Can Europe save Ukraine – and itself – from Putin and Trump?

 In an interview with Fox News on August 19^th, Trump spoke of his good relationship with Putin (“a warmth there… a decent feeling”) and repeatedly endorsed the Russian argument that Ukraine shouldn’t be allowed to hitch NATO (“they said “Put us in NATO”, and all people knew you … simply can’t do this”).1 By distinction, Trump criticised Ukraine for desirous to get Crimea again (“They shouldn’t have requested for it, ‘cause it was, you know, a very insulting thing”) and blamed Ukraine for resisting Russia’s assault in phrases that prompt that he thought Ukraine had began the struggle (“you don’t take on a nation that’s 10 times your size and, you know, military experts”). Trump wrote to Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán that he was “very angry” {that a} Ukrainian assault on August 13^th had (quickly) lower off the circulate of oil via Russia’s ‘Druzhba’ pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia – although the 2 nations’ purchases of Russian oil (and gasoline) assist to fund Russia’s struggle effort.²  

On the army entrance, as for a lot of Joe Biden’s presidency, the US has been looking for to forestall Ukraine from hanging Russia with Western weapons. That didn’t change, even after Trump posted on his social media channel, ‘Truth Social’: “It is very hard, if not impossible, to win a war without attacking an invaders [sic] country. It’s like a great team in sports that has a fantastic defense, but is not allowed to play offense. There is no chance of winning! It is like that with Ukraine and Russia”.³ The Pentagon has additionally put in place guidelines permitting it to forestall weapons and munitions earmarked for Ukraine being delivered if the US defence secretary considers that American shares are too low.⁴ 

Second, Russia is not going to conform to Ukraine having any efficient safety assure and the US is reluctant to guard its Western companions in the event that they attempt to present one. Claims by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff after the Alaska summit with Putin that the Russians had agreed that the US and Europe may “effectively offer Article 5-like language to cover a security guarantee” have since been contradicted by the Russian international minister, Sergei Lavrov.⁵ Russia continues to insist that no forces from NATO nations might be deployed in Ukraine as a part of a peace settlement, and that Russia itself, together with China, ought to be among the many nations guaranteeing Ukraine’s future safety. 

Putin nonetheless appears decided to battle, not negotiate – except the negotiation is over the phrases of Ukrainian capitulation.

On the US aspect, the White House has made clear that there can be no US boots on the bottom, whereas speaking vaguely of “other military support options”. A senior US defence official, Elbridge Colby, reportedly informed senior army representatives from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (round 30 nations, largely European members of NATO together with non-EU nations like Turkey and the UK, but in addition together with Australia and Canada) on August 19^th that the US would play a minimal position in safety ensures for Ukraine;⁶ although later reporting from the Financial Times prompt that the US may be keen to offer extra assist than Colby had indicated, together with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), command and management and air defence property.⁷ Trump himself has additionally hinted at offering US air energy. But the US contribution can be primarily based outdoors Ukraine, might need guidelines of engagement designed to keep away from direct confrontation with Russian forces, even when they had been attacking US allies, and can be supplied conditional on the Europeans deploying tens of 1000’s of troops to Ukraine. 

Europeans are (justifiably) nervous that even when they’ll provide you with sufficient troops (over which there are important query marks), Trump will change his thoughts once more concerning the scale and nature of US assist. There are divided views in his personal administration, and the Russians have prior to now been capable of play on Trump’s worry that Ukraine may drag the US right into a nuclear struggle. A US ‘backstop’ with no dedication to responding if Russia attacked European forces in Ukraine can be worse than ineffective, creating an nearly irresistible temptation for Putin to check transatlantic solidarity.  

Third, Putin nonetheless appears decided to battle, not negotiate – except the negotiation is over the phrases of Ukrainian capitulation. He has proven no real interest in bilateral or trilateral negotiations with Zelenskyy of the kind that Trump needs to engineer, wherein the result wouldn’t be pre-cooked however would emerge in leader-level talks. Lavrov informed the US TV community NBC “Putin is ready to meet with Zelensky when the agenda is ready for a summit, and this agenda is not ready at all.”⁸ Lavrov additionally claimed that Zelenskyy was not the reliable chief of Ukraine however solely “the de facto head of the regime”, with whom Russia couldn’t signal a peace deal. 

