“Insights from the Frontlines: Navigating Strategic Competition”

Good morning — and good evening to those joining from SAIS campuses in Bologna and Nanjing via livestream. I appreciate Professor Mahnken and Tom for hosting, and Dean Steinberg for the kind invitation. It’s always a pleasure to be present at SAIS.

When Paul Nitze co-founded the School of Advanced International Studies — roughly 25 years prior to his role as Deputy Secretary of Defense — he aimed to create what he later termed “a center in Washington for independent thought.”

Like Nitze himself, SAIS was an essential intellectual driver throughout the Cold War — and I acknowledge that its history greatly influences the institution. There’s even a fragment of the Berlin Wall showcased downstairs.

Over the years, SAIS has consistently honored its origins, nurturing waves of national security scholars, practitioners, and policymakers — both military and civilian; Democrats and Republicans alike. The term “SAIS mafia” exists for a reason.

Today, as I prepare to leave the same Pentagon office that Nitze occupied during America’s last period of strategic rivalry, it seemed the ideal moment to convey how, in the past four years, we have been reinforcing America’s national defense for this contemporary era of strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China.

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Now, the current PRC is not the Soviet bloc of the Cold War, and our strategy for strategic competition will not succeed if it’s simply a replay of tactics from 40 years ago.

However, it’s undeniable that we find ourselves in a strategic rivalry. The PRC stands as the sole nation with both the will and increasingly the resources to reshape the international order, fusing its economic, diplomatic, technological, and military strengths to challenge the stable, open international system that has benefited so many for such a long period.

That’s why ensuring that the United States equips our servicemembers with everything necessary to safeguard the nation, our allies, and our interests has been my paramount concern since I assumed office nearly four years ago. I have acted under the direct support of Secretary Austin, who shares my apprehension regarding this highly consequential contest.

Of course, competition does not equate to conflict, as no one should wish for the global destruction a war would entail.

Rather, we want the PRC leadership to wake each morning, weigh the risks of hostility, and think to themselves, “today is not the day” — and for them to maintain that thought today, and every day, through 2027, 2035, 2049, and further.

Nitze would have referred to that as deterrence, which is indeed how we aim to avert conflict: by deterring PRC aggression against us and our allied partners. Central to deterrence is the capability and readiness to prevail if called upon to fight.

Yet, “deterrence” is frequently interpreted to a Mandarin term, wēishè, which suggests coercion. Therefore, I want to clarify: we are not attempting to coerce or compel the PRC. That is neither our objective nor our methodology. This is just one example of terms used by DoD that we’ve recognized can be misinterpreted by the PRC.

A perhaps better descriptor of our goal and approach is “peace through strength,” an age-old phrase that was first broadly introduced into American discourse in the 1950s by Bernard Baruch, a close counselor to President Franklin Roosevelt. It has been a consistent, bipartisan theme in U.S. foreign policy for decades, and one that the PRC should comprehend.

Maintaining peace in a prolonged competition demands that we never become complacent.

Long-term strategic rivalry implies that any area where we currently possess an advantage either is or will be vigorously contested. Initiatives will provoke counter-initiatives, counter-counter-initiatives, and so forth. This is an unavoidable element of any competition. Hence, we’ve bolstered our institutional capacity to routinely evaluate our performance and adjust as needed.

With this in mind, I present four lessons that I deem essential for succeeding in our current strategic competition, which I offer to those who will advance the endeavor.

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First: Maintain focus on your top priority. The world will continually attempt to divert your attention, but whether you succumb to distractions is completely your choice.

Bear in mind, DoD has never had the privilege of concentrating on only one matter at a time. We are a global force with worldwide obligations. This was true during Paul Nitze’s many years of service, throughout the post-Cold War period, the post-9/11 era, and it continues to be applicable in this age.

The challenge posed by China isn’t novel — not for the Pentagon, nor for me. When I was involved in DoD’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, we made it clear even then that “in the period beyond 2015, there’s a possibility that a regional great power or a global peer competitor may arise.” Russia and China were labeled as “having the potential to be such competitors.”

Since then, the PRC has worked with determination to construct a modern military, aiming to challenge longstanding U.S. operational advantages. Furthermore, Beijing’s conduct has been a gradual accumulation of incremental aggression, causing rising unease across the region.

It’s unsurprising then that the PLA’s expanding capabilities and assertive actions have been a growing concern for defense policymakers throughout the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. And with bipartisan agreement and continuity, our nation began to lay down the foundational elements for change. Yet, actual implementation often fell short of aspirations.

