The Unlikely Summit: How Jimmy Carter and Kim Il-sung averted a Nuclear Crisis

Three decades ago, the globe was on the edge of a nuclear confrontation – until Jimmy Carter arrived in North Korea.

In June 1994, the former US president traveled to Pyongyang for discussions with then leader Kim Il-sung. This was a landmark occurrence, marking the first instance of either a former or current US president visiting.

However, it was also an extraordinary embodiment of personal intervention, which many assert barely staved off a conflict between the US and North Korea that could have taken millions of lives. It initiated a phase of increased interaction between Pyongyang and the West.

None of this may have transpired if not for Carter’s series of diplomatic maneuvers, who passed away at the age of 100 on December 29.

“Kim Il-sung and Bill Clinton were on the verge of conflict, and Carter jumped into the void, adeptly navigating a path toward a diplomatic resolution of the standoff,” North Korean scholar John Delury from Yonsei University shared with the BBC.

In the early part of 1994, relations soured between Washington and Pyongyang, while attempts were made to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear endeavors.

US intelligence services suspected that, despite ongoing negotiations, North Korea might have covertly developed nuclear weapons.

Then, in a shocking proclamation, North Korea revealed it had begun withdrawing thousands of fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor for reprocessing. This contravened a previous agreement with the US that necessitated the presence of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

North Korea also declared its withdrawal from the IAEA.

Suspicion in the US surged as officials believed Pyongyang was gearing up to create a weapon, prompting American delegates to terminate the negotiations. Washington commenced preparations for various countermeasures, including implementing UN sanctions and bolstering troop presence in South Korea.

In later discussions, US officials conveyed they also contemplated the prospect of dropping a bomb or launching a missile at Yongbyon – a move they recognized would likely trigger war on the Korean peninsula, leading to the annihilation of the South’s capital, Seoul.

It was within this charged environment that Carter took action.

For years, he had been subtly courted by Kim Il-sung, who dispatched personal requests for him to visit Pyongyang. In June 1994, upon learning of Washington’s military strategies and after discussions with his contacts in the US government and China – North Korea’s primary ally – Carter made the decision to finally accept Kim’s invitation.

“I believe we were on the brink of war,” he stated to the US public broadcaster PBS many years later. “It could very well have resulted in a second Korean War, during which around a million individuals could have lost their lives, along with a continued production of nuclear fissile material… had we not experienced a conflict.”

Carter’s excursion was characterized by adept diplomatic maneuvering – and brinkmanship.

Initially, Carter needed to assess Kim’s genuine intentions. He made a sequence of requests, all of which were accepted, with the exception of the final one: Carter expressed a desire to journey to Pyongyang from Seoul traversing the demilitarized zone (DMZ), a territory that serves as a buffer between the two Koreas.

“Their immediate reaction was that no one…had ever performed this for the past 43 years, which led even the United Nations secretary-general to travel to Pyongyang via Beijing. And I remarked, ‘Well, I’m not attending, then’,” he stated.

A week afterward, Kim relented.

The subsequent challenge for Carter was more complex – persuading his own administration to permit his journey. Robert Gallucci, the primary US negotiator with North Korea during that period, later mentioned there was “unease in almost every sector” regarding the US effectively “subcontracting its diplomacy” to a former president.

Carter initially sought approval from the State Department, who disregarded him. Unperturbed, he opted to simply inform then-US president Bill Clinton that he would be going regardless.

He had an ally in vice-president Al Gore, who intercepted Carter’s message to Clinton. “[Al Gore] contacted me by phone and suggested if I altered the phrasing from “I’ve decided to go” to “I’m strongly inclined to go,” he would attempt to obtain permission directly from Clinton… he called back the following morning and confirmed that I had clearance to proceed.”

The journey was set.

On 15 June 1994, Carter entered North Korea, accompanied by Rosalynn, a select group of aides, and a television crew.

Meeting Kim posed a moral dilemma for Carter.

“I had loathed Kim Il-sung for 50 years. I was aboard a submarine in the Pacific during the Korean War, and many of my fellow soldiers lost their lives in that conflict, which I believed he had instigated without cause,” he conveyed to PBS.

“Hence, I harbored very serious reservations about him. Upon my arrival, however, he treated me with considerable respect. He was evidently quite thankful that I had come.”

Over several days, the Carters held discussions with Kim, were shown sights around Pyongyang, and enjoyed a cruise on a luxurious yacht owned by Kim’s son, Kim Jong-il.

Carter realized his intuition was correct: North Korea not only feared a potential US military assault on Yongbyon, but was also prepared to mobilize.

“I asked [Kim’s advisers] directly if they had been preparing for war. And they replied unequivocally, ‘Yes, we were’,” he recounted.

“North Korea could not tolerate the vilification of their nation and the humiliation of their leader; therefore, they would retaliate.

“Furthermore, I believe this modest and self-effacing nation, along with the profound religious devotion they held, in effect, for their revered leader, their Great Leader as they referred to him, implied that they were willing to endure catastrophic losses within North Korea to uphold their dignity and honor, which would have resulted in a catastrophic failure in my view.”

Carter submitted a list of requirements from Washington along with his recommendations. These included reinstating negotiations with the US, initiating direct peace discussions with South Korea, mutual troop withdrawals, and assisting the US in locating the remains of American soldiers interred in North Korean land.

