Fresh Insights: The China-Taiwan Dynamic – January 16, 2024 Edition

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 16, 2024

Contributors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe from the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung from the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 15, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a collaborative effort from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. This update bolsters the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan initiative, which evaluates Chinese actions against Taiwan, investigates alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if required—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update concentrates on the CCP’s methods to secure control over Taiwan and developments across the Taiwan Strait.

Key Highlights

• Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) approved amendments to the Constitutional Court backed by the opposition after a Cabinet-ordered second review. These amendments will hinder the Constitutional Court until the LY greenlights nominees to fill several of its vacant positions, effectively preventing the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) from obstructing opposition-sponsored legislation for the time being.
• The National Security Bureau (NSB) of Taiwan published a report on January 12, which underscores organized crime and religious groups as channels for infiltration to recruit agents and carry out espionage activities within Taiwan.
• The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) indicated that 50,000 participants took part in its protest condemning the detention of TPP founder Ko Wen-je due to corruption charges, which the TPP argues are politically driven. The nature of these protests and the extent of support they garnered have been central to PRC coverage, corresponding with previous anti-DPP sentiments within PRC-affiliated media outlets.
• The PRC is assembling a fleet of barges equipped with extendable piers, likely intended to aid in amphibious landings.
• South Korean authorities detected a 164-foot tall and wide steel structure erected by the PRC within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea in December 2024. This construction forms part of PRC’s continuous attempts to assert sovereignty over the contested waters, capitalizing on the leadership void in South Korea amidst its internal political strife following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s proclamation of martial law on December 3, 2024.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) approved opposition-supported amendments regarding the Constitutional Court after a Cabinet-ordered second review. These amendments will suspend the Constitutional Court until the LY consents to nominees to fill particular vacant positions, and will make it temporarily unfeasible for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to hinder opposition-supported legislation. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which together control a majority in the LY, ratified amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act on December 20 despite robust resistance from the DPP. The Executive Branch requested the LY to undertake a second review of the bill. The LY passed the bill again on January 10 with a 62-51 tally, with all 51 DPP representatives voting against. President Lai Ching-te must now endorse the bill. The amendments necessitate that a supermajority of 10 justices (from a total of 15 on the court) be present to adjudicate a case, and at least nine justices must vote against a law for it to be declared unconstitutional. As it stands, the court contains only eight active justices, and the opposition parties rejected all seven of the Lai government’s nominees to fill the vacant posts.[1] Consequently, the court will be unable to evaluate the constitutionality of any laws until some vacancies are filled, nullifying the DPP’s final institutional method of obstructing opposition-backed legislation. Taiwan lacks a presidential veto.

The DPP legislative faction sought a constitutional examination of the bill and a temporary injunction against its enforcement on January 15, even though President Lai has not yet enacted the bill. Nonetheless, the court does not adjudicate on bills not yet promulgated into law and has never done so even to grant temporary injunctions. The DPP and Lai’s Cabinet are weighing the introduction of “preventive rights relief,” a legal mechanism to safeguard individuals’ rights proactively prior to violations occurring, to substantiate a request for the court to make an exception. DPP legislators including Premier Cho Jung-tai contended that the incapacitation of the Constitutional Court will severely affect the rights of Taiwanese citizens, considering most cases submitted to the court come from citizens. Yang Hao-ching, the director-general of the court’s clerical department, mentioned that the court addresses temporary injunctions and preventive rights relief as distinct issues.[2] KMT legislator Lo Chih-chiang asserted that should the Constitutional Court impose temporary sanctions against amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Law that are not yet effective, it would be undermining the Constitution and democratic system by encroaching upon the legitimate authority of the legislature to enact laws. KMT-aligned publication United Daily News reported that the KMT internally concludes that it will be challenging to justify the court hearing the case before the bill becomes law.[3] The hearing and injunction would conventionally need to occur after President Lai endorses the bill. However, the court’s existing eight justices will be incapable of hearing any case concerning their powers without breaching the new law post-President Lai’s endorsement, creating a potential constitutional crisis in Taiwan. Lai is legally obligated to sign the bill by January 23.[4]

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) published a report on January 12, highlighting organized crime and religious communities as infiltration channels to recruit agents and conduct espionage within Taiwan.[5] The report underscores the PRC’s intelligence and United Front organs capably exploiting five significant infiltration channels to facilitate the PRC’s agent recruitment: organized crime groups, underground financial institutions, shell corporations, religious organizations, and civil society entities.[6] The report conveys that PRC intelligence operatives endeavor to utilize these societal sectors to persuade retired military officials to engage active-duty personnel, establish espionage networks via the internet, and provide financial incentives to entice targets, notably those grappling with financial difficulties.