Thus, we entered office resolved to build upon the achievements of our predecessors — from both sides of the aisle — and to initiate necessary transformations. We approached this with a serious mindset that neither overstates nor underestimates the nature of the competition.

That’s why, since 2021, we have proceeded with a balance of confidence and urgency: Urgency to maintain deterrence and our military advantage, even as the PLA updates its capabilities. And with assurance — yet never blind optimism — that America possesses the capability to meet what is necessary to rise to the occasion: today, tomorrow, and in the foreseeable future.

Even as a global power, trade-offs are inevitable. In regions such as Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, everyone desires additional Patriot batteries, which unfortunately do not come about easily or quickly.

You must adhere to your strategy and utilize it as your guiding principle. Competition for limited resources will always be fierce, and it should be — unchecked budgets do not benefit taxpayers and do not automatically convert into military might. Therefore, senior decision-makers must carefully align objectives, methods, and resources to ensure the strategy itself remains valid and that DoD can fulfill it. If it isn’t meeting expectations, these same leaders must pursue change from the top down.

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This leads me to my second lesson: Execution is crucial. Moreover, that execution must happen across the complete delivery chain that transforms vision into capabilities, at scale. It’s easy to make grand statements, but you must be prepared to deliver.

Realigning one of the world’s largest bureaucracies towards strategic competition isn’t for those lacking fortitude. It necessitates considerable personal investment, cultural shifts, deliberate disruptions and discomfort, and…

constantly dismissing “business-as-usual” methodologies.

From the very beginning, our determination has been unwavering in driving the transformations required to surpass the PRC and guarantee our sustained military superiority. This commitment has yielded a more advanced, lethal, and nimble force across our capabilities, operational strategies, posture, and more.

Such focus has been essential, as the PLA’s modernization has been swift, ambitious, and sharply concentrated on us — even while their leadership has publicly derided the PLA’s “false combat abilities,” possibly alluding to their issues with widespread corruption.

For our part, we’ve consistently dedicated ourselves to providing genuine U.S. military capabilities that are combat-ready and state-of-the-art, spanning from the oceans to outer space.

Indeed, at present, the United States holds a substantial advantage in numerous sectors compared to the PRC and Russia. An essential illustration is undersea warfare. We intend to maintain this superiority, even as their naval forces continue to modernize.

Our AUKUS collaboration with the U.K. and Australia is set to further enhance our collective strength beneath the waves. Additionally, we’re revitalizing America’s submarine industrial sector to produce at the necessary scale and speed. Over the past four years, we’ve aimed to invest approximately $10 billion in the workforce and industrial foundation that bolsters the lethality of America’s silent service.

We’ve made substantial investments in orbit, overseeing the DoD’s largest space budgets ever.

In 2024, U.S. space launches deployed more satellites than China has throughout its entire history, a trend that has persisted each year since 2021.

America’s vibrant commercial space sector facilitates this. It will continue to yield even greater benefits for the DoD through our new Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve — akin to our Civil Reserve Air Fleet for airlift, but tailored for space services delivered via satellites.

This initiative will not only capitalize on our numerous advantages in commercial space; it’s also crucial for maintaining space as a realm of stability and peace, rather than chaos and destruction. It exemplifies one of the many methods by which we ensure that the network of satellites available to the DoD is so expansive that any attempt to attack or disrupt them would prove futile and escalate tensions.

Moreover, we are surpassing China’s military in the rapid, responsible utilization of data and AI, enhancing our decision-making edge even further.

Our approach embodies our ethical standards and democratic values — we do not utilize data and AI to censor, suppress, or weaken individuals.

Instead, following in the footsteps of our predecessors, we harness our many U.S. strengths: superior chips, advanced technology, exceptional talent, and the guiding principles that shape our use of data and AI.

Our investments and sustained leadership morphed Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control from a distant ambition into a tangible capability now employed across various combatant commands, including INDOPACOM. Our speed exemplifies the remarkable potential of software to enhance hard power: providing for the warfighter in days and weeks, not years.

The high-quality data that powers our applications originates from decades of real-world, contemporary military operations, and years spent in active conflict zones. It harnesses a wealth of durable sensors and connectivity across all domains — reinforced by real-time data-sharing with allies and partners.

The PLA not only lacks such data; their AI strategy diverges from ours, with autonomy exceeding human oversight across an expanding range of missions. We pursue the opposite approach — for it is more effective and safer, as we remain conscious of the potential dangers associated with AI.

When we can perceive ourselves and our opponents clearly — when we enhance the battlespace’s transparency for ourselves — we can sense, comprehend, and react more swiftly while still preserving human judgment and accountability in the application of force: achieving the best of both worlds.

