Somalia’s Crucial Moment: Unveiling the Draft Resolution Vote in the Security Council

Tomorrow morning (27 December), the Security Council is likely to hold a session to vote on a draft resolution, spearheaded by the UK (the lead country on Somalia), concerning the successor operation to the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The mandate for this mission was most recently extended by resolution 2748 on 15 August until 31 December 2024. Ethiopia and Somalia are anticipated to take part in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional procedural framework.

The draft resolution in blue affirms the determination of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) to substitute ATMIS with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and allows AU members to undertake all necessary actions relating to this for a period of 12 months, commencing on 1 January 2025. Additionally, the draft document permits AU members to send up to 12,626 uniformed personnel, including 1,040 police officers, to AUSSOM until 30 June 2025, and to finalize by this deadline the transfer of all AU forces from ATMIS to AUSSOM.

Background

According to resolution 2748, UN Secretary-General António Guterres delivered a joint AU-UN report to Council members on 26 November, which is not accessible to the public. The report stressed that the framework set forth in resolution 2719 from 21 December 2023, regarding the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), offers a vital opportunity to establish a sustainable funding model for AUSSOM. It highlighted the significance of utilizing Somalia as the initial pilot for this framework to avert a security void that could upset Somalia and the wider region and to reinforce the security advancements made thus far.

The report suggested a “hybrid” approach for implementing resolution 2719, promoting streamlined responsibilities between the AU and the UN. This would involve applying the 2719 framework to the AUSSOM budget, with 75 percent funded through UN assessed contributions, prioritizing full coverage of troop reimbursements. The remaining 25 percent would be gathered by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources, with the AU covering civilian personnel expenses. Regarding logistical backing for AUSSOM, it proposed a restructured and resized UN support office, funded through UN assessed contributions. This funding model would balance the application of the new mission-specific rate of $1,000 for per capita troop allowances against the expenses of the reconfigured UN support office. (For additional context and details, see the brief on Somalia in our August 2024 Monthly Forecast and the 15 August What’s in Blue report.)

While there was broad consensus among Council members concerning the deployment of AUSSOM, differing opinions arose regarding the financing of the mission. The US has shown reluctance to utilize the 2719 framework for Somalia, deeming it an untimely adoption. It reportedly drafted a non-paper asserting that the milestones in the AU-UN joint roadmap for executing resolution 2719, endorsed during the eighth AU-UN conference on 21 October, are unlikely to be finalized before mid-2025. It suggested a two-year interim mechanism to provide additional time for finalizing the framework and addressing budgetary and logistical issues.

Council members within the European Union (EU)—France, Malta, and Slovenia—expressed apprehension that such a mechanism might imply further obligations for financial contributors to ATMIS. These nations have advocated for a sustainable financing model that relies on diverse contributions alongside considerable cost-sharing.

Another point of contention was whether resolution 2719 could be strictly applied to particular financing obligations or should be comprehensive. Some Council members—including the “A3 plus” (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) and the EU representatives—favored a “hybrid” approach to resolution 2719, covering troop reimbursements, while continuing logistical support for the successor mission through a UN support office. The US contended, however, that assistance provided to AUPSOs under resolution 2719 covers all support categories, including logistics.

Before the formal negotiations commenced, AU Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat dispatched a letter to the Council’s African members, dated 6 December. The letter underscored that the modalities outlined in the AU-UN joint roadmap for implementing resolution 2719 are meant to serve as guidance rather than prerequisites for implementing the framework. It warned that delaying the execution of the framework would sustain the current funding model, which is unsustainable and would institutionalize a persistent funding shortfall for the new mission, particularly concerning troop allowances. The letter urged the Council to reach a clear decision regarding the immediate execution of resolution 2719 in Somalia. (For further context and information, see the brief on Somalia and the In Hindsight section in our December 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

Following initial conversations with Council members and a “pre-zero” draft, the UK shared the preliminary draft of the resolution with all Council members on 9 December. After several rounds of expert-level discussions, four revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder released an unaltered fourth revised draft text in blue earlier today (26 December), to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The negotiations were marked by disputes and difficulty, reflecting fundamental differences among Council members regarding the financing responsibilities for the new mission. The draft initially proposed by the penholder requested the Secretary-General to expedite preparations for applying the 2719 framework to AUSSOM, including mobilizing the necessary extra-budgetary resources from the international community in collaboration with the AU Commission Chairperson. It also requested the Secretary-General to implement, within existing resources made available by the rightsizing of UNSOS, the 2719 framework for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025, including access to UN assessed contributions not exceeding 75 percent of its yearly total budget. However, this draft included a stipulation that this implementation would rely on the Secretary-General’s assessment of sufficient progress in operationalizing the modalities of resolution 2719.

This draft elicted various reactions from Council members, reflecting their established positions. It appears that the US proposed specifying that the 2719 framework be applied to AUSSOM and UNSOS, with access to UN assessed contributions capped at 75 percent of the annual total budget of the consolidated mission. It recommended this framework take effect from 1 January 2026—indicating a one-year bridging mechanism—unless any Council member asserts that inadequate progress has been made in operationalizing resolution 2719’s modalities. This, the US…maintained, would prompt the Council to evaluate different financing alternatives starting from 1 January 2026. The US seemingly contended that the discussions leading to the passage of resolution 2719, including its wording, signified the Council’s intention for the 2719 framework to be utilized for logistical support and personnel following a “one mission, one budget” approach.

