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SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you.
Good morning, everyone. Fred, I’m grateful for that remarkably generous introduction, and especially for your leadership of this council over nearly twenty years. It is a pleasure to be with you today and to be in this remarkable new venue.
In the early 1960s, distinguished diplomats, public thinkers, philanthropists, and others coalesced in Washington to establish an organization aimed at addressing the challenges of a more interconnected world. Among those present was Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who candidly expressed what he believed would be beneficial for this council: “The department [is] hoping for initiative, research, and, if necessary, the boxing of State Department ears.” (Laughter.)
That’s precisely what the council has offered for more than sixty-five years – initiating with the Trans-Atlantic partnership and expanding to include expertise on various regions of the world, particularly the area I wish to discuss today: the Middle East.
From the very beginning, the Biden administration’s foremost objective in the Middle East was not to replicate past mistakes of attempting to overhaul its governments or societies, but rather to reconfigure relationships with, between, and among U.S. allies in the region.
This is due to our belief that a more unified region is more inclined to achieve stability and security, foster economic opportunities for its citizens, and find resolutions to common challenges – ranging from pandemics and terrorism to infrastructure and energy demands. A more cohesive region is also better positioned to prevent any individual neighbor from overpowering others, or any external nation from dominating the area, deterring aggression and nuclear proliferation, and to de-escalate or resolve conflicts through diplomacy.
We acted swiftly to advance this vision. We expanded the Abraham Accords. We led new coalitions such as I2U2, which unites India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States to address shared issues. We announced an innovative economic corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.
We collaborated with the UN to mediate a ceasefire in Yemen. We continued to lead and reinforce an 87-nation coalition against ISIS.
After the Trump administration’s unilateral and misguided exit from the Iran nuclear accord, we clarified that a mutual return to compliance was possible if Tehran met the necessary conditions. Simultaneously, we reinforced America’s formidable sanctions framework against Iran and fulfilled President Biden’s pledge —
(Protest chants.)
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. I value your opinions; please permit me to express mine. Thank you.
(Protest chants.)
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Therefore, to continue – we bolstered America’s strong sanctions framework against Iran and adhered to President Biden’s promise that Iran would not acquire a nuclear weapon during his term.
Lastly, we made considerable headway toward a comprehensive agreement designed to enhance our strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
On October 10th, 2023, my itinerary included travel to Israel and Saudi Arabia to assist in bridging the remaining gaps in the normalization agreement, specifically to negotiate one of its critical elements: a credible route to establishing a Palestinian state, paired with ironclad security assurances for Israel.
However, on October 7th, Hamas launched an offensive against Israel, unleashing the most lethal days for Jews since the Holocaust. Hamas murdered over 1,200 men, women, and children – torturing, mutilating, and sexually assaulting many victims.
The vast majority of those affected by Hamas were civilians. Among the casualties were individuals from over thirty nations, including 46 Americans. Additionally, Hamas captured more than 250 people, comprising around 30 children and 12 Americans, with seven of those Americans still held captive today.
It is crucial to note that the timing of Hamas’s assault was deliberate. Israel’s increasing integration within the region – the potential for normalization with Saudi Arabia – presented an existential threat to Hamas’s influence, its aspirations to dominate the Palestinian political scene, and its raison d’etre, which involves the rejection of two states and the obliteration of Israel.
As recovered notes from meetings among Hamas’s senior officials later disclosed, Hamas aimed to incite a regional war that would derail this agreement, fully aware that such action would cause tremendous suffering to civilians on all sides, including the Palestinian populace whose interests they claim to uphold.
Following the attack, President Biden underscored the United States’ unwavering commitment to support Israel in its self-defense and to prevent another October 7th incident. He expressed his resolve to avert a larger regional conflict, along with all the ensuing death and devastation. He undertook immediate measures to deter further hostility and prevent the conflict from escalating – by deploying two of our largest aircraft carrier task forces, along with fighter jets,
naval vessels, a guided missile submarine, and soldiers into the region. And he vowed unwavering efforts to ensure the release of the captives.
He became the inaugural U.S. president to visit Israel during wartime, addressing the Israeli populace directly: You are not alone. He reminded Israel that, although the nation had a right – indeed, a duty – to protect itself, the manner in which it did was crucial. It was essential to safeguard civilians and extend humanitarian aid to them.
These are the objectives that I’ve strived to promote over a dozen visits to the area since October 7th.
(Protest voices.)
