How Sony Ate Canon and Nikon’s Lunch: The Five-Year Head Begin That Modified Pictures Forever

In the autumn of 2013, for those who walked into any skilled pictures studio, sporting occasion, or marriage ceremony venue, you’d see a sea of black cameras with pink rings and gold badges. Canon’s 5D Mark III and Nikon’s D800 weren’t simply cameras, they have been symbols of significant pictures. Their dimension, their weight, their distinctive mirror slap, these have been the sounds and feels {of professional} work. The digital camera trade had a pure order, and everybody knew their place in it. Then Sony dropped a bomb.

On October 16, 2013, Sony introduced the a7 and a7R, the world’s first autofocus full body mirrorless cameras with digital viewfinders. They have been tiny in comparison with the reigning DSLRs. They regarded nearly delicate subsequent to a 5D Mark III. And the pictures institution, notably Canon and Nikon, checked out them and noticed a toy.

It would take 5 years for Canon and Nikon to understand they weren’t watching a cute experiment. They have been watching their complete enterprise mannequin develop into out of date. By the time they scrambled to reply in 2018, Sony had constructed a commanding early lead that reshaped the market (one Canon and Nikon are solely now starting to reclaim). This is the story of how two of essentially the most dominant firms in pictures slept by way of a revolution taking place proper in entrance of them.

The World Before the a7: Canon and Nikon’s Iron Grip

To perceive why the a7 was so revolutionary, you should perceive simply how utterly Canon and Nikon dominated skilled pictures in 2013. It wasn’t shut. Between them, they managed roughly three-quarters of the interchangeable-lens digital camera market, and a good larger share amongst professionals. Their supremacy was constructed on many years of lens improvement, advertising and marketing, and ecosystem lock-in.

If you have been a working professional, you shot Canon or Nikon. Period. It did not matter that Pentax made nice cameras or that Sony already had some fascinating choices with their A-mount system inherited from Minolta. Those have been wonderful for fans, however professionals wanted the large lens catalogs, the help infrastructure, and admittedly, the credibility that got here with having a 1D X or D4 round your neck.

This dominance wasn’t nearly cameras. It was in regards to the full system: our bodies, lenses, flashes, equipment, service facilities, and most significantly, community results. Sports shooters used Canon as a result of Sports Illustrated photographers used Canon. Wedding photographers used Nikon as a result of that is what their mentors used. The complete trade had calcified round these two giants.

Both firms had experimented with mirrorless know-how. Canon had launched the EOS M in 2012, and Nikon adopted with the Nikon 1 sequence. But tellingly, each methods used smaller sensors (APS-C for Canon, and the even tinier 1-inch sensor for Nikon). The message was clear: mirrorless was for shoppers, vacationers, and hobbyists. Professionals wanted actual cameras. Big cameras. DSLR cameras.

Sony’s Secret Weapon: Years of Strategic Preparation

Here’s what Canon and Nikon missed: the a7 wasn’t a sudden gamble. It was the fruits of years of strategic strikes that flew below their radar.

In 2006, Sony acquired Konica Minolta’s complete digital camera division, gaining many years of optical experience and the muse of what would develop into their A-mount system. While Canon and Nikon dismissed this as Sony shopping for their means right into a market they did not perceive, Sony was really constructing the muse for one thing greater.

By 2010, Sony was experimenting with SLT (Single-Lens Translucent) cameras just like the a77 and later the total body a99 in 2012. These cameras used a hard and fast, translucent mirror as a substitute of a flipping mirror, which meant they already had full-time phase-detect autofocus throughout video and used high-resolution digital viewfinders. Sony was perfecting the EVF expertise and considering computationally about imaging whereas Canon and Nikon remained dedicated to optical viewfinders.

Simultaneously, Sony launched their APS-C mirrorless NEX system in 2010, constructed across the E-mount (the identical mount they’d finally use for full body). For three years earlier than the a7, Sony was testing the market, refining the person expertise, and constructing out their mirrorless ecosystem.

The a7 wasn’t from nowhere. It was the calculated fusion of their full body sensor know-how from the A-mount line and their confirmed mirrorless E-mount system from NEX. And here is the kicker: Sony wasn’t only a digital camera maker. They have been (and nonetheless are) the world’s main picture sensor provider. Many of Nikon’s greatest DSLRs used Sony sensors. This vertical integration gave Sony an R&D benefit that Canon and Nikon merely could not match.

October 2013: The Revolution That Nobody Saw Coming

When Sony unveiled the a7 and a7R at a press occasion in Tokyo, the specs appeared nearly not possible. A full body sensor (the identical dimension as a 5D Mark III or D800) in a physique that weighed simply 474 grams and not using a lens. That was lower than half the burden of Canon’s flagship. The a7 was so small you might nearly disguise it in a jacket pocket.