Russia’s calls for – that Ukraine hand over elements of the Donetsk area that Russia has by no means occupied together with key military-strategic factors, make Russian an official language in Ukraine, agree by no means to hitch NATO and to be completely impartial, and never permit any forces from NATO nations on its territory – haven’t modified because of Putin’s assembly with Trump, and are as unacceptable to Ukraine as they ever had been (although seemingly acceptable to key members of the Trump administration).⁹  

Fourth, although Trump has repeatedly prompt that he’s getting pissed off with Putin and can impose new sanctions, up to now he has not been keen to place direct financial strain on Russia to make concessions within the pursuits of peace. Before the Alaska summit he warned that if Putin didn’t conform to cease the struggle he would face “very severe consequences”; afterwards, not solely did he not announce any new measures in opposition to Russia, however he dropped his name for a ceasefire, suggesting that negotiations on a ultimate peace settlement may proceed in parallel with the combating.¹⁰ The primary step Trump has taken, supposedly to place strain on Russia, is to impose a further 25 per cent tariff on Indian exports to the US to punish it for importing Russian crude oil; that has had no impression on Russia’s willingness to proceed the struggle. Secretary of State Marco Rubio informed NBC tv “the minute you issue new sanctions … our ability to get [the Russians] to the table will be severely diminished” – a wierd inversion of the logic of sanctions, which is to extend the strain on Russia to make concessions.¹¹ Reportedly, within the run-up to the Alaska summit the US even dangled the prospect of renewed US funding in Russia’s power sector (at the moment underneath sanctions) and the acquisition of Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers.¹² Putin have to be fairly sure that no matter he does in Ukraine, Trump is not going to impose important prices on Russia.

The two aims

Against this background, Zelenskyy and his European companions should resolve what to do, not primarily based on what they suppose will likely be most acceptable to Trump, however on their very own safety wants. Then they need to work out present the assets wanted, even when the US is not serving to them. 

The struggle is existential for Ukrainians: they’ll see what occurs within the territories occupied by Russia, and know that their survival as a nation will depend on combating Russia to standstill (at a minimal). Most European leaders are nonetheless behaving as if they’ll dwell with the implications of Ukraine’s defeat, although they’re keen to assist delay that final result. Most haven’t begun to face up to what’s at stake if Ukraine loses, or to clarify the potential impacts to their populations.¹³  

Most European leaders are nonetheless behaving as if they’ll dwell with the implications of Ukraine’s defeat.

German chancellor Friedrich Merz is without doubt one of the exceptions: in an interview with the German TV channel ZDF on August 31^st, he mentioned: “The war could be ended tomorrow, if Ukraine capitulated… but then the day after tomorrow it will be the next country’s turn, and then the day after that it will be our turn. That’s not an option”.¹⁴ Merz must persuade his colleagues that the risk is actual; then they need to draw the conclusion that it’s crucial to take better dangers than they’ve executed up to now with a purpose to make sure that Ukraine survives as a safe, impartial state, with out dropping considerably extra territory. That most likely means deploying forces in Ukraine (or on the very least over it), even within the absence of a ceasefire or peace deal, if the choice is that Russia’s progress accelerates. That is one thing which even Merz at the moment doesn’t wish to do. 

Governments urgently must plan and make investments to realize two aims now:

• Stabilising the entrance and ideally pushing Russia again. Since the failure of Ukraine’s summer time 2023 offensive within the south, Russia has usually been advancing on a broad entrance. Though progress stays sluggish and losses excessive, Russian forces have taken greater than twice as a lot territory between January and July this yr as they did in the identical interval final yr.¹⁵ The Centre for Defence Strategies, a Kyiv think-tank headed by former Ukrainian defence minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk, assessed on August 26^th: “Provided current dynamics of combat operations are maintained, the enemy will be able to capture Pokrovsk by autumn, Kostyantynivka and Kupyansk by the end of the year, and reach the close approaches to Zaporizhzhia and the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration by early winter.”¹⁶ Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk (see map) are a few of the final important cities in Ukrainian fingers within the Donetsk area, and the primary obstacles to a a lot deeper Russian thrust into territory east of the River Dnipro that Russia has been unable to penetrate for the reason that full-scale invasion started. While that may nonetheless go away Russia a good distance from defeating Ukraine, it could mark important progress from the place Russian forces are at this time. Ukraine and its allies must cease Russia’s progress earlier than it may obtain a serious breakthrough.