“He consented to all of them. Thus, I found him to be quite accommodating,” Carter stated. “As far as I can ascertain then and now, he was entirely honest with me.”

Importantly, Carter devised a proposal wherein North Korea would cease its nuclear endeavors, permit IAEA inspectors back into its reactors, and ultimately deconstruct Yongbyon’s facilities. In exchange, the US and its allies would construct light-water reactors in North Korea, capable of producing nuclear energy but not generating material for armaments.

While warmly welcomed by Pyongyang, the agreement faced hesitation from US officials when Carter proposed it in a phone call. He subsequently informed them he was going on CNN to reveal the terms of the agreement – leaving the Clinton administration with little option but to acquiesce.

Carter would later defend his decision to compel his own government by asserting he had to “bring about a resolution to what I deemed to be a very profound crisis.” But it didnot sit well back home – officials were displeased with Carter’s “freelancing” and his efforts to “corner” Clinton, as mentioned by Mr Gallucci.

As the trip drew to a close, they instructed him to transmit a message to the North Koreans, reaffirming Clinton’s public stance that the US would persist in advocating for UN sanctions. Carter was opposed to this, as per reports from that period.

Shortly afterward, he boarded the vessel with Kim and swiftly deviated from the agreed narrative. With television cameras capturing the moment, he informed Kim that the US had ceased work on drafting UN sanctions – sharply opposing Clinton’s position.

An irritated White House quickly distanced itself from Carter. Some openly voiced their exasperation, depicting a scenario of a former president going off the rails. “Carter is hearing what he wants to hear… he is fabricating his own reality,” a senior official lamented at the time to The Washington Post.

Numerous individuals in Washington also criticized him regarding the agreement itself, contending that the North Koreans had taken advantage of him.

Nevertheless, Carter’s astute engagement with the news media to pressure the Clinton administration proved effective. By immediately broadcasting his negotiations, he left the US government with minimal time to respond, and shortly after his journey “it was possible to observe an almost hourly shift in US policy towards North Korea” as they toned down their rhetoric, noted CNN journalist Mike Chinoy who reported on Carter’s trip.

Though Carter later asserted that he had misspoken regarding the sanctions matter, he also reacted with his characteristic defiance to the criticism.

“Upon my return to Seoul, I was astonished and distressed by the adverse reaction from the White House. They urged me not to proceed to Washington for a briefing, advising me to head directly to… my residence,” he stated.

Yet he disregarded their counsel.

“I determined that what I had to present was too significant to overlook.”

A final compelling twist to the situation transpired a month later.

On 9 July 1994, coinciding with US and North Korean officials meeting in Geneva for discussions, state media broadcasted a shocking announcement: Kim Il-sung had passed away from a heart attack.

Carter’s deal was immediately cast into doubt. However, negotiators persevered, and weeks later, they solidified a formal agreement known as the Agreed Framework.

Although the accord collapsed in 2003, it was noteworthy for halting Pyongyang’s nuclear program for nearly ten years.

Robert Carlin, a former CIA and US State Department official who led delegations in talks with North Korea, emphasized that Carter’s true accomplishment was in fostering cooperation from the US government.

“Carter was, for the most part, pushing on an open door in North Korea. It was Washington that posed the bigger challenge… if anything, Carter’s involvement helped halt the freight train of US decision-making that was racing toward disaster,” he remarked to the BBC.

Carter’s journey was also crucial for paving the way towards reconciliation, which subsequently allowed for several visits, including one in 2009 when he accompanied Clinton to retrieve detained US journalists.

He is also acknowledged for facilitating Donald Trump’s summit with Kim Jong Un – the grandson of Kim Il-sung – in 2018, as “Carter made it conceivable” for a sitting US president to meet with a North Korean leader, said Dr Delury.

That summit did not succeed, and inevitably, in the broader context, Carter’s trip did not eliminate the looming threat of nuclear warfare, which has only intensified – currently, North Korea possesses missiles believed to be capable of reaching the US mainland.

However, Carter received acclaim for his political gamble. This represented a stark contrast to his presidency, during which he was criticized for being overly passive in foreign affairs, particularly regarding his management of the Iran hostage situation.

His North Korea expedition “was an extraordinary example of constructive diplomatic intervention by a former leader,” stated Dr Delury.

His legacy is not without contention, given the critiques he faced for taking initiative. His opponents argue that he engaged in a risky and intricate game by, as stated by CNN’s Mike Chinoy, “attempting to bypass what he perceived as a flawed and perilous US policy by assembling the elements of a nuclear agreement independently”.

However, others contend that Carter was the appropriate individual for the task at that time.

He possessed “a very strong will”, yet also was “a man of peace, both internally and externally,” remarked Han S Park, one of several individuals who aided Carter in facilitating the 1994 mission.

Although his tenacity meant that he “did not maintain harmony with a lot of individuals,” ultimately this blend of characteristics rendered him the best candidate “to avert the recurrence of a Korean War,” Professor Park stated.

Above all, Carter was convinced of his righteousness.

“He didn’t allow the US government’s fretting and second-guessing to deter him,” comments Robert Carlin. “Carter had courage.”