But Sony wasn’t simply miniaturizing. They have been essentially rethinking what a digital camera may very well be.

The key innovation was Sony’s current E-mount with its remarkably brief 18 mm flange distance, in comparison with 44 mm for Canon’s EF mount and 46.5 mm for Nikon’s F mount. This technical element sounds boring, nevertheless it was really the key weapon that may crack open your complete trade.

See, Canon and Nikon’s mounts have been designed many years earlier than, when cameras wanted area for a mirror to flip up and down. That mirror was important (it allow you to see by way of the lens optically). But it additionally meant the lens needed to be mounted removed from the sensor, and that distance was locked in endlessly.

Sony’s mirrorless design eradicated the mirror fully. With nothing flipping round inside, lenses might sit a lot nearer to the sensor. And here is the place it received fascinating: whilst you cannot mount a short-flange lens on a long-flange digital camera, you completely can mount a long-flange lens on a short-flange digital camera with a easy adapter.

Suddenly, with adapters just like the Metabones, you might mount your complete assortment of Canon L-series glass on a Sony physique (and the autofocus really labored, at the very least to a level). Nikon lenses may very well be tailored too, although autofocus efficiency lagged behind till higher adapters arrived. Vintage Leica lenses from the Fifties? Perfect. The Zeiss glass you liked however might by no means afford a physique for? All of it labored.

Sony had finished one thing outstanding: they’d constructed an expert digital camera system that did not want many years of lens improvement as a result of it might merely borrow from everybody else’s many years of lens improvement. Your funding in Canon or Nikon glass wasn’t a purpose to stick with these manufacturers anymore (it was a purpose to attempt Sony).

But the adapter story was just the start. The a7 was essentially a unique form of imaging gadget. It had an digital viewfinder that confirmed you the ultimate publicity earlier than you took the shot. No extra chimping (reviewing your LCD after every body to verify for those who nailed the publicity). With the EVF, what you noticed was what you bought.

Sony additionally introduced their deep experience in video and broadcast imaging (honed by way of many years of creating Handycams, XDCAM cameras, and CineAlta cinema cameras) straight into the a7 line. While Canon and Nikon have been nonetheless constructing refined optical devices with some digital elements, Sony was constructing a pc that occurred to take images. The distinction would show decisive.

The Giants’ Miscalculation

In the boardrooms of Canon and Nikon, the a7 wasn’t seen as a menace. It was seen as an oddity, perhaps even a validation of their very own technique.

Look, they reasoned, Sony tried to construct a “professional” digital camera and needed to make it tiny as a result of they could not compete with actual professional our bodies. Pros don’t desire small cameras. Wedding photographers want the battery life that solely an enormous physique gives. Sports shooters want the ergonomics and sturdiness of a weather-sealed DSLR that may take a beating. And no person (completely no person) was going to desert their funding in Canon L-glass or Nikkors to purchase into an unproven system with restricted native lens choices.

This dismissal was constructed on three elementary assumptions that appeared unshakeable on the time:

First, they believed dimension was a characteristic, not a bug. Canon and Nikon had spent many years advertising and marketing the concept an expert digital camera needs to be substantial. The grip ought to fill your hand. The weight ought to telegraph high quality. A digital camera that regarded too small, they believed, made you appear like an novice. Wedding purchasers wished to see a “serious” digital camera. Sports groups wished to see the lenses they acknowledged from ESPN broadcasts.

They utterly missed that skilled photographers did not really love carrying 15 kilos of substances on a six-hour marriage ceremony shoot. They did not benefit from the again ache from mountain climbing with dual-body setups. They tolerated the burden as a result of they’d no selection. Sony had simply given them a selection.

Second, they believed their lens ecosystems have been unbreakable moats. Both firms had large lens catalogs constructed over many years. Canon had over 70 EF lenses. Nikon had over 90 F-mount lenses. Photographers had invested tens of hundreds of {dollars} in glass. The typical knowledge was that this created overwhelming switching prices (no person was going to desert their lens assortment to start out over).

Third, they have been defending legacy companies. This was very true for Canon. They had constructed a profitable Cinema EOS line (costly video cameras for skilled filmmakers). They had intentionally crippled the video capabilities of their DSLRs to keep away from cannibalizing these high-margin cinema digital camera gross sales. The 5D Mark III might shoot stunning video, nevertheless it had a recording time restrict. It overheated. It lacked options that Canon’s engineers might simply have included.