As properly as urgent Ukrainian forces on the entrance, Russia has elevated its drone and missile assaults on Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure this yr, together with with the assault on Kyiv on the evening of August 27^th-28^th that killed a minimum of 23 folks and broken the EU delegation’s workplaces. Attacks on civilian targets aren’t strategic, within the sense of straight affecting Ukraine’s capacity to maintain combating – a degree made just lately by Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic research on the University of St Andrews.¹⁷ They do, nonetheless, affect Ukrainian civilian morale, and on the arrogance of Ukraine’s companions in its capacity to maintain the struggle. The scale of the current Russian assaults displays specifically mass manufacturing of the ‘Geran’ drone, an improved Russian model of the Iranian ‘Shahed’ drone that Tehran equipped earlier within the struggle. Without extra US Patriot launchers and interceptors, Ukraine will likely be susceptible to ballistic missiles, however on the entire Russia has used these extra sparingly (maybe reflecting manufacturing constraints). Europeans ought to be keen to offer extra air defence to assist the hard-pressed Ukrainian air pressure and to beef up civilians, together with by basing plane in Poland and Romania to offer air cowl over cities and demanding infrastructure in western and central Ukraine. The UK and France helped Israel to shoot down Iranian drones in April 2024; they need to equally assist Ukraine now. The want is pressing: Russia is already stepping up its assaults on power infrastructure, aiming to inflict one other chilly and darkish winter on Ukrainian civilians.¹⁸  

Though its forces are nonetheless far bigger than these of some other European nation, Ukraine has confronted rising manpower issues, and there may be most likely scope for nations with efficient coaching and mobilisation programs (equivalent to Finland) to assist Ukraine devise higher methods of utilizing the human assets it has. Ukraine will all the time be at a numerical drawback to Russia, nonetheless, so the main focus ought to be on compensating with munitions and expertise. To put it crudely, to achieve the present struggle of attrition, Ukraine must trigger about 5 occasions as many casualties because it suffers (the ratio for the reason that begin of the full-scale struggle is not more than 2:1); or it must discover a totally different approach to battle.¹⁹  

One step that European governments may take to assist Ukraine improve the price of Russian advances nonetheless additional (as Finland, Poland and the Baltic states have already got) is to withdraw from the 2 worldwide agreements prohibiting the manufacture, switch and use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, restart manufacturing and assist Ukraine to deploy more practical limitations to Russian assaults. Russia has by no means been a celebration to both conference, and the deep minefields it laid in occupied territory had been a serious cause for Ukraine’s lack of ability to make important advances in 2023. 

Ukraine will stay in danger so long as Putin or a Putin-like successor is in energy in Moscow.

Strengthening Ukraine’s defences can at finest freeze the battle, nonetheless. Ukraine wants to have the ability to regain the initiative and put strain on Russian occupying forces. The use of drones has already made it exhausting for each side to maneuver troops and provides to and from the entrance line. Ukraine and Russia are continuously making an attempt to make the ‘kill zone’ behind the enemy’s ahead positions deeper.²⁰ Kyiv and its companions must provide you with reasonable methods to make Russian positions in occupied territory much more untenable. Even with a ‘land bridge’ linking it to Russia through occupied territory in south-eastern Ukraine, Crimea is especially susceptible to produce disruptions. European nations ought to assist Ukraine re-establish its lead in drone expertise and manufacturing, countering Russian benefits in manufacturing scale. According to Oleksandr Kamyshin, an adviser to Zelenskyy, Ukraine may triple defence manufacturing if it had extra money to take action.²¹ Europeans may assist improve provides nonetheless additional by placing surplus manufacturing capability elsewhere in Europe to work, as prompt by Sander Tordoir in March 2025.²² 

One space wherein Ukraine has had some current success is in mounting assaults deep inside Russia, utilizing long-range drones and modern sabotage ways to strike Russia’s oil and gasoline infrastructure, army bases and defence industrial websites. Phillips O’Brien has argued just lately that that is the sensible approach for Ukraine to battle, somewhat than specializing in the tactical battle on the entrance line.²³ Reuters has estimated that Ukrainian assaults shut down 17 per cent of Russian oil refining capability in August. European nations may do extra to assist Ukraine’s efforts to construct long-range drones, and missiles equivalent to the brand new ‘Flamingo’ (with a claimed vary of three,000 kilometres and a 1,000 kilogram warhead) and Long-Range Neptune (a improvement of a coastal defence missile, with the vary prolonged from 300 to a claimed 1,000 kilometres). By hanging refineries, pipelines and transport infrastructure, Ukraine can concurrently harm Russia’s primary supply of export revenues, disrupt its home financial system and restrict its capacity to keep up giant forces in occupied Ukraine. 