SECRETARY BLINKEN: All of this has been part of a comprehensive administration effort, led by President Biden, including Jake Sullivan, Bill Burns, Lloyd Austin, Brett McGurk, Amos Hochstein, Barbara Leaf, and our diplomats across the region and worldwide.
Now, more than 15 months later, Hamas’s military capabilities and governance structure have been significantly weakened, and the masterminds behind the assault have been eliminated.
Tehran finds itself on the defensive. Its two missile strikes against Israel were countered by a coalition of regional allies that we organized. Israel’s response, which we significantly influenced, dismantled Iran’s air defense systems, exposed Tehran’s most sensitive military installations, and conveyed a clear message of deterrence – while simultaneously steering clear of a perilous escalation.
Hizballah, Iran’s most formidable proxy, is a mere shadow of its former self. Its leadership has been eradicated. Its terrorist infrastructures, comprising tunnels and weapons production – have been devastated. In Lebanon, Hizballah’s diminished forces have retreated northward of the Litani River as part of a U.S.-mediated ceasefire agreement.
After Iran dedicated decades pouring billions into bolstering Assad’s brutal regime, the Assad government has collapsed, and Tehran has withdrawn from Syria. None of Assad’s benefactors – not Iran, not Russia, not Hizballah – confronted the ability to save him this time. All were mired in crises of their own making, which the United States effectively aggravated.
Iran has lost its land supply route to Hizballah. Many of the Assad regime’s installation bases, arms factories, and weapons – including banned chemical arms – have been obliterated by Israel.
It’s not solely about what we have accomplished but also about what we have averted. When I traversed the region in the aftermath of October 7th, I sensed from partners a palpable anxiety that an extensive regional conflict was imminent. The combination of American diplomatic and military measures – and support to maintain and enhance Israel’s deterrent – has been pivotal in preventing that from transpiring in the weeks following October 7th, and during several intense moments since then.
America’s allies and partners, notably in the Middle East, have recognized who they can depend upon to support their friends, and who they cannot – which powers strive to alleviate crises, and which powers refrain from action or exacerbate issues. The balance of power in the Middle East is undergoing a significant transformation, and not in the manner Hamas and its supporters anticipated or envisioned.
Yet, the region still brims with peril, from Syria’s precarious political transition to Iran’s urgent attempts to restore its deterrence, with all that entails for its nuclear ambitions, to the Houthis’ continuous assaults on Israel and global shipping, to a scarcity of opportunities and the suppression of dissent and human rights in various countries.
Furthermore, while the strategic advancements made over the past 15 months are genuine, they have come at a tremendous and agonizing cost. For the families of kibbutzim, concertgoers, children, and soldiers slain in the October 7th attack, unimaginable sorrow lingers. For those with relatives and friends still held captive, each day brings additional torment from uncertainty over their loved ones’ suffering or even whether they are alive.
The persistent humanitarian crisis in Gaza has caused immense suffering among Palestinian civilians – children, women, men caught in a conflict they did not instigate and are powerless to halt. Tens of thousands of individuals have lost their lives in Gaza. Nearly the entire population has experienced the loss of a loved one. Almost the entire population is facing hunger. Nearly the total populace – around two million individuals – has been displaced, many multiple times. Most have no place to return to, as numerous homes in Gaza have been damaged or annihilated. Gaza stands as one of the most perilous locations in the world for a child, a civilian, or a journalist to be.
And as is typical in conflicts, the more individuals suffer, the less empathy they feel for the suffering of those on the opposing side. Across the Arab and Muslim worlds, significant majorities believe that the events of October 7th either did not occur – or if they did, that they constituted a justified attack on Israel’s military. Within Israel, there is almost no coverage of the conditions in Gaza and the daily struggles faced by its inhabitants.
This dehumanization represents one of the most profound tragedies of the conflict. The late Cardinal Martini once spoke of our necessity to experience collective sorrow. It aids us in salvaging from moments of loss and despair a sense of shared humanity. Without it, we forfeit one of the essential pillars of reconciliation – and ultimately coexistence.
For the United States – a nation with distinct global commitments and responsibilities – the conflict has heightened risks to our personnel, our facilities, and our assets, strained our military posture, stockpiles, and readiness.
Terrorist organizations have sought to take advantage of the crisis in Gaza to enhance recruitment and incite anti-American sentiment.
Autocrats have opportunistically leveraged the conflict to rationalize their aggression and atrocities while advancing their efforts to challenge the international rules and principles that protect American interests and values.
And naturally, it has divided our communities – from university campuses to places of worship to families.
