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Roberta Lugo Robles, DrPH1; Alida M. Gertz, MD, DrPH1; Francisco Alvarado-Ramy, MD1; Adelaide Asare, MPH1,2; Kristen Pringle, MPH1; Kara Adams, MPH1; Yonette Hercules, MPAS, MHSc1; Mayra Garcia Brown, MPH1; Justice King, MPH1; Linda C. Pimentel, VMD1; Faisal S. Minhaj, PharmD3; Clive Brown, MBBS1; Sundari Mase, MD1; Shannon Gearhart, MD1 (View author affiliations)
What is already identified about this subject?
Aircraft contact investigations of individuals touring with clade II Monkeypox virus (MPXV) an infection recommend that clade II MPXV transmission danger throughout industrial air journey is low; nonetheless, information point out that clade I MPXV could be extra transmissible than clade II.
What is added by this report?
Among 60 plane contacts of three individuals with laboratory-confirmed clade I MPXV who traveled on 5 industrial flights and had been investigated to evaluate transmission danger throughout air journey, no secondary circumstances had been recognized. CDC discontinued plane contact investigations for all MPXV clades and subclades in 2025.
What are the implications for public well being apply?
Similar to clade II, clade I MPXV transmission danger throughout industrial air journey seems to be low.
Monkeypox is a vesicular rash sickness brought on by Monkeypox virus (MPXV), which could be divided into clades (e.g., clade I and II), every of which incorporates subclades. MPXV is normally transmitted from individual to individual by means of shut, sustained bodily contact. Global spread of clade II MPXV began in 2022; to date, approximately 37,500 cases have been reported in the United States (provisional data), and domestic transmission is ongoing. CDC began conducting aircraft contact investigations for clade II MPXV in 2021. In February 2023, based on data showing no evidence of in-flight transmission of clade II MPXV, CDC discontinued routine aircraft contact investigations. Although outcome data were missing for approximately one third of identified aircraft contacts, a 2024 report describing data from 2021 to 2022 on clade II MPXV transmission risk during commercial air travel found no secondary cases reported among 1,538 persons who had contact with 113 infected travelers on 221 flights (1).
Outbreaks caused by clade I MPXV started in Central Africa in 2023 and 2024 and spread across the African continent, resulting in approximately 150 travel-associated cases outside of Africa. Limited data suggested that clade I MPXV might be more transmissible than clade II (2). Historically, clade I MPXV outbreaks have resulted in higher case-fatality rates (CFRs) than did those associated with clade II MPXV infections (3); however, recent clade I outbreaks have been associated with lower CFRs than those historically reported, with some studies describing CFRs similar to those associated with clade II infections (4). Investigations of clade I MPXV transmission risk during commercial air travel are limited. This report describes the results of an analysis of aircraft contact investigations after identification of three travelers who flew on commercial aircraft into or within the United States while infectious with clade I MPXV.
During November 2024–January 2025, CDC was notified by U.S. health departments and one foreign health authority of three men aged 20–40 years who traveled on five flights while infectious* with confirmed clade I MPXV. Each of the three passengers traveled separately on international flights inbound to the United States, and two took subsequent domestic flights. Data from aircraft contact investigations coordinated by CDC were analyzed. This activity was reviewed by CDC, deemed not research, and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.†
Signs and symptoms of MPXV reported by the three infected passengers during travel included skin lesions or rash (two), fever (one), and malaise (one). Additional signs and symptoms documented after arrival included fatigue (one), nausea (one), inguinal lymphadenopathy (one), and an ulcerative lesion in the genital region (one).
Air travel contacts were defined as crew members who served the infected travelers and passengers seated within two seats (6 ft [1.8 m]) of the infected travelers. Eighty contacts were identified, all of whom were designated as having uncertain to minimal risk.§ The number of identified contacts on each flight ranged from nine to 24. Twenty contacts were excluded from further analysis for the following reasons: 1) 11 (14%) had known contact (e.g., travel companion or household member) with the infected passenger outside of the flight, 2) five (6%) had already departed the United States at the time of the investigation, and 3) four (5%) did not have a U.S. address (i.e., incomplete location information or no U.S. address available to CDC). The 60 (75%) remaining contacts for whom CDC sent notifications to state or territorial health departments were included in this analysis (Table). Of these, girls accounted for 57% of recognized contacts, and the median age was 43 years (IQR = 30–57 years). Overall, well being departments succeeded in interviewing 29 (48%) contacts. One contact reported fatigue, physique aches, and a pores and skin lesion after the flight; subsequent polymerase chain response testing of the lesion was adverse for MPXV. No secondary circumstances had been recognized.
Similar to outcomes from clade II MPXV plane contact investigations (1), this evaluation means that the chance for clade I MPXV transmission throughout industrial air journey is low; nonetheless, this evaluation was restricted by a small pattern measurement and the low proportion (fewer than one half) of contacts interviewed. Based on the absence of proof for on-board transmission supplied by these information, CDC discontinued plane contact investigations for all MPXV clades and subclades in 2025. Although proof suggests a low danger for clade I and II MPXV transmission throughout air journey, individuals with monkeypox are suggested to delay travel until their illness has resolved. Persons traveling to destinations with outbreaks should be provided with information about the risks associated with monkeypox. Vaccination of groups at risk for monkeypox has been shown to be an effective public health mitigation measure and can help to decrease spread and disease severity (5).
CDC port health station staff members; members of the CDC clade I Mpox Response Team; state, local, and territorial health departments who participated in finding and assessing exposed travelers and providing outcomes to CDC; International Health Regulations National Focal Points.
1Division of Global Migration Health, National Center for Emerging Zoonotic and Infectious Diseases, CDC; 2Cherokee Nation Operational Solutions, Catoosa, Oklahoma; 3Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology, National Center for Emerging Zoonotic and Infectious Diseases, CDC.
Abbreviations: MPXV = Monkeypox virus; NA = not relevant.
* Listed in chronological order of prevalence.
† Three males aged 20–40 years traveled on 5 separate flights whereas infectious with confirmed clade I MPXV an infection. Each of the three passengers traveled on a global flight inbound to the United States, and two took subsequent home flights.
§ A complete of 12 of the 29 interviewed contacts reported no historical past of vaccination. Vaccination standing for the opposite interviewed contacts was not reported.
Suggested quotation for this text: Robles RL, Gertz AM, Alvarado-Ramy F, et al. Notes from the Field: Contact Tracing for Monkeypox virus Clade I Cases Associated with Air Travel — United States, November 2024–January 2025. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2026;75:202–203. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7515a2.
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