• Providing credible, efficient and sustainable safety ensures. Even if the entrance line is frozen (or moved again in direction of the Russian border), Ukraine will stay in danger so long as Putin or a Putin-like successor is in energy in Moscow. The nation is not going to be protected from additional Russian aggression except and till Russia disavows Putin’s notion that Ukrainians and Russians are one folks and that impartial Ukraine is a synthetic creation of Russia’s enemies.²⁴ For the foreseeable future, Putin’s historical past of violating legally binding worldwide agreements signifies that it could be very unwise for Ukraine to depend on a peace take care of him; it additionally must have in place pledges from its companions to reply militarily if Ukraine is attacked once more.  

What these safety ensures ought to seem like continues to be underneath debate, nonetheless. The finest assure of safety for a European nation (up until now) has been NATO membership. Despite NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit pledge that Ukraine (and Georgia) “will become members”, nonetheless, opposition – initially from France and Germany, and latterly from Hungary, the US and others – signifies that Ukraine is so far as ever from coming underneath the safety of NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence dedication.

There has been speak since 2023 of turning Ukraine right into a ‘porcupine’ – on an identical mannequin to Israel, with sturdy home forces and nearly limitless entry to Western weapons, however no Western forces stationed within the nation and no binding safety assure.²⁵ Superficially, this feels like a sensible and fewer dangerous choice for Ukraine’s companions than providing NATO-style ensures. After assembly Zelenskyy in Brussels on August 18^th, von der Leyen mentioned: “There can be no limitations on Ukrainian armed forces, be it co-operation with other third countries or assistance from other third countries.” 

Security ensures will solely be supplied as soon as Ukraine’s instant want for them has handed.

Ukraine is a really totally different nation from Israel, nonetheless, and faces very totally different issues. Even together with the occupied Palestinian territories, the world Israel’s inhabitants of about 10 million has to defend is lower than 30,000 km², and it doesn’t share a border with its most important adversary, Iran. In Ukraine’s case, if the entrance traces had been frozen close to to their present place a inhabitants of about 30 million must defend nearly 500,000 km², together with a line of contact with Russia stretching about 2,000 kilometres. Though the US has not given Israel a safety assure, since 2008 the US authorities has been legally obliged to keep up Israel’s “qualitative military edge” – to make sure that it may “defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties.” Russia is way from invincible, because the struggle has proven, however it’s exhausting to see how the collective West may make an identical pledge to Ukraine, given the size of Russian army forces and its army industrial institution. And above all, Israel is a nuclear-armed state going through potential adversaries who don’t (but) have such weapons; Ukraine is a non-nuclear state going through a nuclear-armed superpower.

Finland’s President Alexander Stubb has argued that Ukraine may emulate the instance of Finland when it was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1940, accepting some limits on its international coverage, giving up some territory, however constructing a affluent and democratic society on the remaining.²⁶ But Soviet chief Josef Stalin didn’t declare of Finland, as Putin has mentioned of Ukraine since a minimum of 2008, that it was “not even a country”.²⁷ When Putin talks about eliminating the basis causes of the Ukrainian disaster, as he did on the Alaska summit, he means eradicating Ukraine from the map of Europe as a sovereign entity; his goal shouldn’t be restricted to ‘Finlandising’ the nation.  

When the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ first shaped, within the wake of Trump’s Oval Office ambush of Zelenskyy, the idea was that a big European pressure would deploy to Ukraine – in March, there have been media reviews suggesting that 30,000 troops can be stationed in Ukraine to protect a peace deal and deter renewed Russian aggression. Over time, nonetheless, the members of the coalition have gotten chilly ft. What is now contemplated is a presence that might not defend itself, not to mention Ukraine.

The UK defence secretary, John Healey, reported to Parliament in July that the coalition’s planners had agreed on the mission of the long run ‘Multinational Force Ukraine’, which might be to “regenerate [Ukraine’s] land forces by providing logistics, armament and training experts”; “secure Ukraine’s skies by using aircraft to deliver levels of support similar to that for NATO’s Air Policing mission” – a peacetime mission involving small numbers of plane offering reassurance, however not designed to have interaction in fight; and “support safer seas by bolstering the Black Sea Task Force [a mine-clearing operation involving Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey] with additional specialist teams”.²⁸ None of those actions would come near offering Ukraine with a safety assure or deterring Russian assaults. 

