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This morning (20 December), the Security Council is anticipated to vote on a draft resolution extending the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for an additional year, through to 20 December 2025.
France and Sierra Leone, the co-penholders for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), shared an initial draft of the resolution on 5 December and held two rounds of discussions on 9 and 12 December. Following this, a revised draft entered silence until 5 pm on Monday (16 December), at which point China, Russia, and the US raised concerns regarding various components of the draft text. The co-penholders then established a revised draft under a second silence procedure until Wednesday (18 December), yet the same nations again broke silence. France and Sierra Leone further amended the text and directly presented it in blue yesterday afternoon (19 December), without initiating another silence procedure.
Background
This year’s discussions regarding the renewal of MONUSCO’s mandate occurred amidst promising developments in regional strategies to tackle insecurity in eastern DRC. These encompassed the ceasefire agreement signed on 30 July between the DRC and Rwanda under Angola’s mediation, referred to as the Luanda process; the initiation of the strengthened Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism (R-AVM) on 5 November to oversee the ceasefire; and the approval on 25 November of a cohesive plan to neutralise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—an armed group of ethnic Hutu active in eastern DRC that played a role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide—alongside Rwanda’s withdrawal of its “defensive measures”.
During the Council’s latest gathering concerning the DRC, held on 9 December, members acknowledged the recent progress, encouraged the DRC and Rwanda to fulfill their obligations, and expressed support for Angola’s mediation efforts. They also signaled their anticipation for the tripartite discussions in Luanda aimed at fostering direct communication between the DRC and Rwanda, set to occur on 15 December. However, a press release on 15 December from Angola’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the talks were postponed at the last moment upon the request of one party. The statement also highlighted that the conclusion of a peace accord between the two nations had been hindered by the issue of negotiations with the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), a rebel group combating the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). The Congolese government has continually refused to engage in dialogue with the M23, opting to converse directly with Rwanda instead. Likewise, the M23 has also declined to enter into discussions with the government.
On 17 December, the DRC sent a letter (S/2024/927) to the Security Council accusing Rwanda of prolonging the tripartite summit by insisting on direct negotiations with the M23 as a prerequisite for the peace agreement. Rwanda has dismissed this claim, asserting that the matter was brought up by Angola, and has been under discussion since August. The DRC also clarified in its letter that it has no qualms about the M23’s involvement in the Nairobi process, a regional initiative led by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta.
At the 9 December meeting, several Council members voiced their concerns that the M23, backed by Rwanda, was increasing its territory in violation of the ceasefire and establishing administrative frameworks. They further raised alarms regarding “jamming” and “spoofing” incidents impacting Global Positioning Systems (GPS)—highlighted in the Secretary-General’s latest report on MONUSCO, dated 29 November—which compromises MONUSCO’s capability to execute its mandate and endangers both peacekeepers and humanitarian workers.
Concerning MONUSCO’s disengagement strategy, endorsed by the Security Council through resolution 2717 of 19 December 2023, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita discussed ongoing consultations with the Congolese government to tailor the process to shifting security dynamics and civilian protection threats. Council members expressed their support for a flexible, phased disengagement, underscoring the necessity to avert a security vacuum and assist the Congolese government in gradually taking on security responsibilities.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The draft text in blue extends MONUSCO’s mandate until 20 December 2025, maintaining its existing troop ceiling of 11,500 military personnel, 600 military observers, 443 police officers, and 1,270 personnel in formed police units. Although China suggested extending the mandate to March 2026 to harmonize Council mandate renewal cycles, the host nation seemingly did not support this proposal. The text also retains the mission’s three primary priorities: protection of civilians (PoC), support for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), and assistance with security sector reform (SSR).