The NSB’s findings also indicate that PRC collaborations with gangs pose the threat of armed factions aiding military operations against Taiwan.[7] An AEI-ISW analysis from May 2024…

on PRC coercive measures short of outright conflict against Taiwan underscored the hazards of enlisting military individuals and criminal syndicates as part of the PRC’s strategies to diminish Taiwan’s resolve and capability to safeguard itself.[8]

Lai has called for heightened alertness against the PRC’s infiltration within Taiwan’s religious sector since assuming his position.[9] The PRC capitalizes on cross-strait religious interactions as one of the less governed avenues of exchange to forge connections between its intelligence operatives and Taiwanese targets who could potentially be recruited and developed as agents within Taiwan. This approach illustrates how deeply United Front and intelligence operations interweave with PRC civil society and infiltrate seemingly innocuous cross-strait interactions.

An espionage incident in October 2024 effectively demonstrates the PRC’s strategy of leveraging specific segments of Taiwanese society to gain access to military personnel and secure recruits. Taiwan’s High Prosecutor’s Office indicted Lee Huei-hsin, a member of the Sun Alliance criminal organization, who also oversaw a temple in New Taipei City, for spying for the PRC after intelligence officers from the PRC initiated contact with Lee during a religious engagement in Macau a year earlier. Lee allegedly utilized her connections in both the underworld and the religious community to recruit military officials facing financial difficulties, convincing them to exchange sensitive information for payment.[10]

The annual number of PRC-related espionage prosecutions in Taiwan has surged from 16 in 2021 to 64 in 2024. Retired and active-duty military personnel made up 23% and 43% of all PRC espionage prosecution cases in 2024, respectively. PRC endeavors to recruit military personnel for espionage have influenced high-ranking officials within the ROC military.[11] This pattern is already carrying over into 2025, following the detention of retired ROC Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo on January 10 on suspicions of receiving money from the CCP to recruit both active-duty and retired ROC military officers as spies for the PRC.[12]

The rise in prosecutions of PRC agents indicates the Lai administration’s robust focus on counterintelligence and is likely a sign of the PRC’s escalating campaign of subversion against Taiwan. This pattern aligns with the PRC’s increasing efforts in various facets of its strategy to exert pressure on Taiwan following the election of President Lai Ching-te, including coercive military operations and intimidation through threats against Taiwanese “separatists.”

Meanwhile, Lai’s administration has undertaken more significant measures to curb the PRC’s infiltration channels. The ROC Ministry of Interior announced on November 6 its intention to seek the dissolution of the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) due to its involvement in organized crime and intelligence operations on behalf of the PRC.[13] The CUPP is a minor political entity established in 2005, advocating for unification with the PRC and adhering to the One China Principle, which acknowledges the PRC as the legitimate representative of China, with Taiwan being a part of that entity.

The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reported that 50,000 individuals participated in its protest against the detention of TPP founder Ko Wen-je on alleged corruption charges that the TPP has denounced as politically motivated. The substance of these protests and the level of support garnered have become focal points of PRC media coverage, mirroring earlier anti-DPP narratives within PRC-supported outlets. The Taipei District Prosecutor’s Office revealed on December 26 that Ko had been indicted on charges including bribery, profiteering, embezzlement, and breach of public trust, potentially resulting in a sentence of 28 and a half years in prison. These charges relate to his actions during his tenure as mayor of Taipei and while campaigning for the presidency in 2023-2024.[14] The TPP has continued to support Ko following the indictment, accusing the DPP of targeting a political competitor without adequate evidence.

Acting TPP Chairman and Legislator Huang Kuo-chang expressed that the January 11 protest was organized to counter DPP authoritarianism and “Green Terror,” a nod to the DPP’s official color and the historical “White Terror” period from 1949-1987, during which countless Taiwanese were executed and imprisoned by the government.[15] The protest garnered backing from the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), with several KMT lawmakers present. Former DPP politicians Hsu Kuo-tai and Lin Cheng-chieh also addressed the gathering, condemning current DPP lawmakers for “undemocratic conduct.”[16] Lin was one of the founding members of the DPP but departed the party in 1991, subsequently supporting the opposition Pan-Blue (KMT-aligned) Coalition. Hsu served as a DPP representative in the LY from 1987 to 1996. Both Lin and Hsu have previously criticized the DPP’s actions, and while neither aligns with the current DPP initiative, their identification as DPP founders in Blue-leaning Taiwanese media might aim to illustrate that the modern DPP diverges from its original principles. [17] The contrasting political affiliations of speakers and attendees highlight the degree of political fragmentation within Taiwan. Such disunity could considerably affect the DPP’s capacity to govern effectively and may suggest a decline in public backing for the Lai administration.