Our decision-making superiority is a crucial element of our kill chains, which we’ve been fortifying since 2021. Concurrently, we are well-versed in countering adversary kill chains.

Through investments in essential weaponry, platforms, and enablers across various domains — air, land, sea, and beyond — we have continuously heightened our ability to detect, observe, and engage in contested environments, while simultaneously complicating our adversaries’ capabilities to do so.

Examining our efforts in missile defense and interception, examples from 2024 include the successful demonstration of ballistic missile defense for Guam, and successful testing by multiple services employing Hypervelocity Gun Weapons System projectiles to intercept missiles and drones at significantly lower cost-per-shot ratios.

For our munitions, we have adopted a diverse assortment of long-range artillery, including subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic, and newer, cost-effective long-range munitions.

We do not view munitions as merely a financial burden. In fact, when comparing the last four annual defense budgets to the four preceding years, our cumulative munitions investments have surged by over 30 percent.

With bipartisan Congressional support for multi-year procurement of munitions, we have been acquiring up to the limits of our industrial base, even while expanding those limits, including maximizing the procurement of munitions most pertinent to the Indo-Pacific: Maritime Strike Tomahawks, SM-6s, long-range anti-ship missiles, and joint air-to-surface missiles, among others.

Additionally, we have sustained our long-term investments in modernizing America’s nuclear triad. This is crucial, as strategic deterrence is a mission with no margin for failure.

We’ve also concentrated on augmenting our exquisite, world-class systems with solutions that are small, intelligent, inexpensive, and can be swiftly acquired and deployed on a large scale.

This is the objective of our Replicator initiative, initially by deploying all-domain attritable autonomous systems in the thousands, across multiple domains, by this August. It serves as a pathfinder that is on course to achieve our stated goals, accelerating the broader scaling of responsible autonomy.

We recognized from the outset that execution was vital for Replicator; this understanding was part of our strategy from the beginning. It reflects where previous innovative visions have faltered.

By propelling both technological and cultural change, Replicator demonstrates that the DoD can move decisively to influence the battlespace and furnish our warfighters with the resources necessary to prevail.

Ultimately, when we assess four annual defense budgets alongside multiple supplemental funding bills — aggregating all our capability investments for R&D-plus-procurement — the actual dollar figure exceeds $1.2 trillion. Even after adjusting for inflation, this figure surpasses what the DoD invested in those areas, R&D-plus-procurement, during any four-year span throughout the totality of the Cold War.

In addition to the capabilities themselves, we have also prioritized the development and deployment of innovative operational concepts and force structures for utilizing our capabilities, demonstrating our ability to continually shape and command the evolving nature of warfare. And this is of significant concern to Beijing.

You see, beginning in the 1990s, the PRC meticulously designed its extensive military modernization to counter two enduring U.S. strategies for power projection.

One was aircraft carriers, exemplified during the 1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second was our prolonged, phased force deployments that transferred America’s military might from the continental United States into the theater before an operation — similar to Desert Shield preceding Desert Storm, and subsequent regional buildups ahead of later conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since that time, we have observed Beijing diligently redirect their military concepts and capabilities toward an anti-access, area-denial strategy aimed at excluding us from the western Pacific during a crisis.

Consequently, we are altering the dynamics, which entails adapting ourselves when necessary. For example, we are examining what it takes:

• To be in position
• earlier, with a more dispersed, mobile, lethal, and resilient force configuration in the first island chain;
• To maneuver, communicate, perceive, strike, and resupply within and around a battleground that is intensely contested across numerous, if not all, warfighting domains, and the electromagnetic spectrum;
• To maintain the capability to jeopardize a peer adversary’s centers of operational gravity — not solely on demand, but on unexpected timelines, from unforeseen locations, and through unanticipated methods and capabilities;
• All aimed at thwarting the territorial ambitions of a military that aspires to surpass us someday.

While there’s considerable more to accomplish, it’s already evident in aspects that vary significantly from the military that the PLA formed itself to defeat.

We’re witnessing in classified wargames that these strategies are yielding results.

Let it be clear, our innovative concepts are creating dilemmas that instill uncertainty in our rivals: sometimes with new capabilities like attritable autonomous systems, and sometimes by employing existing capabilities in novel manners — ways that are more adaptable, mobile, and rapidly deployable.

For instance, this summer the Navy demonstrated that our flexible SM-6 missile possesses a long-range air-to-air capability that is actively deployed today. The Marine Corps is advancing its Force Design initiative, deploying agile Marine Littoral Regiments that can function throughout the first island chain and are proving capable of firing Naval Strike Missiles from Joint Light Tactical Vehicles.