Sony had no such legacy to guard. They might put their greatest video tech into the a7 with out worrying about killing one other product line. So they did. And when hybrid capturing (photographers who additionally shot video) turned the norm slightly than the exception, Sony was prepared. Canon was nonetheless defending their cinema line.

The proof of how badly Canon and Nikon misjudged the second? Look at what they have been really doing throughout this era. Canon continued growing the EOS M system with its APS-C sensor whereas concurrently planning a separate, incompatible full body RF mount for the long run. This break up focus divided their R&D sources. Nikon pushed the Nikon 1 with its 1-inch sensor. Both have been positioning mirrorless as consumer-grade know-how, one thing for individuals who did not want a “real” digital camera.

They noticed the market Sony was really pursuing (skilled full body mirrorless) and determined it did not exist. Classic Innovator’s Dilemma.

The Five-Year Desert: 2013 to 2018

For 5 years, Sony had your complete full body mirrorless market to themselves. Not as a result of the market was small, however as a result of Canon and Nikon had determined to not compete in it.

And Sony did not waste that point. They iterated relentlessly.

In 2014, they launched the a7 II, following Olympus’s pioneering work on IBIS by bringing 5-axis in-body stabilization to full body for the primary time (a characteristic that made each lens you owned, tailored or native, successfully stabilized). In 2015, they launched the a7R II with a groundbreaking 42-megapixel sensor and improved autofocus. In 2017, the a7R III saved the 42 MP decision however added twin card slots, a lot better battery life, quicker AF, and improved dealing with.

Sony’s early lens lineup wasn’t good (lots of their preliminary E-mount lenses have been criticized for being comfortable, sluggish, and costly). But in 2016, they launched the G Master sequence, beginning with the 85mm f/1.4 GM, and the standard hole closed dramatically. Third-party producers like Sigma, Tamron, and Zeiss, seeing the place the market was heading, dedicated to the E-mount with their very own lineups of high-quality glass.

Meanwhile, Canon and Nikon weren’t standing nonetheless. In 2017, Nikon launched the D850, broadly thought of the best DSLR ever made. It was a masterpiece of engineering that gained numerous “camera of the year” awards (even over Sony’s mirrorless choices). The D850’s large success seemingly bolstered Nikon’s complacency. It satisfied them that the DSLR nonetheless had an extended life forward and that execs would keep on with the “best” optical-based system. They have been perfecting mirrors and pentaprisms whereas Sony was eliminating them fully.

But crucial launch got here in February 2018: the Sony a7 III. If the unique a7 was the proof of idea, the a7 III was the refinement that may develop into the default selection for a technology of photographers.

The a7 III was spectacular. It had 693 phase-detection autofocus factors overlaying 93% of the body. It had Eye-AF that might observe a topic’s eye even after they turned their head. It delivered 10 fps burst capturing with steady AF monitoring. It had twin SD card slots for backup and overflow. It shot oversampled 4K from the total width of the sensor at 24p (1.2× crop at 30p). And at launch, it price simply $2,000 body-only (undercutting the Canon 5D Mark IV [released in 2016] by practically $1,500).

For working professionals, particularly these doing hybrid picture and video work, the a7 III was a revelation. You might shoot a marriage ceremony at 10 fps with Eye-AF, guaranteeing each body was tack sharp, then instantly change to 4K video for the reception. The picture high quality was beautiful, and the physique merely disappeared throughout use.

Sony wasn’t simply promoting cameras anymore. They have been promoting a whole, mature system that might deal with any skilled task.

The Panic: Canon and Nikon’s 2018 Response

In September 2018, Canon and Nikon lastly responded. Canon introduced the EOS R system. Nikon introduced the Z6 and Z7. Both have been full body mirrorless cameras designed to compete straight with Sony.

On paper, they regarded aggressive. The EOS R had a 30-megapixel sensor and Canon’s wonderful shade science. The Z7 had 45.7 megapixels and Nikon’s legendary construct high quality. Both firms made an enormous deal about their new mounts (the RF and Z mounts, respectively), which might allow higher optical efficiency than even their legendary DSLR lenses.

But when reviewers and professionals really received their arms on these cameras, the gaps turned apparent. These weren’t rivals to the a7 III, Sony’s third-generation digital camera. They have been rivals to the unique a7 from 2013. Canon and Nikon had spent 5 years watching Sony iterate, they usually’d responded by basically constructing what Sony had constructed half a decade earlier.

The EOS R launched with solely a single SD card slot. For marriage ceremony photographers, occasion shooters, and anybody who could not threat dropping information to a corrupted card, this was a dealbreaker. The a7 III had two. The EOS R’s autofocus, whereas good, could not match Sony’s 693-point system or refined Eye-AF. And most damningly, the EOS R’s 4K video had a extreme 1.7x crop issue, turning your extensive angle lenses into regular lenses and making the digital camera practically unusable for severe video work.