PRC state media has also reported on narratives surrounding “Green authoritarianism” in coverage of the protests, vehemently criticizing the DPP for manipulating Taiwan’s judicial framework and acting against the interests of the Taiwanese public.[18] This critical coverage extended to the DPP’s stance on cross-strait relations, urging the Taiwanese populace to unite against the DPP and pursue political reform and peace across the strait. The political disunity within Taiwan presents an opportunity for the PRC to manipulate anti-DPP sentiments among the Taiwanese population, casting doubt on the legitimacy of DPP governance in accordance with PRC strategic and cognitive warfare campaigns.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) refuted accusations regarding the cutting of undersea cables off Taiwan’s coast. Such cable-cutting presents the PRC with a method to sever Taiwan’s connections. TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua labeled the cable-cutting incident as a “routine maritime accident.” He remarked that “DPP authorities, without clarifying the fundamental facts and accountability for the accident, fabricated their own narratives and deliberately exaggerated the submarine cable incident as a so-called ‘gray zone threat’ from the mainland.”[19] Chen’s remarks followed Taiwan’s initiation of an inquiry into a cable-cutting incident that occurred on January 3, involving a ship with a Chinese crew. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) reported that the “Department of Digital Communications will collaborate with the Coast Guard, the Ministry of Justice, the Communications Commission, and judicial authorities to enhance law enforcement against violations of relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Management Act” to safeguard undersea cables.[20] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) stated it convened an inter-agency meeting to “thoroughly review future measures” to protect undersea cables in light of the incident.[21] Taiwan’s National Security Bureau also indicated it would strengthen monitoring of vessels with flags of convenience approaching undersea cables within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan’s coastline.[22]

Research by ISW-AEI has identified cable cutting as a tactic short of war that could isolate Taiwan from its nearby islands and international allies.[23] The PRC may have been working on developing new technologies capable of isolating Taiwan through cable cutting in recent years. Newsweek discovered that researchers from the PRC’s Lishui University in Zhejiang Province, situated across from Taiwan, designed a “dragging type submarine cable device” in 2020.

These creations were developed based on a 2009 patent submission for an “marine towing type cutting apparatus” seemingly intended to eliminate unlawful cables off the PRC’s coastline.[24] The creators of the 2020 model indicated that underwater cables occasionally necessitated severing in “critical situations” and that the “conventional cutting approach requires first identifying the location of the cables, followed by excavation and recovery for cutting. The procedure is intricate, demands considerable expensive equipment, and incurs high costs.”[25] Newsweek’s connection to the patent application was non-functional at the time of this writing; Google Patent keeps a record that outlines the configuration of the device, which would be towed by a tugboat.[26] Newsweek noted that both the 2009 and 2020 patents were abandoned and referenced a nameless undersea cable specialist who stated that “the justification for the necessity of the devices to eliminate illegal cables was ludicrous since the method was arbitrary and could also result in harm to operational cables.”[27] The genuine effectiveness of such a device remains ambiguous but indicates the PRC’s intention to innovate technologies involving cable-cutting applications.

Taiwan has initiated measures to mitigate its digital susceptibility amid manmade and natural risks to its underwater cables. MODA’s declaration indicated that Taiwan has enhanced its information resilience by “subsidizing the setup of new international submarine cable stations and backup equipment facilities, augmenting the resilience of current international submarine cable landing stations, and employing diverse heterogeneous communication networks like microwaves and satellites to back up crucial communication circuits of disrupted submarine cables.”[28] The diversification of its informational domain has fortified Taiwan’s resilience after previous cable-cutting occurrences. Taiwan confronted extensive interruption to its internet connectivity with remote Matsu islands subsequent to a cable-cutting event in 2023. A MODA press release stated that MODA utilized low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites to establish disaster response networks following this incident.[29]

Four China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered ROC restricted waters at four locations south of Kinmen on January 9, marking the first such transgressions of the calendar year. The four ships intruded into restricted waters at approximately 7:30 AM, traveled in two-boat formations, and departed at 9:30 AM.[30] The same vessels returned at 10:00 AM into restricted waters and exited at 12:00 PM. This occurrence happened much earlier in the day than is typically observed, following a recent trend of shifting CCG entry times into restricted areas, necessitating constant vigilance from the Taiwanese. Kinmen is an ROC archipelago situated merely two miles from the PRC mainland. Taiwan does not assert claims over territorial waters or a contiguous zone surrounding its outer Kinmen and Matsu Islands due to the islands’ proximity to the PRC but maintains concentric prohibited and restricted regions around the islands that are roughly equivalent.