Considering the costs – particularly the human costs – we bear the responsibility to ensure that the strategic gains achieved over the past 15 months endure, establishing the groundwork for a brighter future.
Far too often in the Middle East, we have witnessed how the shoes of one dictator can be assumed by another, or lead to conflict and chaos; how a nation can oust one external power only to witness another take its place; how eliminating one terrorist group can give rise to even more lethal successors.
Thus, our imperative is not to revert to the pre-October 7th state of affairs. It is to create a new reality for the Middle East – one in which all individuals are more secure, all can attain their national aspirations, and all can coexist in peace.
Is that difficult to attain? Yes. Peace in the region has always been challenging.
(Protest voices.)
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Is it difficult? Yes. Is it unattainable? No. Is it vital? Absolutely, yes.
And that’s the reason we have pursued three interconnected diplomatic objectives: facilitating a lasting resolution to the Israel-Hizballah conflict; concluding the war in Gaza; and normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which will furnish Palestinians and Israelis with the incentives and reassurances necessary to fulfill their long-desired national aspirations.
Israel has endured an unsustainable situation along its northern border for far too long.
Hizballah – a terrorist organization whose proclaimed objectives include annihilating Israel – wielded control over vast areas of Lebanon, including territories south of the Litani River, contrary to the UN resolution that concluded the previous war between Israel and Hizballah – territory Hizballah utilized, with Iran’s backing, to train combatants, amass weapons, construct armaments and tunnels, and execute deadly strikes on Israel.
Commencing on October 7th, Hizballah initiated
thousands of missiles towards Israeli communities without justification, vowing to persist with its assaults until Israel concluded its military operation in Gaza.
Hizballah’s hostility has exacted a severe toll on both Israelis and Lebanese. Approximately 70,000 Israelis have been compelled to flee their homes along Israel’s northern frontier. In Lebanon, numerous individuals have perished – a quarter of Lebanon’s populace has been uprooted.
Our objective in pursuing a halt to hostilities was not simply to pause the conflict and avoid a more extensive regional war. Instead, we sought to hinder Hizballah from reestablishing itself in a manner that could pose a threat to Israel or continue to hold the Lebanese state and its citizens as captives. Additionally, we aimed to foster conditions that would allow displaced Israeli and Lebanese families to safely return to their residences.
The agreement we facilitated, in conjunction with France, fulfills those criteria. It enables the Lebanese government to regain authority over its territory. It offers vital assistance and support to Lebanon’s economy and security forces. It upholds Israel’s right to self-defense in line with international law. It fulfills Israel’s purpose of disconnecting confrontations on its northern front from the conflict in Gaza.
Since the accord was ratified, Israeli forces have commenced their withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army has mobilized to ensure the elimination of remaining terrorist infrastructure and to prevent Hizballah’s resurgence. The U.S. and France are collaborating continuously to oversee the agreement and address any breaches.
Now, just six weeks following the accord, Lebanon’s parliament overwhelmingly voted to elect a new president – the first time the nation has had a national leader in over two years. Just yesterday, a new prime minister was chosen. Both represent significant strides towards becoming a secure, sovereign, and prosperous nation while addressing the needs of the Lebanese populace.
Secondly, we have endeavored to conclude the conflict in Gaza in a manner that will establish the groundwork for lasting peace, as well as to further the legitimate dreams of Israelis for enduring security – and Palestinians for an autonomous, viable state of their own.
A month into the hostilities, during a meeting of G7 foreign ministers in Tokyo, I outlined principles that the United States considered crucial to achieving these objectives. The principles included: a Gaza that is never again governed by Hamas or utilized as a platform for terrorism or other violent assaults; new Palestinian-led governance – with Gaza unified with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority; no Israeli military occupation of Gaza or reduction of Gaza’s territory; no attempts post-conflict to besiege or isolate it; and no forced displacement of Gaza’s populace.
These principles also advocated for the establishment of a sustained mechanism for Gaza’s recovery and rebuilding, and for creating a pathway toward Israelis and Palestinians coexisting side by side, in their respective states, with equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity.
Now, we and our allies acknowledged that we would not be able to accomplish these objectives overnight.
The first step, as we have long held, is to secure an initial ceasefire – six weeks – during which Israel and Hamas cease hostilities, Israeli forces withdraw, hostages begin to return home, Palestinian prisoners are released, and humanitarian aid floods into Gaza. It will also create space for finalizing a post-conflict plan to facilitate the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, to make the ceasefire permanent, and to bring the remaining hostages home.