Meanwhile, the Army is establishing Multi-Domain Task Forces, demonstrating how Typhon missile batteries can be transported 8,000 miles away in just 15 hours. The Air Force is reinforcing Pacific bases and developing collaborative combat aircraft. The Space Force is showcasing how we can quickly launch space systems with less than a day’s notice.

I will conclude my examples here. The PRC’s strengths in intellectual property theft and sheer industrial capacity make them capable fast-followers. Therefore, we must be cautious about what we disclose and what we reveal, as a long-term investment can only be shown once. We must continuously strive to enhance our advantage.

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The third lesson for strategic competition is that the United States possesses robust, lasting competitive edges that it needs to exploit: from our dynamic network of allies and partners, to our unparalleled capability to foster innovation through and with our private sector, to the finest combat forces globally.

Strategic competition is a collective endeavor, and more is more both domestically and internationally.

Globally, our allies and partners act as a force-multiplier that strengthens us. Where we have partners of choice, our opponents are left with associates of last resort.

Since 2021, we have made historic, transformative enhancements and upgrades to U.S. posture across the Indo-Pacific, bolstering our stance from Northeast Asia down to Australia and the Pacific Islands. This has been a significant, personal priority for Secretary Austin, and a lasting legacy he will leave behind.

Additionally, we are reinforcing our interoperability with key allies and partners, and amplifying cooperation on both cutting-edge concepts and capabilities. We are broadening co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment, and fortifying our industries and supply chains through a 15-nation Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience.

Furthermore, across the globe, America’s friends and allies have significantly contributed to the common defense. They’re investing more autonomously and in our collective self-defense, collaborating more closely with each other and with us, and deploying more advanced capabilities.

When Beijing observes us training and engaging with capable allies like Australia, Japan, and Korea — whose 14 total Aegis destroyers possess over 1,200 VLS cells — it illustrates the substantial combined military strength that others can summon alongside our own if we ever need to combat territorial aggression.

And when Beijing witnesses, as they did last year, navy ships from Canada, Germany, and other nations peacefully navigated through the Taiwan Strait, they’re reminded that America isn’t the sole democracy desiring to see stability and prosperity triumph over chaos and conflict. Since that crucial waterway is practically the jugular vein of the global economy.

Domestically, more is also more when we collaborate across government, industry, academia, and non-profits. The same principle applies to DoD partnering with other government agencies and Congress.

Strategic competition rarely remains confined to the military realm, and while military tools are powerful, they have limitations. When rivals like China act coercively employing gray zone tactics, the most effective responses may include intelligence sharing, economic actions, diplomatic efforts, or other measures. Sometimes DoD should contribute, but not always.

We must harness all levers of national power, and beyond. That’s why this administration has undertaken steps to ensure that U.S. resources and innovation aren’t exploited for PLA military enhancement.

Our private sector also presents a pivotal asymmetric advantage, and we must continuously collaborate to achieve our competitive objectives. This is why we’ve made significant, ongoing investments annually to bolster the health, productivity, workforce, facilities, and supply chains of our defense industrial base, both traditional and non-traditional — from critical minerals to microelectronics, and much more.

Our capacity to innovate is an aspect that Beijing can never dull, steal, or replicate, as it is ingrained in our system of free minds, free markets, and free people. We don’t intend to control innovation or force it into compliance. Rather, we aspire to nurture and unleash creativity.

That’s why, over the past four years, we have removed obstacles hindering DoD from integrating America’s best commercial technologies.

We constructed additional pathways and express lanes over the barriers between warfighter requirements, research and development, and large-scale production and deployment.

We opened more avenues for newcomers, from defense tech startups and scale-ups to commercial enterprises — and from fiscal years 2021 through 2024, at least $375 billion DoD dollars were allocated to non-traditional defense firms.

Perhaps the most intangible edge we have over the PLA resides in the individuals who constitute America’s all-volunteer force. They represent our greatest asset. Retention remains high, and with ongoing post-COVID focus, last year we achieved our recruitment contracting goals across the breadth of the joint force. That reflects our commitment to supporting our personnel.

In recent years, PRC leaders have lamented their so-called “five incapables” — namely, how certain PLA officers and commanders struggle to assess situations, comprehend higher authorities’ intentions, make operational choices, deploy forces, or manage unforeseen circumstances.

The U.S. military does not face these challenges. Our officers and senior enlisted leaders are not only capable of all that; they excel. And due to our application of mission command principles, we don’t require centralized decision-making or micromanagement of operations as the PLA does.