 

The PRC normalized CCG intrusions into the restricted waters near Kinmen in 2024 to assert its law enforcement authority in the waters and compel the Taiwanese Coast Guard to allocate resources. These incursions commenced after two PRC fishermen perished when their speedboat capsized while evading a CGA vessel in Kinmen’s no-go waters in February 2024. The PRC has since developed a reliable pattern in which groups of four CCG ships execute “law enforcement patrols” three or four times per month in restricted waters for two hours each time. The January 9 incident was not the first occasion where the CCG conducted two incursions within one day, although it was the briefest interval between incursions ever observed.

The PRC’s Fujian province set up county-level Taiwan Affairs Offices (TAOs) to promote cross-Strait integration within the province. The PRC is intensifying its focus on using Fujian as its primary testing site for “peaceful reunification” policies and to garner political backing in Taiwan for unification. Zhou Qingsong, head of the organization office of the Fujian provincial committee of the CCP, noted that Fujian has established distinct Taiwan Affairs Offices (TAOs) “in all counties with substantial Taiwan-related responsibilities.” It is uncommon for county-level governments and below to have their own TAOs, although some province-level governments do. Zhou stated in an article in the state-owned magazine China Institutional Organization that this action was part of an organizational reform to bolster the cross-strait affairs framework.[31] He also indicated that Fujian will roll out additional supportive policies for Taiwanese individuals aspiring to study or work in Fujian: vocational institutions will recruit Taiwanese educators, Fujian will facilitate the admission of Taiwanese students into universities and public schools, and Fujian will cultivate a more appealing business atmosphere for Taiwanese firms and entrepreneurs. The new offices are integral to a broader initiative aimed at transforming Fujian into a test zone for cross-strait “integrated development,” which the PRC announced in 2023.[32]

Zhou’s announcement coincided with the anniversary of the PRC’s prior set of measures to facilitate “cross-strait integration” in Fujian and signifies that the PRC aims to intensify this endeavor to lay the groundwork for “peaceful unification.” The state-operated tabloid Global Times quoted Li Zhenguang, deputy director at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, who stated that the establishment of county-level TAOs indicates that Fujian is allocating more manpower and resources to “fully leverage their local strengths at the county level.”[33] The county-level TAOs could also free up resources for the provincial-level TAO to concentrate on more extensive cross-strait integration endeavors. The new measures Zhou previewed are supplementary to various rounds of initiatives including the Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass, Fuzhou-Matsu industrial cooperation park, PRC residency and identification documents for Taiwanese to access services in the PRC, recruiting Taiwanese for local governmental roles, and other initiatives aimed at easing the process for residents of Taiwan’s remote islands and Taiwan in general to live and work in Fujian.[34]

The PRC’s efforts to promote the incorporation of Taiwanese into Fujian society serve to create the perception that Taiwan and mainland China form a singular nation. The PRC can also utilize any actions Taipei undertakes to deter Taiwanese citizens from merging with the PRC as evidence that Taiwan’s government is unjustly persecuting “Taiwan compatriots” desiring peaceful integration. Taiwanese legislation prohibits Taiwanese citizens from holding government or military roles in the PRC and from registering households in the PRC.[35] A recent revelation regarding the PRC’s “United Front” strategies by a Taiwanese YouTuber claimed that 200,000 Taiwanese had secured identification documents in Fujian over the previous decade. Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng did not validate whether this figure is accurate but cautioned that the PRC’s encouragement for Taiwanese individuals to apply for official PRC documentation is part of its wider United Front strategy to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. He mentioned that the Taiwanese government has annulled the household registration papers, ID cards, and passports of 679 Taiwanese within the last decade after they acquired PRC household registration or passport.[36] Central TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua stated on January 15 that 359,000 Taiwanese individuals applied for Taiwan Compatriot Certificates in Fujian in 2024, reflecting a 25% year-on-year increase and surpassing pre-pandemic levels.[37] DPP China Affairs Director Wu Jun-zhi suggested that it is plausible that the PRC aims to turn

Taiwanese individuals into PRC citizens could utilize this as a justification to initiate conflict with Taiwan in the future, a strategy akin to that utilized by Russia in its confrontation with Ukraine.[38]

The PRC’s ongoing focus on cross-strait integration in Fujian may shed light on why the PRC’s increasing military pressure on Taiwan in 2024 has not significantly affected Taiwan’s offshore islands in recent times. Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu islands are situated only a few miles from the PRC’s coastline, and their inhabitants generally hold relatively favorable views towards China, frequently visiting the PRC for business or family-related matters. The PRC’s military maneuvers from December 9 to 11 around Taiwan and in the East China Sea did not encompass operations near Kinmen or Matsu islands, contrasting with the actions taken in May and October 2024. The Fujian CCG has established a routine of conducting approximately four “law enforcement patrols” each month in the restricted waters surrounding Kinmen, yet these incursions have not penetrated Kinmen’s designated prohibited waters (which are roughly comparable to territorial waters) since May. Additionally, the Fujian CCG has refrained from attempting to apprehend Taiwanese nationals in proximity to these waters since July. Such escalations are not unprecedented and would be relatively straightforward for the PRC to execute, hence the PRC’s apparent restraint in recent months could be associated with renewed efforts to progress the Fujian cross-strait integration zone while avoiding delivering a hostile message to the Taiwanese residing closest to Fujian.

