creation of a common sustainment framework aimed at enhancing Ukrainian sustainment capability across spares, maintenance, training, and industrial support capacity.
• Delivery of seven commercial-grade 3D printers, post-processing equipment, and consumables to the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine (RDC-U), alongside the procurement of seven additional polymer printers with necessary support equipment and consumables.
• Establishment of tele-maintenance capabilities and execution of an augmented reality demonstration to enhance maintenance and repair training for Ukrainian personnel in the field.
• Translation of more than 1,600 technical repair and operational manuals.
• Facilitation of, and support for, collaborations with Ukrainian industries.

for collaborative production and ongoing support activities.

• Instances of U.S.-Ukraine industrial alliances comprise:
  • The Department of State formed a group of specialists to assist the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries in enhancing the resilience and effective regulation of Ukraine’s defense sector, addressing pressing military manufacturing demands, and supplementing the aid rendered through $2 billion in fresh Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the initiation of the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program (UDEP). This specialist group includes a Defense Production Liaison and a Defense Industry Partnerships and Policy Strategist (November 2024).
  • Northrop Grumman entered into a contract with the Government of Ukraine to supply equipment and training for establishing a medium-caliber ammunition production line (July 2024).
  • Amentum signed a Memorandum of Intent to create a Joint Venture with Ukrainian Defense Industry (UDI) aimed at collaboration in the restoration and maintenance of U.S.-donated armored vehicles (June 2024).
  • D&M Holding Company erected an ammunition factory in Ukraine and is presently expanding production in accordance with agreements with the Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industries and significant corporations (October 2023).

• Instances of international-Ukraine industrial alliances comprise:
  • UDI commenced domestic manufacturing of CZ Bren 2 assault rifles after a series of agreements with the Colt CZ Group (Czech Republic) (December 2024, contracted July 2024).
  • The Swedish government declared funding and industrial aid for the production of long-range missiles and UAS in Ukraine (November 2024).
  • Through Task Force HIRST, the United Kingdom is collaborating with various industrial partners to perform maintenance, repair, and upgrades of capabilities within Ukraine.
  • Nammo (Norway) declared that it will license the production of 155mm rounds in Ukraine (August 2024).
  • KNDS (France/Germany) is establishing a subsidiary in Ukraine to manufacture 155mm rounds and spare parts (June 2024).
  • Rheinmetall (Germany) executed a Letter of Intent to create a manufacturing site for Lynx armored vehicles in Ukraine, building upon a Joint Venture between Rheinmetall and UDI to set up a maintenance center in the country for German-donated military equipment (June 2024).

Working Groups

Activities of the NADs under the auspices of the UDCG are structured into four Working Groups aligned with functional domains: Innovation, Production, Sustainment, and Support for the Ukraine Defense Industrial Base.

The intersection between the NAD Working Groups and the UDCG Capability Coalitions is synergistic, not redundant. The NADs hold a distinctive position to implement ministerial-level guidance generated by the Capability Coalitions by offering specialized knowledge in procurement, production, and sustainment. Specific, long-term requirements identified by Capability Coalitions will steer the NADs’ methodical prioritization and allocation of appropriate industrial base and sustainment investments. This “require-deliver-sustain” alliance between the Capability Coalitions and NAD Working Groups bridges gaps between needs and capability provisions, optimizes the impact of investments by UDCG members while preventing redundancy of efforts.

• Innovation Working Group: Enhances the speed from concept to deployed capability, concentrating on anticipating opposing advancements and refining emerging technologies for operational application. Current initiatives include:
  
  • Lower-cost missiles
  • Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) detection, tracking, and engagement capabilities
  • Countermeasures for guided munitions
  • Laser-based solutions
  • Experimental capabilities for one-way attack drones

• Production Working Group: Expedites and propels production initiatives for essential weapon systems by facilitating co-production opportunities, supporting funding prospects, pinpointing production challenges, and enabling re-supply contracts. Current efforts include:
  • Identifying needs and opportunities for increasing or speeding up production of 155mm artillery and TNT, among other vital programs and components
  • Applying insights gained from multinational production collaborations to air defense interceptors

• Sustainment Working Group: Enhances the availability of Ukraine’s weapon systems by tackling overarching sustainment challenges in critical enabling areas such as spare part supply and ordering, operational upkeep, and depot-level training, as well as sustainment capacity across Ukrainian and allied industrial bases, and bolstering Ukraine’s ability to maintain donated assets. Current endeavors include:
  • Funding key sustainment requirements in Ukraine to support combat reconstitution
  • Joint pooling and provision of spare parts
  • Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of legacy and western equipment, including broadened sustainment assistance for Soviet-era armored combat vehicles
  • Backing current weapon systems with a unified sustainment support framework (spare parts, technical data, training, maintenance tools, etc.)

• Ukraine Industrial Base Support Working Group: Coordinates initiatives to promote a strong Ukrainian industrial base that supplies materials for urgent necessities, contributing to Ukraine’s enduring security and economic stability. Current actions include:
  • Facilitating partnerships that enhance co-production or co-sustainment between Ukrainian industry and U.S. or international firms, including collaborating with the Department of State to shorten timelines for obtaining necessary export licenses
  • Identifying and advocating for cooperative funding strategies to channel pooled resources directly into top-priority Ukrainian defense industrial base projects
  • Identifying and resolving policy and regulatory challenges hindering industrial collaboration with Ukraine