We can place our trust in the fact that even if our forces become isolated from higher headquarters, they will rely on their understanding of commander’s intent, the rules of engagement, and the law of armed conflict, and they’ll adapt on the fly to realize their mission goals. It’s not blind trust — we are confident they can because their capabilities have been proven repeatedly, in the heat of combat, for decades.

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Last but not least is my fourth insight: Pay attention to your actions and your words. They hold more significance than you may realize.

Many of you

Here at SAIS, we recognize the notion of a security predicament: where the measures taken by two nations to ensure their safety press each other to escalate their efforts, increasing the chances of misinterpretations, errors in judgment, or unintended escalation that might precipitate conflict.

Some believe this could already be a component of the current strategic rivalry between the United States and the PRC. Regardless of whether you concur, the potential for a security dilemma ought to guide the policies of both the PRC and the U.S. Ultimately, we aspire for our actions, endeavors, investments, and communications to uphold deterrence rather than unnecessarily incite Beijing into initiating hostilities.

Even if our intention is deterrence, it is prudent for us to contemplate how our actions may be viewed behind closed doors on the other side. Similarly, it is essential for China to engage in the same reflection.

For example, it has been reported publicly that certain individuals in Beijing may genuinely believe we are attempting to provoke or deceive them into conflict. We are not, and it is worth noting what we are not doing as part of our rationale: We are not implementing rationing measures, not accumulating significant currency reserves, not reintroducing conscription.

We do not support or propagate separatism or aggression — in fact, the United States firmly rebukes both.

Concurrently, we acknowledge the PRC’s military drills; we listen to its leader’s pronouncements regarding a readiness to employ force against Taiwan — and we take these declarations seriously.

We do not perceive conflict as unavoidable. However, our responsibility is to avert war by being perpetually prepared for it should it arise. Where Beijing may interpret the DoD as anticipating a possible conflict, it is merely a reflection of our concerns that Beijing may instigate one. Both parties must endeavor diligently to prevent misunderstandings in this environment.

To clarify, we are not — and we have no justification to be — engaged in an ideological contest for global supremacy with the PRC. They do not need to suffer the fate that befell the USSR in 1991 for us to flourish and succeed in the competition of the 21st century. The PRC is here to stay. And that is acceptable. Nor are we going anywhere.

As we articulate the criteria for “victory” we seek in the prolonged strategic contest with China, we ought to be unequivocal with all parties that:

Victory entails ensuring the ongoing safety, security, and prosperity of our nation and our citizens, our allies and partners, and our interests.

Victory necessitates ensuring that the international framework is not detrimentally skewed against us.

And victory should additionally signify preventing the global economic and humanitarian devastation that would result from a full-scale war between the nuclear-capable nations of the United States and China.

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Winston Churchill once inspired the British by declaring: “It would be unwise to obscure the seriousness of the situation. It would be even more foolish to lose morale and resolve.”

Churchill’s message has stuck with me throughout my tenure as Deputy Secretary of Defense. As I previously mentioned, we must approach the significant threat that the PRC poses to American interests with urgency, yet we must also embody confidence.

We must be candid about the extent of the advancements in the PRC’s military capabilities, then exert our utmost effort to outthink, outmaneuver, and outstrategize them: to avert conflict if we can, while being prepared to triumph in war if we must.

Recall whose interests we represent: we are the United States of America, and alongside our allies and partners, we possess countless asymmetric advantages that the PRC lacks — all of which are manifest here today:

We uphold an open society, a vibrant innovation ecosystem that is unrivaled, and a dynamic free-market economy that Beijing cannot duplicate.

We have reliable and increasingly capable friends and allies across the region and the globe who stand by us because they resonate with our values.

And we boast the most experienced, competent, and professional military worldwide, supported by the leading intelligence agencies.

Thanks to them, we are aware of the seriousness of the situation. And because of them — and you — I have every reason to maintain my morale and resolve.

Whether you are a student or a service member; an entrepreneur, educator, or engineer; whether you currently contribute or will someday contribute to the mission of America’s national security — each of you will shape the future and our nation’s destiny in this extended era of strategic competition. You are the innovators and problem-solvers, and it requires collective effort.

I am immensely proud of all that the Defense Department has achieved to further this mission over the last four years. Certainly, work remains — the demands are constantly evolving. This is a pursuit for at least a generation, and likely more to come. The previous years are just the beginning.

Thus, as I conclude this, my third, tenure in government, much like Paul Nitze and my predecessors before me, I will be observing my successors as they build upon our advancements with their own.

I will be cheering for those who continue to safeguard our nation: our warfighters, civilians, military families, and all those who support them.

And they will be held in my thoughts and prayers as they aid in our defense.

Thank you.