China

A state-sponsored cyber threat entity of the PRC infiltrated the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) as part of a broader scheme aimed at the US Department of Treasury.[39] Three anonymous US officials reported the breach to CNN but did not indicate when it happened. CFIUS is an interagency body that evaluates foreign investments for potential national security threats. In December, CFIUS expanded its powers to review real estate transactions near US military bases, a measure designed to reduce national security risks related to foreign surveillance and intelligence-gathering initiatives.[40] The theft of sensitive information from CFIUS could jeopardize US counterintelligence efforts. It remains uncertain what data the threat actor was able to extract from CFIUS, if at all.

The U.S. Treasury informed the Senate on December 30 that it was subjected to a PRC cyber operation earlier that month, which gained access to Treasury Department workstations and retrieved unclassified documents stored on them.[41] Unidentified US officials disclosed to the Washington Post that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Office of the Treasury Secretary were among the targets of the operation, which focused on espionage activities.[42] The PRC’s targeting of OFAC illustrates its efforts to acquire intelligence regarding US policymaking concerning sanctions, possibly including OFAC’s methods for evidence procurement, its criteria for designations, or entities being examined by the United States. The information regarding the CFIUS breach seems to be distinct from these compromised devices but might form part of the same operation.

The recent surge of revelations concerning malicious PRC cyber activities illustrates the intensity with which the PRC is deploying cyber capabilities to undermine the United States and further its own agendas, particularly in terms of intelligence collection. This intrusion coincides with the United States’ ongoing investigation into another extensive cyber espionage initiative attributed to a PRC state-sponsored APT, which infiltrated at least eight US telecommunications companies and impacted numerous nations.[43] This operation targeted the private communications of 100 identified individuals, including former President Donald Trump, members of his family, his running mate JD Vance, affiliates of the Kamala Harris campaign, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.[44] Investigators have also verified that Salt Typhoon compromised systems containing court orders for wiretap requests, which could potentially undercut US counterintelligence undertakings.[45]

The US Commerce Department announced new regulations governing how the manufacturing of artificial intelligence (AI) chips may be shared globally, which could restrict PRC access to AI chip technologies. The newly established policy, The Interim Final Policy on Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, categorizes the world into three distinct groups: partner nations that face no restrictions on AI chip availability; nations barred from transferring AI technology from the United States; and all other countries subject to limits on AI imports that must engage in specialized agreements with the United States to produce AI chip technology patented in the US.[46] The White House affirmed that these regulations aim to “strengthen US AI leadership,” provide allies access to US-manufactured AI, and “ensure that adversaries cannot readily exploit advanced AI technologies.”[47] Countries not afforded partner status under the new guidelines, such as Israel, Mexico, and Poland, will have the right to contest the regulations.[48] The PRC has not been labeled as an adversarial country under these new stipulations, yet PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative Guo Jiakun condemned the United States for excessively broadening “the concept of national security” and for weaponizing trade and technology-related matters.[49]

The US Department of Defense has included five PRC technology companies on a list of PLA-linked firms operating in the United States. Adding them to the DoD list could trigger sanctions against these companies. The five companies now included on the DOD’s Section 1260H list are Tencent, the PRC multimedia behemoth and parent company of WeChat; Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), a battery producer focusing on electric vehicle technology; Changxin Memory Technology, a semiconductor manufacturer; Quectel Wireless, specializing in antennas and wireless modules; and Autel Robotics, a manufacturer of drones, quadcopters, and UAVs.[50] The US Secretary of Defense is mandated to identify and publish an annual roster of companies associated with the PRC military in compliance with Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act.[51] Being designated on this list does not automatically result in a ban or the imposition of sanctions but carries reputational implications that could hinder commercial advancement in the United States. The DoD regards the 1260H list as an “important ongoing initiative aimed at highlighting and countering the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy.”[52] This Military-Civil Fusion strategy forms a component of PLA modernization that dissipates boundaries between the PRC’s civilian research and industry and its military and defense sectors. This approach enables the PLA to exploit all technological advancements occurring within the PRC to fulfill its objective of establishing a “world-class military by 2049.”[53] Publicizing the 1260H list enhances awareness of Military-Civil Fusion within US marketplaces and communicates the potential national security hazards linked to economic and technological collaborations with identified firms.