Healey’s assertion additionally highlighted the largest drawback with safety ensures as up to now conceived. He spoke of being prepared “when peace comes”. In different phrases, safety ensures will solely be supplied as soon as Ukraine’s instant want for them has handed: the proposals underneath dialogue up to now depend on there being a minimum of a ceasefire, if not a peace settlement, earlier than any Western forces are deployed. That provides Putin each incentive to maintain the combating going, thereby exercising a de facto veto on the presence of a Western ‘reassurance force’ in Ukraine. Moreover, by insisting {that a} US safety assure should accompany any Western deployment on the bottom in Ukraine, European leaders have additionally given Trump a de facto veto on European motion. The UK shouldn’t be the one nation reluctant to commit forces to Ukraine when, as Keir Giles of Chatham House wrote in March 2025, “Europe is now acutely vulnerable to the possibility of withdrawal of US co-operation”.²⁹  

With Ukraine on the again foot on the battlefield, nonetheless, European leaders now face uncomfortable decisions: they’ll keep on with their insistence that they may solely deploy forces within the occasion of a ceasefire, and watch Putin proceed to advance; or they’ll put troops in hurt’s approach as a part of an effort to re-establish deterrence and thereby carry combating to an finish, however with a excessive chance that Putin will assault them and that US forces might properly not intervene. So far, most appear to desire the primary choice. In doing so, they’re underpricing the seemingly impression of eventual Ukrainian defeat. As Macron mentioned in a current interview, Putin is “a predator who, for his own survival, needs to keep eating”.³⁰ If he succeeds in devouring Ukraine, he’ll transfer on to totally different prey – maybe the Baltic states or Poland – additionally elements of Europe that Putin or these round him regard as ‘historically Russian lands’ to be returned to Russian management.³¹ 

A pressure of Ukrainian and different allied troops could possibly be highly effective sufficient to make Putin suppose twice.

No European chief will really feel comfy committing floor, air or naval forces to an on-going struggle – particularly with out an American safety blanket in case issues go improper. They could possibly delay the choice if they’ll step up the circulate of weapons and munitions to Ukraine, together with longer-range missiles to allow Ukraine to proceed and improve its strikes on army industrial websites, oil refineries and different services important to Russia’s capacity to keep up the tempo of the struggle. If they conclude that they don’t have any alternative however to play a extra direct half within the combating, they are able to focus their contributions on capabilities that the Ukrainians are significantly in need of, equivalent to air defence or long-range fires, somewhat than exposing infantry to drone warfare that NATO armies are solely starting to coach for. But in the long run, by no matter means, they should discover a approach to cease Putin’s expansionist wars. When von der Leyen mentioned in February 2022 that Ukraine was “one of us”, it was meant as a political declaration of assist for Ukraine’s eventual EU membership. But it additionally expresses a reality for a lot of Central and Northern Europe: if the prices imposed on Putin for invading Ukraine are tolerable, from his perspective, why would he cease there? 

The answer is for European leaders within the Coalition of the Willing to cease pondering by way of providing Ukraine safety ensures as soon as the struggle is over, and reframe the duty as forming an alliance with Ukraine to offer mutual safety ensures as quickly as attainable, within the face of a Russian risk that stretches far past the borders of Ukraine and reveals no signal of receding. The new alliance could possibly be modelled on the Western European Union – a defence pact initially shaped in 1948, largely outmoded after 1949 by NATO and in the end absorbed into the EU in 2011.³² The WEU’s Brussels treaty included a extra binding safety assure than NATO’s (members promised to assist a rustic underneath assault with “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”, whereas a NATO ally solely guarantees to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”). Although Europe nonetheless lacks many capabilities that in the meanwhile solely the US can provide, Trump’s unreliability as an ally and his optimistic view of Putin make it unwise to rely on the US offering fight troops within the occasion of a Russian assault on NATO territory, a minimum of so long as he’s president. 

Ukraine now has by far the biggest and most battle-hardened military in Europe, and an modern defence industrial sector with a lot to show European corporations. The total capability of Ukraine’s defence sector on the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion was $1 billion; this yr it’s anticipated to achieve $35 billion.³³ Collectively, the European members of the Coalition of the Willing even have lots to contribute, even when they haven’t but labored out flip numbers of personnel and rising defence budgets into efficient combating forces. Importantly, France and the UK are nuclear powers, in a position (although not up to now keen) to offer a strategic deterrent that may cowl different members of a European alliance. It can be attainable to place collectively a pressure of Ukrainian and different allied troops highly effective sufficient to make Putin suppose twice about taking it on.