Once we determined that Israel had fulfilled its primary goal in Gaza of ensuring that Hamas could not execute another October 7th, President Biden publicly outlined his comprehensive ceasefire strategy. We traveled worldwide to garner support for the proposal. The UN Security Council promptly adopted a resolution backing it – with 14 members voting in favor, and no members voting against it. The Arab League, nations in the region and beyond, all expressed their backing. Hamas, the sole dissenting party, but now completely isolated, ultimately accepted President Biden’s framework.
During this period, we have worked tirelessly with Qatar and Egypt to negotiate the specifics of the agreement and its execution.
At various junctures, different parties have complicated finalizing an agreement, or events have postponed or thwarted its completion.
For several months, Hamas has acted as an obstacle. However, in recent weeks, our focused efforts have brought us to the verge of a full and final agreement.
On Sunday, the United States, Qatar, and Egypt proposed a final plan. The decision now rests with Hamas.
If Hamas agrees, the deal is prepared for ratification and implementation.
I am confident that we will achieve a ceasefire. Whether we accomplish this within the remaining days of our administration or after January 20th, I believe the deal will closely follow the terms of the agreement that President Biden proposed last May and that our administration rallied global support for.
From the very beginning, we also recognized that we could not afford to delay planning for what would follow a ceasefire. For many months, we have been working intensively with our partners to devise a detailed post-conflict strategy that would enable Israel to completely withdraw from Gaza, prevent Hamas from re-establishing itself, and ensure Gaza’s governance, security, and reconstruction – based on the principles I initially articulated in Tokyo. We intend to hand it over to the next administration to carry forward.
However, let me outline a few of its fundamental components this morning.
We believe that the Palestinian Authority should solicit international partners to assist in establishing and managing a temporary administration responsible for crucial civil sectors in Gaza such as banking, water, energy, health, and civil coordination with Israel. The international community would supply funding, technical assistance, and oversight. The interim administration would involve Palestinians from Gaza and representatives from the PA – chosen after genuine consultation with Gaza’s communities – and would transfer full authority to a thoroughly reformed PA administration as soon as feasible.
The administrators would collaborate closely with a senior UN official, tasked with overseeing the international stabilization and recovery initiatives.
An interim security mission would consist of members of partner nation security forces and vetted Palestinian personnel. Its duties would encompass creating a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and ensuring border security, which is vital to thwarting smuggling that could enable Hamas to restore its military capabilities. We would establish a new initiative for training, equipping, and vetting a PA-led security force for Gaza – focused on law and order and gradually taking over responsibilities from the interim security mission.
These arrangements would be enshrined in a UN Security Council Resolution.
Some of our allies have already indicated their willingness to provide troops and police for such a mission – but only if it is agreed that Gaza and the West Bank are unified under a reformed PA, as part of a pathway to an independent Palestinian state.
And therein lies the challenge. Achieving agreement will necessitate that all parties muster political will, make tough decisions, and reach difficult compromises.
Key regional and international stakeholders must fully commit to supporting Palestinian-led governance and preventing Hamas’s resurgence.
The PA must carry out swift, extensive reforms to establish more transparent and accountable governance – continuing a process it initiated last year.
Israel will need to agree to the reunification of Gaza and the West Bank.under the guidance of a reformed PA.
And all must adopt a time-sensitive, conditions-dependent route toward establishing an independent Palestinian state. These tenets are mutually supportive.
Time-sensitive because no one will believe in or accept a never-ending process. Palestinians require and warrant a transparent and imminent outlook for political self-governance.
Conditions-dependent because while Palestinians possess a right to self-governance, this right is accompanied by responsibilities. No one should anticipate Israel to endorse a Palestinian entity that is dominated by Hamas or other radicals; that is militarized or has an independent armed group; that collaborates with Iran or other entities which deny Israel’s right to exist; that instructs and promotes rejectionism; or that, if not reformed, becomes a failed state.
Israelis must determine the type of relationship they wish to cultivate with Palestinians. This cannot be the fantasy that Palestinians will consent to being a non-entity without national rights. Seven million Israeli Jews and approximately five million Palestinians are established in the same territory. Neither is relocating.
Israelis must discard the illusion that they can execute de facto annexation without repercussions for Israel’s democracy, its international standing, or its security.
Embracing a time-sensitive, conditions-dependent strategy for Palestinian statehood will furnish the political framework that regional and global entities require to supply the security forces and financial resources essential to assist new Palestinian leaders in governing, securing, and reconstructing Gaza.