The PRC is constructing a fleet of barges featuring extendable piers that are likely intended to enable amphibious landings. The barges are equipped with long road bridges extending from the front of each vessel, appearing capable of discharging tanks, trucks, and other military vehicles. The barges additionally possess what seems to be large columns, presumably intended to drop to the seabed to stabilize the vessels amid choppier shallow waters, according to analysts from defense outlet Naval News who uncovered the barges.[54] Satellite images from Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI) reveal what is likely five of these specialized barges currently under assembly.[55] Naval News also highlighted a “self-supporting” stern ramp on the barges to facilitate the docking of roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ferries. The PRC’s civilian RORO ferries are designed to transport military

vehicles and have engaged in the PRC’s naval and amphibious assault drills since 2019.[56]

Taiwan possesses a restricted number of shorelines that are appropriate for an amphibious landing, which would limit the PRC’s alternatives when attempting such an incursion. The extensive length of the ramps, measuring up to 393 feet, could potentially stretch beyond a beach and link directly to a coastal road. Extended ramps might facilitate the PRC in evading Taiwan’s beach defenses, such as mines and barricades, which could conserve valuable time for the PRC forces during a landing operation.[57]

The PRC’s state-operated tabloid Global Times highlighted the potential for the barges to be utilized for civilian endeavors, including disaster relief. Nonetheless, the sizable dimensions of the barges, coupled with GSI’s history of promoting the PRC’s naval growth via the production of specialized vessels, bolster the argument that they are designed for military purposes.

The emergence of the barges follows the PRC’s recent unveiling of a new class of amphibious assault ship, underscoring the PRC’s ongoing commitment to enhancing its naval abilities to execute amphibious missions. The PRC’s creation of what appear to be military-focused barges indicates its ambition to acquire the necessary military capabilities to forcibly annex Taiwan.

Northeast Asia

South Korea

South Korean officials uncovered a 164-foot tall and broad steel structure erected by the PRC within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea in December 2024. This construction is part of the PRC’s continuous efforts to assert territorial dominance over the contested waters, leveraging the leadership void in South Korea amid its political discord following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s martial law declaration on December 3, 2024. South Korean intelligence services detected through reconnaissance satellites that the PRC had positioned a 164-ft tall and broad steel framework within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) in December 2024.[58] South Korea and the PRC consented to establish the PMZ in the overlapping regions of both nations’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) on August 3, 2000, to address disputes concerning fishing rights and oil exploration in the Yellow Sea.[59] The two nations have not reached an agreement on maritime boundaries, and the PMZ framework forbids the installation of structures beyond those for fishing operations.[60] The PRC has installed at least 10 buoys in and around the waters of the PMZ since the first such installation was noted in 2014. The PRC built its initial steel framework in 2018 and erected similar constructions in April and May 2024 but ceased additional installations following protests from the South Korean government. The announcement made in December follows a lull in formal protests. The PRC has reportedly claimed that the structure is a “fishing support facility,” while South Korean officials suspect the PRC aims to install a total of 12 structures in the vicinity.[61]

The PRC is likely gearing up to assert territorial dominance in the Yellow Sea by restricting South Korea’s access to the waters and seeking control over its aerial and maritime space, capitalizing on South Korea’s political turmoil after President Yoon Suk-yeol’s martial law declaration on December 3, 2024. The PRC officially defends the establishment of buoys and other installations as necessary for maritime data collection and fishing activities, but its past behavior in the South China Sea suggests that this installation may be part of a broader strategy to claim authority in the Yellow Sea.[62] The Yellow Sea falls within the PRC-claimed First Island Chain and offers direct access to Beijing and Shanghai.[63] The PRC has employed comparable strategies in the South China Sea, constructing island bases that became militarized over time.[64] The PRC can enhance its physical presence and fulfill similar strategic aims in the Yellow Sea through gradual encroachment on the PMZ.