Conversely, it seems that the Council’s EU and “A3 plus” members advocated for the application of the 2719 framework through a “hybrid” approach, as suggested in the joint AU-UN report dated 26 November. These members evidently expressed apprehension that the draft wording did not adequately capture the insights presented in the joint report.

The Council’s EU members apparently asserted that the 2719 framework ought to be set in motion beginning 1 January 2025, accompanied by a restructured, cost-effective, and minimized support office. Additionally, they firmly rejected any phrasing implying that the deployment of the 2719 framework should be dependent on any further evaluation of its relevance, maintaining that robust structures are already established to facilitate its implementation. It appears that some of these members claimed that the joint UN-AU report does not anticipate any supplementary reporting obligations to actualize the framework or any intermediary period, thus insisting that the Council must resolve to initiate the 2719 framework within this resolution.

The “A3 plus” members seemingly held a similar stance regarding the non-requirement of additional assessment for activating the rollout of resolution 2719, yet they appeared open to flexibility concerning the commencement date for its application. They particularly emphasized the necessity to articulate in the resolution that the 2719 framework be executed in a “hybrid” format and requested that this be unmistakably reflected throughout the text in relevant segments. Russia seemingly backed this stance.

During the negotiation process, Senator James E. Risch, the ranking member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sent a letter on 12 December to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield. The correspondence urged the US to veto any Council resolution that commits Washington to a peacekeeping mandate for Somalia under the 2719 framework. This perspective was reportedly reiterated by the US during the negotiations, with Washington emphasizing its position of maintaining a second decision point to facilitate necessary modalities and allow the incoming US administration to make policy determinations.

In light of the differing opinions among Council members concerning the financing of AUSSOM, the UK seemingly abstained from altering any contentious paragraphs in the first revised text. Instead, it encouraged members to engage in a comprehensive discussion about a wide array of potential financing options, beyond those delineated in the AU-UN joint report.

In the second revised draft, the UK appeared to modify the text regarding AUSSOM financing to incorporate language about the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework, confining its application to AUSSOM. The text was further updated to indicate that the framework would be implemented if the Council concurs that adequate progress has been achieved and reaffirms this through a letter or resolution, based on a report from the Secretary-General requested in the resolution detailing the progress made in preparing for the framework’s execution.

With the incorporation of language regarding the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework and considering the US’ firm position on the necessity for a second decision-making clause, the “A3 plus” members seemed willing to exhibit some adaptability on this matter. However, the Council’s EU members were reportedly hesitant to accept this phrasing. It appears that France proposed a compromise, suggesting that the Secretary-General be assigned with executing the 2719 framework in a “hybrid” format starting on 1 July 2025, unless the Council decides otherwise through correspondence by 1 June 2025. Nevertheless, this proposal was rejected by the US.

China seemed open to discussion on the second decision-making clause but suggested substituting the term “agree” with “confirm” concerning the Council’s decision regarding the Secretary-General’s assessment of the 2719 framework’s execution, a position also backed by the Republic of Korea (ROK). China allegedly contended that the Council should retain the power to make the final choice on the issue. This proposal was incorporated into the draft resolution in blue.

It seems that the “A3 plus” members insisted on integrating language addressing the mobilization of the remaining portion of the AUSSOM budget, excluding UN assessed contributions. This was previously agreed language from resolution 2719. Its exclusion led them to break the first silence procedure. Their proposal was included in the draft resolution in blue, which stipulates that the remaining sum is to be collectively mobilized by the AU and the UN from the international community as extrabudgetary resources, while pledging to consider all feasible options in case of significant shortfalls in resource mobilization.

It appears that although the US softened its stance on the phrasing related to the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework, a substantial issue arose from language it proposed indicating the eventual transition of applying the 2719 framework to both UNSOS and AUSSOM under one consolidated budget. Several members, including the “A3 plus” and the Council’s EU members, firmly opposed the inclusion of this language in the text. These members reportedly argued that the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework remains the most appropriate model to guarantee predictable and sustainable funding for the mission and should be applied throughout all stages of the mission’s presence.

This prompted the US to break silence twice; however, it proposed a few alternatives for this language to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, some members also suggested alternative compromise language. The EU and “A3 plus” members rejected any such suggestion, asserting that a “one mission, one budget” model might escalate the mission’s overall costs and could impose additional financial pressures on traditional donors and the AU.

It appears that the penholder engaged in bilateral discussions with select members on this matter. However, these efforts did not yield consensus, thus language addressing the transition or review of the 2719 framework was omitted from the final text.

To obtain the US’ backing and address concerns raised by various members, the penholder reportedly proposed adding language in the preambular paragraphs that would reflect the Council’s intention to keep the execution of this resolution, including the specific modalities of the 2719 framework, under scrutiny. Despite these efforts, the US apparently remained hesitant to endorse the resolution, and the language was ultimately not integrated into the draft text in blue.

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General to apply, using existing resources made available through the rightsizing of UNSOS, the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025. This execution is conditional on the Council confirming the request through a decision by 15 May 2025, taking into account a report requested in this resolution. This report is mandated to include, among other aspects:

• timelines and measures taken for the necessary discussions and approvals by relevant UN bodies in accordance with their mandates and the UN Charter;
• the status of the 25 percent of AUSSOM’s annual total budget to be jointly mobilized by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources; and,
• an update on arrangements for the orderly and practical implementation of the “hybrid” execution of the 2719 framework for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025.

Tags: Insights on Africa, Somalia