Some in Israel contend that endorsing a political framework for the Palestinians would reward Hamas for October 7th. In truth, Hamas has sought to annihilate the concept of two states for decades. It aimed to dismantle the Oslo Accords through relentless suicide attacks. It endeavored to suffocate the Arab Peace Initiative by instigating the horrific Passover assaults. Far from rewarding Hamas, accepting a political framework would serve as the ultimate repudiation of its nihilistic agenda of chaos and devastation.
We earnestly hope the parties are ready to make difficult choices moving forward. However, the undeniable truth is that, up to this moment, they have either failed to make these tough decisions or acted in ways that push a deal and lasting peace further from attainment.
Israel’s administration has systematically weakened the credibility and functionality of the only feasible alternative to Hamas: the Palestinian Authority.
Think about funding. Israel continues to withhold PA tax revenues that it collects on behalf of the Palestinians, funds that rightfully belong to the Palestinians and are essential for the PA to remunerate those who provide critical services like health care and security in the West Bank, which is crucial for Israel’s own security.
This week, U.S. involvement led Israel to consent to releasing hundreds of millions of dollars in PA tax revenues – a positive move. However, these funds should never have been withheld initially. Moreover, Israel is still retaining over half a billion dollars in tax revenues that the PA urgently requires and to which Palestinians are entitled.
In the West Bank, Israel is accelerating the expansion of official settlements and nationalizing land at an unprecedented rate while overlooking a surge in illegal outposts. Violent assaults by extremist settlers against Palestinian civilians have reached alarming heights.
We have long articulated to the Israeli Government that Hamas cannot be overcome through military action alone – that without a definitive alternative, a post-conflict strategy and a credible political framework for the Palestinians, Hamas, or another equally repugnant and perilous entity, will resurge.
That is precisely what has transpired in northern Gaza since October 7th. Each time Israel concludes its military operations and withdraws, Hamas militants regroup and reappear because there is no other force to fill the gap. Indeed, we estimate that Hamas has recruited nearly as many new militants as it has lost. That is an equation for an enduring insurgency and constant warfare.
The longer the conflict persists, the more dire the humanitarian conditions become in Gaza.
Israel confronts exceptionally challenging scenarios in Gaza: a civilian populace ensnared there with Hamas operating from and beneath homes, hospitals, schools, and mosques.
Indeed, Hamas has callously exploited the anguish of Palestinians. In a missive that Yahya Sinwar – Hamas’s military chief at the time – sent to intermediaries, he referred to the deaths of Palestinian civilians, and I quote, “necessary sacrifices,” asserting that the more innocent Palestinians perish, the more Hamas would stand to gain.
Despite these significant challenges, Israel’s efforts have fallen considerably short of addressing the immense need in Gaza.
We have been clearly vocal, both publicly and privately, that there are measures Israel could implement to ameliorate the humanitarian situation in Gaza and guarantee that critical assistance reaches every Palestinian in need. These include reinstating the flow of commercial goods; implementing pauses in military actions, just as it did during the effective polio vaccination initiative; and securing specific routes for the transfer of aid to storage and distribution points.
The plight of civilians in Gaza is a tragedy in its own right. It also isolates Israel on the international stage and jeopardizes its hard-earned progress toward fostering relationships in the region.
The longer the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues, the more Arab nations that recently normalized ties with Israel will encounter pressure from their populations to disengage, and the higher the risk that Israel’s long-established peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt will collapse. The stability these partnerships provide for Israel and the region is easy to overlook, especially for generations accustomed to a world where these nations coexist peacefully. However, their breakdown would trigger even greater instability and be exceedingly difficult to mend.
Remaining entrenched in Gaza will adversely affect Israel economically. Already, foreign direct investment and Israel’s credit rating have taken significant hits. The prolonged mobilization of reservists is undermining tens of thousands of businesses and diminishing private sector productivity.
For its part, the Palestinian Authority has repeatedly failed to implement overdue reforms, such as curbing corruption and a bloated bureaucracy, further diminishing its backing among Palestinians. The PA’s reluctance to consistently and unequivocally denounce Hamas and the attacks of October 7th only deepens the skepticism among Israelis that the two communities can ever coexist peacefully – as do the PA’s payments to the families of terrorists and the antisemitic statements from its leader.
Many partners in the region and beyond have also been hesitant to publicly denounce Hamas. Amidst the chorus condemning Israel, the silence regarding Hamas has been staggering. Where was the enduring and united demand for Hamas to release hostages and disarm? Where was the urgent push to crack down on the financing, the arms, and the materials that Hamas employs to lethal effect? Where was the condemnation for Hamas’s abhorrent practice of hiding amongst civilians? Had countries around the globe applied this collective pressure, Hamas’s leaders might have been compelled to make different choices many months prior, potentially averting widespread suffering.