Nikon’s Z6 and Z7 have been higher in some methods (the Z7 specifically had a beautiful sensor), however they too launched with single card slots and an autofocus system that felt a technology behind Sony’s. More importantly, each Canon and Nikon launched their new methods with tiny lens lineups. The EOS R launched with simply 4 native RF lenses. The Z system launched with three.

Yes, each firms supplied adapters for his or her legacy DSLR lenses. But this was Sony’s technique from 2013, besides Canon and Nikon have been doing it 5 years later with out the advantage of having spent that point constructing out native mirrorless glass. 

The market spoke clearly. The a7 III turned one of many best-selling cameras of all time. Working professionals who had been ready to see what Canon and Nikon would do purchased Sony cameras as a substitute. YouTube was all of the sudden stuffed with movies of Canon and Nikon shooters making the change.

The Aftermath: A Three-Way War

To their credit score, Canon and Nikon realized shortly. By 2020, Canon launched the wonderful R5 and R6, which fastened many of the EOS R’s issues and added spectacular options like 8K video and twin card slots. Nikon launched the Z6 II and Z7 II with twin card slots, then later the spectacular Z8 and Z9, which proved they might construct world-class mirrorless our bodies that competed straight with Sony’s flagship a1.

Today, the mirrorless market is engaged in a brutal three-way struggle. Canon’s R5 Mark II, Nikon’s Z9, and Sony’s a1 are all phenomenal cameras that may compete on practically each metric. Canon has been exceptionally aggressive, and up to date market knowledge exhibits they’ve caught as much as (and in some areas surpassed) Sony in new full body mirrorless gross sales.

But here is what Canon and Nikon cannot get again: these 5 childhood from 2013 to 2018. Sony used that point to construct an ecosystem that is nonetheless essentially the most complete in full body mirrorless. They have one of the intensive native lens lineups. They have the strongest third-party help from producers like Sigma and Tamron. Most importantly, they gained a whole technology of photographers who entered the skilled market throughout these years and constructed their companies on E-mount.

Rental homes like LensRentals report that Sony mirrorless gear stays amongst their most-rented cameras. In reality, in 2024, Sony tied with Canon on the corporate’s top 20 most rented list, with every firm occupying 4 areas with their digital camera our bodies. YouTube creators and Instagram photographers (the brand new technology of image-makers) nonetheless overwhelmingly select Sony for his or her first skilled system. That’s the facility of getting there first.

Canon and Nikon aren’t going away. They’re too huge, too properly established, and admittedly, their latest cameras are too good for them to fail. But they misplaced one thing irreplaceable: they misplaced 5 years. Five years the place third-party lens producers constructed their methods round E-mount. Five years the place the trade narrative shifted from “Sony is trying to compete” to “Canon and Nikon are trying to catch up.”

The Lesson: You Can’t Sleep Through a Revolution

The Sony a7 story is not nearly cameras. It’s a masterclass in disruption and the risks of incumbent considering.

Sony understood one thing that Canon and Nikon did not: the digital camera market was present process a elementary transformation. It wasn’t nearly transferring from mirrors to mirrorless. It was about transferring from optical devices to computational pictures. From single-purpose cameras to hybrid instruments. From methods constructed on legacy know-how to platforms designed for the long run.

Canon and Nikon have been constructing higher horse-drawn carriages. Sony was constructing cars.

The tragedy for Canon and Nikon is that they’d each benefit. They had the model recognition, the supplier networks, the advertising and marketing budgets, and the many years of optical experience. If they’d taken Sony critically in 2013 and responded in 2014 or 2015, this story might need ended very in another way. Sony is an enormous firm with loads of revenue from different divisions, and it is fully attainable they might have exited the digital camera and lens market fully.

Instead, Canon and Nikon waited. They protected their legacy companies. They assumed their clients would keep loyal. And they awakened in 2018 to seek out that the market had shifted beneath their toes.

Today, for those who stroll into an expert pictures studio, you will nonetheless see loads of Canon and Nikon gear. But you will additionally see loads of Sony cameras with these distinctive orange GM lens rings. The sea of black and pink and gold has been joined by black and orange. And whereas Canon and Nikon have constructed wonderful cameras that may compete technically, they’re nonetheless combating to reclaim the cultural and ecosystem momentum that Sony captured throughout these 5 essential years.

That’s the price of sleeping by way of a revolution. Not essentially dropping the struggle, however spending a decade combating to win again floor you need to by no means have misplaced within the first place.