The PRC’s ongoing installations occur amid South Korea’s political disorder following President Yoon’s martial law announcement on December 3. This context suggests that South Korea’s political instability provides the PRC with an opportunity to proceed with activities in the PMZ without facing substantial opposition. Key military roles, such as the defense minister, army counterintelligence chief, army chief of staff, capital defense command head, defense intelligence director, and army special operations commander, remain unfilled due to resignations and investigations linked to President Yoon’s impeachment proceedings.[65] The 43-day vacancy of the defense minister as of January 16, marking the longest since the Korean War, has likely diminished South Korea’s capacity to react to the PRC’s initiatives. South Korean officials have condemned similar installations previously, yet no formal response has been documented up to this point.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippines has accused the PRC of harassing Filipino fishermen near Scarborough Shoal and the coastline of Zambales, Luzon. The CCG has maintained a persistent presence around Scarborough Shoal since the onset of January, reinforcing PRC territorial claims in the vicinity. The Assistant Director General of the Philippine National Security Council, Jonathan Malaya, reiterated official demands on January 14 for the CCG to withdraw its vessels, including the CCG 5901, one of the largest coast guard ships globally, from Scarborough Shoal.[66] The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has been observing the movements of the CCG 5901 within Philippine maritime territory since January 3, deploying the BRP Teresa Magbanua to monitor the CCG vessel’s traversing within the Philippines EEZ.[67] The PCG noted the presence of the CCG 5901 77 nautical miles from Zambales, Luzon, along the Philippines’ northwestern coastline. Malaya expressed that the CCG’s presence within Philippine waters was “unacceptable.” PCG Spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela reaffirmed that the PCG would maintain its presence in the South China Sea to counter PRC attempts to normalize CCG presence in Philippine maritime areas.[68]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated on January 13 that the CCG’s presence in Scarborough Shoal was for law enforcement activities under PRC rights as per international law.[69] The PRC accused the Philippines of misrepresenting facts and carrying out a smear campaign against peaceful PRC operations.[70] The PRC has employed similar rhetoric in the past, blaming other claimant nations for the tensions in the South China Sea. The PCG’s continued deployment of its vessels and vigilant monitoring of CCG activities within Philippine waters is significant, sending a message to the PRC that it will not allow the PRC to remain unchallenged in its waters.

Europe

Germany has charged three individuals with espionage on behalf of the PRC following a series of arrests related to espionage in 2024. A statement from the German Federal Prosecutor’s Office on January 9 revealed that German nationals Herwig F., Ina F., and Thomas R. worked together to supply the PRC with information pertaining to technologies associated with military and naval applications from 2017 until their arrest in April 2024. Thomas R. reportedly “acted as an agent for an employee of the Chinese intelligence service MSS”; Herwig and Ina F., a married pair, allegedly utilizedtheir commercial connections to gather intelligence pertinent to “enhancing China’s naval warfare capabilities.”[71] The office indicated that the gathered intelligence comprised “data on marine engines, sonar technology, defense systems for aircraft, drive systems for armored vehicles, and drones that may serve military functions.”[72] The accused individuals also reportedly “acquired a total of three specialized lasers from Germany on behalf of and funded by the MSS, and exported them to China without permission, despite the lasers being regulated under the European Union (EU) Dual-Use Regulation.”[73] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun charged Germany with “amplifying the alleged ‘Chinese espionage threat’” during a routine press conference on January 10.[74]

This incident is part of numerous PRC espionage inquiries in Germany during the past year. Espionage within Germany – a central EU hub and a significant trading ally for the PRC – provides insight into European arms exports and EU decision-making that may impact the PRC. Some instances of espionage have followed patterns of PRC tactics observed in other regions. Germany apprehended a PRC national for reportedly photographing the Kiel-Wik naval base located on the Baltic Sea on December 9, 2024.[75] This alleged occurrence of “gate crashing” resembles similar incidents in the United States: the Wall Street Journal noted up to 100 incidents of unauthorized access to US military installations in recent years.[76] The PRC Foreign Ministry’s reaction aligned with its pattern of responses to espionage allegations. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian accused Germany of “orchestrating and defaming with the so-called ‘spy case’” during a routine press conference on December 20.[77]

Other PRC espionage initiatives in Germany have targeted a broader range of institutions across both public and private sectors. German authorities detained a PRC citizen accused of utilizing her position in airport logistics to relay “information regarding flights, cargo, and passengers at the airport to an employee of a Chinese intelligence agency” in October 2024. This included “data on the transfer of military assets and individuals linked to a German arms firm.”[78] In November 2024, Germany detained a US citizen alleged to have attempted to utilize his role in the US Army to relay information to the PRC.[79] Additionally, German authorities apprehended an aide to an EU legislator for purportedly sharing information on European Parliament deliberations with the PRC and tracking the activities of PRC dissenters in Germany in April 2024.[80] The scope of these espionage episodes underscores the PRC’s eagerness to monitor a wide array of activities in Germany and the EU, as well as its readiness to utilize diverse sources, gatherers, and techniques.