Hamas, in particular, has often opted to remain passive, believing that as time elapsed, and as Palestinians in Gaza endured more hardship, the greater the likelihood Iran, Hizballah, and others would retaliate against Israel, igniting a broader conflict; the more international pressure would escalate on Israel to unconditionally cease its military operations; the more probable it would be for a rift to develop between Israel and the United States.
For its part, Israel has pursued
its military initiative beyond merely incapacitating Hamas’s combat capabilities and eliminating the leaders accountable for October 7th, persuaded that persistent military assertiveness was essential to compel Hamas to agree to a ceasefire and hostage arrangement on Israel’s conditions. And Israel has steadfastly maintained that any shift away from its rigorous military operations would be perceived by Hamas as a signal of frailty or dwindling resolve.
Some have questioned whether an alternative strategy and methodology would have altered this landscape, whether we placed excessive pressure on Israel, on Hamas, on Iran – or insufficient pressure.
We have deliberated these inquiries passionately within the administration, within the State Department, where various perspectives have enriched our discussions.
Some argue that by discreetly and publicly aiming to restrain and redirect Israel’s military actions, we hindered it from delivering even greater harm to Iran, to Hamas, Hizballah, and other foes.
Others contend that we facilitated the Israeli Government to pursue a military operation that was excessive, counterproductive, and against U.S. interests.
It is vital to probe into such inquiries, which will be analyzed for many years ahead.
I wish I could stand here today and assert with confidence that we made every decision correctly. I cannot.
I wish I could claim that leaders in the region consistently prioritized their populations’ welfare over their personal ambitions. They did not.
However, what I can communicate is this:
First, we persist in believing that the optimal means to foster a more stable, secure, and prosperous Middle East – and to deal a lasting setback to Iran, Hamas, Hizballah, and the entire so-called “axis of resistance” – is by creating a more cohesive region. And the linchpin to achieving that cohesiveness – now more than ever – is resolving this conflict in a manner that fulfills the enduring aspiration of both Israelis and Palestinians to coexist peacefully and securely in their own sovereign states.
Second, as considerable influence as the United States holds in the Middle East, we cannot dictate results. Ultimately, whether the region embarks on the journey towards greater integration will boil down not to us but to the decisions made by its leaders and by its populace.
Lastly, we find ourselves now with a historic window of opportunity still ajar. While seizing this moment cannot undo the loss of innocent Israeli and Palestinian lives, it can avert further loss; it can disrupt the cycle of violence and bloodshed. We mustn’t let this opportunity slip away.
Israel’s most profound aspiration since its inception has been to gain acceptance and to be regarded as a normal state within the region and the global community, with the rights and responsibilities that entails.
At the same time, within the hearts and minds of Israelis lies the deeply held belief that previous peace efforts have been met with rejection, violent pushback, and heightened insecurity – with Camp David resulting in the second intifada, and the unilateral retreats from Lebanon and Gaza culminating in Hizballah and Hamas. In the aftermath of October 7th, persuading Israelis otherwise will require significant and determined efforts.
The potential for normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia signifies the prime opportunity to accomplish the long-desired goal of Israel’s deeper integration into the region.
Furthermore, it serves as an optimal incentive for the parties to undertake the tough choices necessary to fully realize the longings of both Israelis and Palestinians and untangle the Gordian Knot that has obstructed progress until now.
Much of the substantial work for normalization is complete, including discussions on the intricate U.S.-Saudi facets of an agreement.
These facets comprise:
A strategic alliance agreement that positions Saudi Arabia as a treaty ally of the United States.
A defense cooperation agreement that enhances military collaboration and cultivates integrated capabilities.
An energy agreement that incorporates civil nuclear cooperation.
And an economic agreement aimed at boosting bilateral trade and investment.
For both parties, October 7th has increased the stakes of the normalization process.
For Saudi Arabia, advancing efforts to accomplish Palestinian self-determination was always a fundamental element. However, the urgency to conclude the war in Gaza and to establish a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood has grown increasingly critical for Riyadh.
For Israel, October 7th and its subsequent events have illuminated that a more integrated regional and security framework can best mitigate threats to its safety and isolate its adversaries.