Once the entrance line is frozen – ideally alongside Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders – and safety ensures are in place strong sufficient to discourage Putin or any successor from attacking once more, Europe might want to flip its consideration to serving to Ukraine create a dynamic financial system to make sure its future sustainability, for which funding will likely be wanted. Using the revenue from immobilised Russian central financial institution property in Europe to assist Ukraine to restore the harm executed can be a helpful first step, however European governments ought to go additional, and seize the property themselves (which quantity to greater than €200 billion).³⁴ They could possibly be used to fund the preliminary levels of Ukraine’s reconstruction, with a deal with important infrastructure and the army industrial complicated. 

The EU must also pace up Ukraine’s EU accession course of, or a minimum of give it early entry to EU membership advantages, although it should additionally preserve the strain on Ukraine to battle corruption and strengthen the rule of legislation.³⁵ One important step is to offer Ukraine with methods to align with the only market pre-accession, in order to deepen its integration into European worth chains. The EU has mentioned it could be keen to open strategic partnerships in industrial ecosystems of mutual curiosity (equivalent to uncooked supplies, batteries, equipment) even earlier than accession. 

Ukraine is extra more likely to be a long-term success story, economically and politically, contained in the EU than out of it. Though the size of EU pre-accession support to Poland and the next advantages of single market membership don’t fully clarify the differing financial trajectories of Polish and Ukrainian GDP per capita after 1991 (Chart 1), Poland, which has had one of many quickest rising economies on the planet the previous few many years, has definitely executed higher as a member than Ukraine has as a non-member. 

To the extent attainable, the Commission ought to make use of the scope for ‘gradual integration’, an idea endorsed by the European Council in June 2022 and once more in June 2024. One avenue can be for the Commission to suggest amendments to the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. This would permit Ukraine to turn into a part of the EU’s inner market sector-by-sector, because it aligned absolutely with EU guidelines in areas equivalent to transport, telecommunications or battery manufacturing (although with out getting a voice in EU decision-making). For financial and psychological causes, Ukrainians ought to be capable to see that getting nearer to the EU is having a tangible optimistic impact on their lives, even when the ultimate vacation spot of membership stays a way off. 

Conclusion

At current, the aims of stabilising the entrance line and offering efficient safety ensures for Ukraine even when Russia doesn’t cease combating will seem like political fantasy to European decision-makers. They wish to see this struggle ended with out additional bloodshed, on phrases that every one sides settle for. In pursuit of that goal, because the assembly of the Coalition of the Willing on September 4^th confirmed, European leaders will really feel that they don’t have any alternative however to maintain partaking with Trump and supporting his dialogue with Putin, whereas doing nothing to bother him. A pessimistic justification is that though Trump shouldn’t be serving to Ukraine a lot at current, he may do it rather more hurt, as he did after the February row with Zelenskyy, when he lower off each army provides and intelligence sharing. A extra optimistic view is that fixed engagement with Trump might nudge him in the best route, and make sure that these within the administration who’re extra hostile to Ukraine, together with Vice President J D Vance, are saved in verify. For now, Europe wants at a minimal to keep up the circulate of US intelligence to Kyiv, and to maintain open the opportunity of shopping for American weapons and munitions to cross on to Ukraine (accepting the chance that the Pentagon may nonetheless block their export). But European and Ukrainian leaders ought to search over time to scale back their dependency on the US, and think about any further assist Ukraine will get from the US as a bonus.  

The actual fantasy is to consider that Trump’s erratic peace overtures to Russia can finish the struggle on minimally acceptable phrases, or that Putin will cease combating except pressured to take action. Winston Churchill mentioned of the appeasers of the Nineteen Thirties: “Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last.” A Russia that might use Ukrainians as cannon fodder (because it has executed with these forcibly conscripted in occupied Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk)³⁶ and had entry to Ukraine’s defence industrial knowhow and pure assets can be a way more formidable risk to the remainder of Europe.

European governments should cease hoping that the struggle will likely be resolved with minimal effort from them – both as a result of the US will ship a peace deal, or as a result of Ukraine will make sufficiently big concessions to purchase Putin off, or as a result of Putin himself will conclude that the prices of the struggle are too excessive. Trump can not efficiently mediate as a result of he doesn’t perceive that Putin’s wishes and Ukraine’s wants are basically incompatible; Ukraine can not make sufficiently big concessions to fulfill Putin with out fatally undermining its personal safety; and Putin is detached to the human and monetary prices of combating and has spent years shaping Russian society for struggle. If European leaders wish to keep away from confronting Russian forces on NATO territory, they must confront them in Ukraine, and quit the phantasm that the capricious Trump will save them from the rapacious Putin.

Ian Bond is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.

September 2025

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