German authorities are taking steps to mitigate the threats posed by PRC espionage amid these occurrences. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz labeled the situation as “extremely troubling” following the arrests in April 2024.[81] Germany’s Interior Ministry formulated legislation in October aimed at enhancing security vetting for staff involved in nationally sensitive infrastructure and engineering sectors, including the country’s Chancellery, government ministries, and the Office of the Federal President.[82] Germany’s security initiatives target suspected espionage threats from Russia, which have surged since the onset of the war in Ukraine, in addition to those from the PRC.[83]

Russia

The PRC’s Shandong Port Group has prohibited US-sanctioned tankers from docking or receiving services at its ports following the US Department of State’s sanctions against the Russian energy sector on January 10. The US State Department implemented these sanctions to “restrict the Kremlin’s capacity to exploit the international financial system and generate income to support its war against Ukraine.” [84] Prominent Russian oil companies Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas are under sanction alongside 183 vessels constituting Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” which consists of older ships that deliberately obscure their origins and typically lack sufficient insurance.[85] The shadow fleet enables Russia to circumvent Western sanctions that limit the price of Russian oil to $60.00 per barrel.[86] Morgan Stanley estimates that these tankers transported around 1.5 million barrels of crude oil each day, which represents 1.4% of global oil demand, in 2024.[87] Among the sanctioned vessels, 143 are oil tankers responsible for 42% of Russia’s total maritime crude exports, with 300 million of the 530 million barrels sent to China.[88] On January 13, three tankers carrying more than two million barrels of Russian oil were positioned off the Chinese coastline, and maritime data indicated that at least 65 oil tankers have paused their operations in various locations ranging from Iranian ports to areas near Russia.[89]

Independent refiners in Shandong are the primary purchasers of discounted sanctioned crude oil from Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. Shandong’s imports from these three nations represent approximately 17% of China’s total oil acquisitions.[90] Shandong Port Group oversees numerous major Chinese ports, including Yantai, Rizhao, and Qingdao (which houses the headquarters of the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet).[91] The sanctions are likely to compel Chinese oil refineries to seek alternative sources in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas while limiting Chinese access to affordable oil supplies.[92] In response to these actions, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the nation opposes such “illegal unilateral sanctions,” which they claim lack foundation in international law or endorsement by the Security Council.[93]

Syria

PRC Representative to the United Nations (UN) Fu Cong conveyed concern regarding Syria’s appointment of Uyghurs linked to the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) to defense roles. The interim government controlled by Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) appointed Uyghur combatants to significant defense positions – including one elevated to the rank of brigadier-general – in December 2024.[94] The UN Security Council convened to address humanitarian and security issues in Syria on January 8.[95] Fu voiced apprehension that “the Syrian army has recently awarded senior roles to numerous foreign terrorist fighters, including the leader of the terrorist group ‘Turkic Islamic Party’ or ‘East Turkestan Islamic Movement’ listed by the Security Council.” Fu urged Syria to “meet its anti-terrorism commitments and prevent any terrorist factions from utilizing Syrian soil to threaten the security of other nations.”[96] Fu also highlighted Syria’s humanitarian difficulties and asserted that “Long-term illegal unilateral sanctions have further exacerbated the hardships faced by the Syrian populace.”[97] These sanctions remain imposed while the HTS-led administration entrenches its power with the aim of projecting the semblance of moderate governance.

The management of ETIM, TIP, and related Uyghur militant activity is likely to continuously influence the PRC’s policy towards Syria. Uyghur militants have been engaged in Syria since at least the mid-2010s; the PRC has aimed to suppress this activity, influence Syrian perceptions regarding Uyghur militancy, and advocate favorable views of PRC policy in Xinjiang.[98] The website of the PRC embassy in Syria contains numerous inactive or outdated links from the early 2000s to Xinhua articles about Xinjiang and a tourism website for Xinjiang.[99] The PRC sustained a strategic partnership with Syria under the ousted former leader Bashar al-Assad and used its relationship with Syria to advance counterterrorism objectives. The two parties agreed in 2023 to “continue to enhance anti-terrorism and security collaboration and co-operate to combat terrorism.”[100] The PRC likely perceives the establishment of an HTS-dominated government in Syria as a disruption to these longstanding counterterrorism channels.[101]

Syria’s stance towards the PRC may strive to strike a balance between PRC interests anddemands with HTS’ intention to provide the coalition’s Uyghur combatants a “symbol of appreciation” via governmental roles.[102] The inclusion of TIP members in the revamped Syrian administration generates competing interests for the new Syrian government, which may necessitate the PRC’s endorsement as it endeavors to lift international sanctions. ISW evaluated that radical factions within HTS could generate tension within the coalition as al Qaeda-linked organizations like TIP conflict with HTS chief Ahmed al Shara’s articulated moderate stance on governance.[103]

 

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