That’s precisely what we witnessed in April and again in October when, under U.S. leadership, regional partners and allies united in an unprecedented manner to assist in defending Israel against Iran’s unprecedented direct missile assaults. This also reflects what the global community could achieve to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions and ensure that Tehran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
In 2021, a group of documentary filmmakers traversed Gaza asking children a simple question: What is your dream?
Many of the children they questioned appeared to be five or six years old – around the same age as my own kids.
A little girl aspired to become a doctor. Why, the interviewer inquired? To care for people in times of war, she replied.
A boy longed to be a pilot, so he could transport people out of their situation, allow them to see the world, and experience happiness.
A girl wished to become an engineer, to assist in reconstructing homes that had been razed.
A boy expressed his dream was, “To see the nation, under my guidance, transform into a beautiful place.”
I know Israeli girls and boys harbor very similar aspirations.
They dream of no longer bidding farewell to older siblings and parents embarking on wartime missions.
Of not enduring nights in bomb shelters, or boarding a school bus that is targeted by militants.
They dream of returning to homes they once fled.
Of restoring beauty to ravaged communities.
Another path is attainable. We’ve witnessed it. A route towards greater integration, enhanced opportunities – towards enduring peace, with lasting security.
I believe that because of the foundations we established, both prior to and following October 7th, that avenue remains open.
And I believe that if leaders make the challenging decisions to follow that path, they will not only have America by their side but also an unmatched power: generations of young individuals determined to reject the notion that conflict is unavoidable and that animosity is inherited, and courageous enough – courageous enough – to embrace peaceful coexistence.
I appreciate your attention. (Applause.)
MR KEMPE: So Secretary Blinken, thank you. That was a significant address, and I believe it will be remembered as such – addressing everything from the future of Gaza to the future of the entire Middle East, in a forward-looking manner. We don’t have much time, but I would like to ask you a couple of questions that relate to the content of that speech.
First, regarding the situation in Gaza, there were reports this morning indicating that Hamas had accepted the ceasefire. Could you provide some comments on that? And in your discussions with Middle Eastern leaders, do you perceive that the Middle East, particularly the wealthier regions, is inclined to intervene in Gaza if they do not receive a firm commitment to what you’ve termed a two-state solution from President Netanyahu?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Regarding the agreement, Fred, as I mentioned, it’s on the verge. It’s closer than it has ever been. However, as we sit here, we await final confirmation from Hamas on its acceptance. Until we receive that confirmation, we will remain on the precipice. That could arrive anytime – it might come in the upcoming hours, or it could take days.
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what we’re seeking. But what we’ve accomplished over the recent weeks and particularly over the last few days has made it quite evident. And the agreement is there, it’s poised to be entirely and finally acknowledged, it’s ready to be executed. However, at this moment, we must wait to receive the final confirmation from Hamas.
Regarding what other nations might do, look, we’ve been engaging with allies throughout the region and beyond for several months, as I mentioned, to ensure that we were ready for when a ceasefire was eventually achieved. It is clear that while there is certainly an ongoing willingness for countries to assist with the humanitarian requirements of Palestinians caught in this horrific conflict of Hamas’s creation, when it comes to actually investing in Gaza’s future and its rebuilding, countries will be exceedingly hesitant without some form of clear political prospect. From their perspective – a viewpoint I share – without that, they’re merely going to be investing in something that will ultimately revert to its current state at some point down the road.
Thus, I believe there’s a potent and widely accepted sentiment in the region and elsewhere that addressing the threat posed by Hamas through military means may be necessary, but it is not enough. Without a political aspect, what we’re ultimately facing is a lingering insurgency that will deplete and exhaust Israel, resulting in a continual conflict. This is an essential consideration for partners across the region.
MR KEMPE: What you touched upon a bit less in your address was Iran, and the direction of the future that you envision – a lot depends on the choices Iran makes. There have been various reports about discussions within the Biden administration regarding the possibility of targeting nuclear facilities in Iran under certain circumstances. Can you elaborate on your perspective regarding the current situation with Iran? How should one assess the nuclear facilities? What guidance will you provide those who follow you in the Trump administration?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Look, President Biden has been very explicit. He was resolute that Iran would not attain a nuclear armament on his watch, and it will not.
Currently, we had a significant portion of Iran’s nuclear initiative contained through the Iran nuclear agreement. The accord focused on Iran’s capacity for fissile material, and what that agreement accomplished was to ensure that Iran could not produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than a year’s duration. Thus, we would have ample time to observe it if it emerged from the accord and proceeded with that.