At the meeting on 9 December, the US emphasized the necessity to leverage the enforcement mandate of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to address armed groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) that persist in launching attacks against civilians. In this context, it sought to enhance PoC language in the text, which was opposed by China and Russia, citing, among other concerns, the fundamental principles of peacekeeping and the host country’s primary responsibility in safeguarding civilians. The draft text in blue includes compromise language, which authorizes the mission to employ “all means at its disposal…to swiftly and effectively prevent armed groups’ assaults against civilians”. The UK also proposed strong language requesting an evaluation of the FIB’s effectiveness and possible modifications to MONUSCO’s framework. However, the “A3 plus” group (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana), China, and Russia pushed back in apparent defense of the FIB troop-contributing countries. The draft text in blue ultimately requests the Secretary-General, in his quarterly reviews on MONUSCO, to assess the mission’s performance, including that of the FIB, and to provide operational evaluations and recommendations.
This year’s discussions were challenging and contentious, primarily due to divisions among Council members regarding the involvement of external forces and advanced weaponry in eastern DRC. The US, supported by Malta, Slovenia, and Switzerland, sought to explicitly condemn the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) for its involvement in the conflict, referencing past reports corroborated by the Group of Experts aiding the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee. The US broke silence to assert its stance; however, the “A3 plus” members opposed this initiative, contending that such action would complicate ongoing discussions between the DRC and Rwanda and advocating for a more general reference instead. This matter has remained divisive among Council members for the past two years, including during the recent negotiations on the25 October announcement regarding the DRC.
On 17 December, the co-penholders organized an informal consultation meeting with additional Council members and consented to a more comprehensive phrasing that includes the “role of a neighbouring state” without directly mentioning Rwanda. Yet, the US expressed its concerns again, criticizing the Council’s inability to address Rwanda’s involvement, which it claimed has become increasingly notable and perilous. The US urged for closed discussions yesterday afternoon to evaluate the M23’s recent military progress in eastern DRC and share perspectives on the current state of the Luanda process.
In the interim, the co-penholders made further modifications to the draft in search of a middle ground but still omitted any reference to Rwanda. The draft text, which was presented in blue before yesterday afternoon’s consultations, includes a newly introduced preambular section that conveys “serious concern regarding the ongoing offensive by M23 in North Kivu that violates the ceasefire and at the operational assistance provided by foreign Forces from a neighbouring State to M23 as reported by the Group of Experts”. It also expresses alarm about “the unauthorized presence of foreign forces from a nearby state in Eastern DRC”, demanding their immediate withdrawal. Moreover, the draft resolution in blue articulates concern over the deployment of advanced weaponry by a neighbouring state—including surface-to-air missiles—as reported by the Group of Experts, alongside incidents of GPS “jamming” and “spoofing” in areas under M23 control in North Kivu.
Discussions around language on women, peace, and security (WPS) also necessitated some deliberation during negotiations. While several Council members aimed to enhance this language, China and Russia resisted. The co-penholders reached a compromise by removing WPS-related references, such as consultations with organizations led by women and gender-sensitive approaches, including those aimed at civilian protection. Nevertheless, China and Russia pressed for further reductions in the WPS language, which the co-penholders ultimately accommodated to facilitate compromise. The “A3 plus” members also seemingly intended to eliminate an operative paragraph addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, contending that no incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse were documented in the Secretary-General’s latest MONUSCO report. In an apparent compromise, the draft text in blue “notes the content of the latest Secretary-General’s report while recalling that combating sexual exploitation and abuse remains crucial”.
In contrast to previous years, the DRC government did not advocate for MONUSCO’s immediate exit during this year’s discussions. In a 13 December Note Verbale, the DRC clarified its stance on the mandate renewal, indicating that while MONUSCO’s departure is inevitable, it will not proceed as initially planned due to the North Kivu situation, particularly the presence of the RDF. The document also underscored the challenges that MONUSCO will face in providing support to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), as mandated by resolution 2746 of 6 August 2023, should the mission withdraw.
As part of the disengagement process, MONUSCO withdrew from South Kivu in June and was later anticipated to scale back from North Kivu and Ituri. The DRC now advocates for a flexible strategy, emphasizing withdrawal from stabilized regions instead of adhering to the original phased schedule. Council members are in favor of this approach, and the text in blue advocates for a customized strategy for a gradual, responsible, and sustainable exit, taking into account changing conflict dynamics and protection risks. The draft resolution requests that this strategy be presented to the Council by 31 March 2025.
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