Regrettably, by withdrawing from the agreement and not substituting it with an alternative, Iran has now reached a juncture where it can generate fissile material for a nuclear weapon within a week or two. Presently, it does not possess the weapon itself. That forms another aspect of the equation. Yet, it is undoubtedly in a considerably more perilous position than it was when we had it contained by the nuclear accord.
I believe that as Iran considers this – and as the upcoming administration evaluates this – we will need to discern if an opportunity exists on the nuclear front to secure another agreement. President Trump previously discussed securing a better, more robust deal from his standpoint. Alright, let’s see. Perhaps there’s a chance to accomplish just that.
If that does not materialize, I am aware of a collective resolve across administrations to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, by one means or another. I personally hold the view that achieving this through a clear, robust, and verifiable agreement is the optimal approach to establish something enduring. Nevertheless, there is a determination in the United States, spanning political affiliations, that Iran must not secure a weapon.
MR KEMPE: So a concluding question, and then I think we need to allow you to resume the critical task of bringing all this to a conclusion, if we can.
The Atlantic Council serves as a forum for dialogue. Some of us found the exchanges today regrettable. We are not a group of loud critics. We are individuals who strive to debate what the rightful objective should be. However, it does not astonish you, or me, that this region provokes strong feelings.
This trajectory toward the future – and let’s not overlook where Europe stood until 1945, prior to the European Union, prior to NATO, and everything that followed. You mentioned, I believe, about Saudi normalization almost in that spirit. Some individuals have speculated about a path of integration that could foster economic collaboration in the Middle East akin to that of the European Union, military integration – not a NATO per se, but nations drawing closer. Are we nearer to that now? Is Saudi normalization with Israel, and the Abraham Accords, leading to something a bit more consequential as you described at the conclusion of your address? Or are we further away from that in light of all that has transpired in the last couple of years?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Look, I believe we are significantly closer to it. The initiatives we’ve undertaken over the past four years, building upon the Abraham Accords, aimed toward their ultimate realization, which is normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Considerable effort has gone into this, including, as I outlined, necessary agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia as well as between Saudi Arabia and Israel. And as we stand here, it’s ready to advance. That could proceed as soon as tomorrow.
However, it necessitates two components. It demands an end to the conflict in Gaza and it requires a credible route to a Palestinian state. Therefore, Israelis must contemplate if actualizing a foundational ambition – to be integrated into the region, to be perceived as a normal nation, and to reap the benefits of participating in a security framework that we observed in action when Iran targeted Israel, not once but twice – whether that is worth the choices necessary to finally resolve their relationship with the Palestinians, in addition to concluding the conflict in Gaza. That’s a decision that solely they can determine.
And as I mentioned, especially given the history and particularly following October 7th, the realization of Palestinian statehood, which is an essential necessity, must also arrive – must also arrive – with uncompromising security assurances with Israel. But that is the choice. That is the choice. And I believe it exists.
At this juncture, because societies are so traumatized, both Israelis and Palestinians find it exceptionally challenging to engage in that dialogue. I understand that, and I addressed it today, not under the delusion that anyone would hear this and accept it tomorrow, but rather to establish that groundwork. Because that discussion must transpire. It will occur. Whether that unfolds next week, next year, or in several years – we shall see. But it is imperative that it takes place. And I am convinced that the work we have accomplished and that we will bequeath to the next administration has laid a foundation not only for this discussion but to actually – actually – propel it forward.
One of the beliefs I hold strongly, Fred, drawing from my own experiences over the past three decades and reflecting on the span of history, is that hereditary enmity does not exist, that we are not destined for conflict or hostility. Even the most intense and violent animosities can dissipate, can transform. During these last four years, two of my closest allies, two of our most trusted partners, have been Germany and Japan. Not so long ago, it was an entirely different landscape.
We often take that for granted. We should not. We need to be reminded of this, driven by this. Because it conveys to us that none of this is fated or preordained. We possess the ability to enact change. We possess the capability to establish peace, to achieve lasting security. Yet, this requires will. It demands tough choices, difficult decisions, and risk. Ultimately, we can attempt to outline the path, but others must traverse it. We will do everything within our power to assist them if they choose to do so.
MR KEMPE: Thank you immensely for that message, and especially that message here at the Atlantic Council, which you understand was established and stands for the resolution of these types of conflicts and advancing toward a significantly improved state. Just as we have addressed those issues for Europe, we are also engaging with those issues for the Middle East.
Therefore, I would ask everyone in the audience to join me not only in expressing gratitude to Secretary Blinken for today, and not merely for his efforts during the administration, but truly for a lifetime of public service. Thank you very much.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. (Applause.)
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